Paul Morriston, a philosopher known for his work in philosophy of religion and ethics, has made significant contributions to the discussion on what would happen if God commanded something terrible. Morriston’s analysis revolves around the moral implications of divine command theory, which asserts that the moral status of an action is determined by whether or not it is commanded by God. In this essay, we will examine Morriston’s key ideas on this topic, his arguments against the divine command theory, and the implications of his views.
Morriston challenges the notion that divine command theory provides a satisfactory account of moral obligations. He argues that if we were to accept divine command theory, we would be forced to accept morally troubling implications. For instance, if God were to command something that is universally considered morally wrong, such as genocide or torture, divine command theory would require us to accept that such actions are morally obligatory.
One of Morriston’s key arguments against divine command theory is the Euthyphro dilemma, named after Plato’s dialogue “Euthyphro.” The dilemma poses the question: Does God command something because it is morally good, or is something morally good because God commands it? If we adopt the first option, that God commands something because it is morally good, then morality is independent of God, and divine command theory becomes unnecessary. If we adopt the second option, that something is morally good because God commands it, then morality becomes arbitrary and lacks a rational foundation.
Morriston argues that divine command theory faces an additional problem when it comes to determining whether a purported command genuinely comes from God. He suggests that it is difficult to distinguish between genuine divine commands and commands that are falsely attributed to God. Morriston contends that the concept of God’s commands is often used to justify actions that are motivated by human desires and interests, rather than moral considerations.
Furthermore, Morriston explores the implications of accepting divine command theory in relation to human autonomy and moral reasoning. He suggests that if moral obligations are solely based on divine commands, there is no room for individual moral judgment or critical evaluation of moral principles. Morriston argues that moral autonomy and the ability to engage in ethical reflection are essential aspects of moral agency and should not be undermined by an uncritical acceptance of divine commands.
Critics of Morriston’s arguments may argue that divine command theory provides a satisfactory explanation for moral obligations and avoids relativism. They may contend that morality grounded in God’s commands provides a firm foundation for ethical norms and avoids the pitfalls of subjectivity and cultural relativism. Critics may also suggest that Morriston’s analysis overlooks the broader theological and philosophical framework within which divine command theory operates.
Moreover, critics may point out that Morriston’s arguments rely heavily on certain assumptions about God’s nature and the nature of moral obligations. They may argue that his objections assume a specific understanding of God and divine commands, which may not align with alternative theological perspectives. Critics may also suggest that Morriston’s focus on extreme examples of terrible commands overlooks the larger framework of divine command theory, which includes considerations of God’s benevolence, wisdom, and overall moral character.
Despite the criticisms, Morriston’s exploration of what would happen if God commanded something terrible raises significant ethical and theological questions. His arguments against divine command theory challenge the notion that moral obligations are solely based on divine commands and highlight the importance of rational moral reflection and individual moral agency. Morriston’s work encourages individuals to critically evaluate ethical principles and engage in thoughtful deliberation when considering the moral implications of divine commands.
In conclusion, Paul Morriston’s arguments against divine command theory shed light on the moral implications of accepting that God’s commands determine the moral status of actions. His analysis challenges the coherence and plausibility of divine command theory, particularly in cases where purported divine commands conflict with commonly accepted moral norms. While his arguments may face criticism regarding their assumptions and the broader theological context, Morriston’s work contributes to ongoing discussions on the nature of moral obligations and the role of divine commands in ethical decision-making.