The Human Person as the Foundation of Kantian Ethics
It is important to note at the outset that we cannot fully make sense of Kantian ethics without first understanding Kant’s concept of the human person. This is because the concept of the human person is the foundation of Kantian ethics. In fact, for Kant, the human person as a rational moral agent is the sole basis in determining the truth of the categorical imperative. Indeed, behind the formal ethical façade of Kant’s categorical imperative is the attempt of the human person to achieve moral perfection. Hence, we can surmise that the ultimate goal of Kant’s moral teachings is for the human person to become morally perfect. It is for this reason that we need to discuss first the anthropological basis of Kant’s categorical imperative before we delve into its specificity. And so, how does Kant view the human person?
According to Kant, the human person has a two-fold nature, namely:
1) homo noumenon and
2) homo phenomenon (Tucker, 1972).
On the one hand, the term noumenon, which is derived from Kant’s epistemology, refers to the essence of things. For Kant, the nounmenon is the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) (Copleston, 1963). According to Kant, the noumenon cannot be known because, as the essence of things, it is beyond experience. For example, as Kant would have us believe, we cannot know the “tableness” of the table, or that which makes a table really “a table”.
On the other hand, the term phenomenon, according to Kant, refers to the thing as it appears to the observer (Copleston, 1963). In other words, the phenomenon is the empirical part of a thing. It is indeed that part of a thing that can be experienced by humans. The hardness, texture, color, and shape of a table are all that we can know about the table. For Kant, they are the phenomenal aspect of the table. Thus, for Kant, everything that exists has two natures, namely: 1) the non-empirical part (noumenon or essence) and 2) the empirical part (phenomenon).
Applied to humans, homo noumenon is the godlike self of the human person, while homo phenomenon is the merely human self (Tucker 1972, p. 24). Now, Kant believes that the human person as a noumenon is the idealized person who is destined to be perfect since she has in herself the godlike nature as belonging to the world of understanding.
Logically then, we can infer that the noumenal self for Kant is the human person’s real self. It is indeed the true self. Since we have this godlike self, Kant believes that it is our duty to attain perfection by actualizing this godlike noumenal self. And according to Kant, we can attain perfection or we can actualize our godlike self by developing ourselves into moral persons, which can be done by obeying the command of the categorical imperative. But how does the human person actualize herself if she cannot know her noumenal self? The phenomenal self can provide us the key.
Since the human person cannot know her noumenal self, then she must take into account the fact that part of her self belongs to the phenomenal world, that she has a phenomenal self. In this way, she can have an idea of her phenomenal self. This is possible because the phenomenal self, according to Kant, is the empirical representation of the noumenal self. The phenomenal self, therefore, serves as the springboard for the actualization of the noumenal self.
Because the phenomenal self always appeals to “desires”, which, according to Kant, is the source of errors, the phenomenal self must be guided by a moral principle based on reason. Thus, the human person as a rational being must consider herself as belonging to the intelligible world if she hopes to attain perfection. This is where the categorical imperative comes in. As Tucker (1972, p. 35) argues, the noumenal self tries to actualize its godlike nature as the real self by obeying the dictate of reason through the categorical imperative.
Kant’s Notion of Morality
The foregoing discussion implies that the phenomenal self has to grapple with desires and take heed of reason to actualize her godlike nature. However, more often than not, the phenomenal self violates the dictate of reason and succumb to her desires or inclinations. Thus, the desire of the noumenal self to attain moral perfection is impeded.
To shed light on this matter, let us consider as an example the act of cheating in school. Unfortunately, cheating in academic institutions has become very rampant. In fact, a recent study indicates that nine out of ten college students commit at least one act of dishonesty (in the form of cheating) in a given academic year (Quintos, 2017). And, as we may already know, cheating, for whatever purpose, is unreasonable and morally unacceptable. But because of the desire to pass an entrance examination and be accepted in the college of choice, or the desire to keep the financial aid from scholarships, or the desire to graduate, students resort to cheating on examinations and on academic papers or projects.
Students who cheat may not immediately recognize that their actions are morally wrong because they are blinded by their justifications. They fail to take into consideration the far-reaching implications of giving-in to their desires. For example, they may not readily realize that cheating while in school could well be a predictor of dishonesty in the workplace. And so, when a medical student, for instance, cheats while in school just to finish the degree, it is very likely that she will be inclined to act dishonestly to patients and colleagues in the future (Desalegn & Berhan, 2014). Needless to say, dishonesty in the medical arena has serious consequences in the delivery of care to human life and negatively impacts social values.
The moment the human person yields to her desires that results in errors, she fails her duty to attain moral perfection. It is for this reason that Kant asserts that human actions must be guided by a moral principle rooted in reason. According to Kant, if the human person thinks rationally about how she should behave, then she will be able to immediately recognize what is morally right, and act accordingly. Thus, Kant formulated the categorical imperative to serve as a guide in determining whether an action is morally right or wrong. Indeed, Kant refers to the categorical imperative as the ultimate rational principle of morality.
To fully understand the specificity of the categorical imperative, as to why Kant formulated it the way he did, it will greatly help to dig deeper into his overarching concepts of morality. And so, what is Kant’s view of morality?
Morality, for Kant, is the strict obedience to the categorical imperative. Thus, for Kant, morality entails a commitment to the absolute command, that is, an obligation to the law as such. In this connection, Kant (1998) says, “Everyone must admit that law, if it is to hold morally (i.e., as a ground of obligation), must imply absolute necessity.”
By absolute necessity, Kant asserts that such law must be all-encompassing, devoid of any exceptions, and binding to all rational beings. This is because, logically speaking, anything that is deemed “necessary” always holds a constant truth across all possible circumstances.
In the aforementioned scenario, for instance, as the law, that is, the categorical imperative says “Do not cheat!” or “Do not lie!”, it stands as an absolute command that applies to every human person in all walks of life, regardless of the circumstances she may face or the justifications of her desires. And so, the act of cheating or lying is deemed morally wrong. Therefore, Kant believes that if and only when the human person acts in accordance with the absolute command that she can claim her actions to be morally right.
The a priori Principle as the Basis of Morality
Because morality requires absolute necessity and strict universality, as Kant posits, then it must be viewed in the light of pure philosophy (Babor, 1998). By pure philosophy, Kant argues that morality must not be based on experience, but on an a priori knowledge or principle. This means that the human person does not need to experience the circumstance in actuality to be able to decide the morality of her actions. Rather, morality must be conceived a priori, so as to make the command, that is, the categorical imperative, binding to all rational beings.
But what exactly is an a priori principle, and how does it differ from a posteriori one? Generally, the terms a priori and a posteriori are used to establish the basis of knowledge, that is, how something is known.
On the one hand, an a priori principle is based on knowledge or concept that can be known independent of experience. The statement “All bachelors are unmarried” is a common example of an a priori knowledge. We all recognize that this statement is true even without interviewing a bachelor. In the same way, we come to know the truth of mathematical propositions (Kitcher, 1980), such as two plus three is five, without the need to actually put together two things next to three other things. But it must be noted that although it does not need actual experience to gain knowledge a priori, it may arise in relation to experience. For example, our knowledge that “The whole is always greater than its parts” is an a priori knowledge, that is, before experience. This is because we don’t need to resort to experience before we can prove that, indeed, the whole is greater than its parts. Through mental processes alone we can say that the whole is greater than its parts. However, such knowledge, according to Kant, is always in relation to experience because we need to know (through experience) what a whole is or what a part is before we can say that the whole is greater than its parts. In fact, Kant (1998) says:
That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw materials of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.
On the other hand, that which can only be known through human experience, according to Kant, is called a posteriori knowledge. Statements such as “The pain due to appendicitis is intolerable” or “The food is delicious” are examples of an a posteriori knowledge. As we can see, it requires one to actually experience appendicitis before she can say that the pain is unbearable or is due to appendicitis, just as one can only say that the food is delicious when she actually tastes it.
Now, for Kant, because an a posteriori principle is dependent on experience and its consequence, it cannot form the basis of morality. As is well known, human persons experience things in different ways. Hence, a posteriori knowledge may vary from one person to another, relative to their actual experiences. Therefore, if morality has to be binding to all rational beings without exceptions, then it must be based on something that holds a universal truth, that is, on an a priori principle.
The Concept of Practical Reason as the Foundation of Morality
Kant continues to assert that as morality is based on an a priori principle, this principle must be determined by reason. For the philosopher, human persons acting morally are tantamount to rational beings acting in accordance with reason. As the foundation of morality, it is necessary to conceive of such a reason in which its application leads to an absolute necessity and forms a universal law.
It is for this reason that we need to discuss and understand Kant’s two-dimensional view of reason. By two-dimensional, Kant is not saying that there are two kinds of reason. Rather, he draws a fine line of distinction between the two employments of reason: speculative (theoretical) and practical. Such distinction is not based on the nature of reason per se, but on their application or manifestation. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1998) writes:
Now if reason is to be a factor in these sciences, something in them must be known a priori, and this knowledge may be related to its object in one or other of two ways, either as merely determining it and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere) or as also making it actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical knowledge of reason.
Obviously, from this passage, Kant distinguishes the speculative or theoretical employment of reason as the determination of “what exists” or knowing “what is [was da ist]” from practical employment of reason as the determination of “what ought to exist” or “what ought to be [was da sein soll]” (Engstrom, 2002).
According to Kant, speculative reason makes it possible for rational beings to attain knowledge about an object; hence, its outcome is cognition. It is concerned with the objects of the cognitive faculty, which are capable of being sensed. Thus, speculative reason manifests in the process of thinking, making inferences, or drawing conclusions based on the senses (Wells, 2006). In fact, the whole process of employing speculative reason begins with sensation. From there, it proceeds to understanding, and ends with reason.
Kant believes that the ultimate end of reason is for the human person to attain full understanding of the totality of the natural world. Thus, the human person tries to cognize the “what is” behind everything, and establishes the interconnectedness of all cognitions as she attempts to understand the totality of the way things are. However, a complete understanding of the world cannot be achieved by the employment of speculative reason alone. This is because there are higher levels of concepts that the human person has no determinate knowledge of, such as the concepts of God, immortality, and freedom (Kleingeld, 1998). From this contention, it can be understood why Kant (1998) says in his Critique of Pure Reason that although all our knowledge begins with the senses and ends with speculative reason, beyond that, “nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought.”
Thus, according to Ulrich (2009), Kant deemed it necessary to “deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith”. By this statement, Kant believes that the human person has to deny the reach of speculative reason beyond the limits of senses and experience, and make room for another employment of reason that is not concerned with the determination of an object from senses, but with the production of an object corresponding to ideas. In this sense, Kant does not merely make room for faith but for the employment of practical reason.
According to Kant, the process of practical reason begins with principle (i.e. of reason), proceeds then to understanding, and finally to the senses. Hence, practical reason manifests in the human person’s acceptance of certain concepts as principles that ought to exist, and act in accordance with them. With practical reason, therefore, human persons can and need to think and act rationally as if they could know the totality of the world and as if free action were possible. In other words, practical reason deals with the grounds in determining the will of the human person to think and act with regard to the world (Grisez, 1958), even when she cannot have determinate knowledge of them, such as the concepts of God, immortality, and freedom.
From this distinction, it can be inferred that reason in speculative use cannot be universal because it only deals with cognition, which is relative to one’s experience only. Thus, nothing can be ascribed as the foundation of morality but practical reason. According to Kant, only reason in its practical use leads to an absolute necessity and universal law of actions of rational beings. This is because, for Kant, all rational beings share the same practical reason, and apply general principles to particular actions. This means that practical reason does not vary from the perspectives of a woman or a man, or a white man and a black man, or a poor man and rich man. This goes to say that if practical reason dictates that one person should act in a certain manner in a particular situation, then any person, when confronted with the same particular situation, should act equally in the same manner.
Indeed, practical reason serves as the guiding principle of moral actions. It compels human persons, as rational beings, to engage in moral reasoning in determining the right actions. Thus, for Kant, human persons are deemed as acting morally only when they act rationally based on practical reason.
Good Will
Mary and Grace are twins who are very passionate towards poor people. One day, they saw two beggars on the street. With an intention to help, Mary and Grace gave money to each beggar. Shortly after, both beggars headed to the store. The one who received money from Mary bought bread and devoured it. However, the beggar who received money from Grace bought a pack of cigarette. In this scenario, do you think Grace failed her moral duty because instead of helping the beggar not to starve, she became an instrument for him to be able to smoke, which can be detrimental to his health?
In Kant’s view, the morality of an action should not be determined by its outcome. This is because consequences of actions cannot hold a universal truth. For one, human persons do not have full control over the outcome of their actions. It is inevitable that, at times, even when the human person acts rationally in accordance with practical reason, she does not achieve the intended outcome due to some uncontrollable circumstances. Indeed, even when Grace’s act of giving is intended to help the beggar not to starve, how the beggar spent the money was beyond her control. Thus, the morality of Grace’s action should not be assessed based on its outcome.
Moreover, if the morality of an action is to be based on its intended outcome or consequence, then morality becomes conditional. In other words, the goodness of a thing or act is conditioned on one’s intended end. Hence, because human persons are motivated by different ends, they may find an action as “good” or “bad” relative to their ends. In this way, an act may be viewed as “good” as a means to one end, and “bad” as a means to some other end. Applied to the sample scenario, Grace’s act of giving may be “good” for the beggar whose end was the gratification of his urge to smoke. However, from the vantage point of a health-conscious person, for instance, Grace’s act of giving may be “bad” because that became an instrument for the beggar to smoke, which could cause damage to his health.
Obviously, the Kantian ethics is in stark opposition to the moral theories of consequentialists who conditioned the morality of an action on its end or outcome. This is because Kant’s morality, as governed by practical reason, is grounded in something that is unconditionally good, that is, good without any qualification.
It is important to understand that when Kant speaks of “good”, he does not merely refer to anything that the human person can think of as good. As is well known, there are many things that may appear as good, but are not truly intrinsically good. For example, talents of the mind, such as intelligence, wit, judgment, or the qualities of temperament, such as courage, resolution, perseverance, are undoubtedly good in many respects, but these too can be precursors of evil acts. On the one hand, a student may use her intellect in studying hard to attain good grades. But ironically, such intellect can be used in planning strategies on how she can cheat during examinations, and still have good grades. Even happiness for Kant is not good at all if that happiness is not deserved. And so, if a woman is happy because she succeeded in luring a married man, then, it is not good for that woman to be happy.
Kant’s point here is that, if something is good without qualification, that something is not merely good as means to one end and bad in another. Rather, it is absolutely good in-itself and universally good in every instance. In the opening remarks of the Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says: “Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will.”
Simply put, for Kant, the only thing that is unconditionally good is a good will. Now, because Kant’s morality is based on something good without qualification, that is, good will, then the moral worth of an action is determined only by the motive or the will that is behind that action. As already known, all those things or actions that people think of as good can become extremely worse if the will to make use of them is bad. Therefore, if actions are to be good, the will of doing such must be good. As of Mary and Grace’s act of giving, when interpreted in the light of Kantian ethics, both must be considered on equal moral ground in terms of their will to help, a good will, regardless of the outcome of their actions.
The Concept of Duty as the Motive behind Moral Actions
In the previous section, it is made clear that, for Kant, an action has moral worth only when the human person is acting out of a good will. But when can the human person claim that she definitely possesses a good will that governs her moral actions?
According to Kant, the human person is said to be acting out of good will only when the sole impetus of her action is that of moral obligation or moral duty (Beauchamp & Walters, 1999). Hence, for Kant, duty is the motive behind a moral act. It follows, therefore, that an action is said to have moral worth when the human person performs such action only because she recognizes through practical reason that it is morally the right action to do in a given situation, and as a rational and moral being, she regarded herself as having a moral obligation or moral duty to do such right action. In other words, the moral worth of an action is possible only when the human person acts for the sake of duty, and not just because of the potential good results that she may get out of her actions. It is for this reason that Kantian ethics is often called deontological, that is, duty-based ethics.
Now, in the discussion on duty, it is important to understand the difference between acting for the sake of duty and acting in accordance with duty. The former gives an action its moral worth, while the latter does not.
On the one hand, acting for the sake of duty means acting for the sake of the law, that is, with absolute respect to the moral law, which dictates what a rational being ought to do. And so, if someone asks why Mary and Grace helped the beggars when their action is not giving them any gain, the twins can respond that they did it because the moral law prescribes helping the poor; hence, it is their duty to help.
On the other hand, acting in accordance with duty means acting simply to conform to the law. When the human person acts simply to conform to the law, the motive of her actions may be influenced by certain inclination or desire for an expected outcome or emotional feelings. And so, if Mary and Grace’s action was only in accordance with duty, they might have helped the beggars primarily because they want to appear us kind-hearted human persons.
To fully understand this distinction, let us take into consideration Kant’s famous example, which states, “To preserve one’s life is a duty, and besides, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so.” Let us use this statement in interpreting the moral worth of the act of preserving the life of a fetus, for instance. If the human person preserves the life of the fetus because she recognizes that it is what the moral law dictates, and understands that it is her duty to do so, then she is acting for the sake of duty. In this sense, her action of preserving the life of the fetus has a moral worth because it is guided by the moral law. However, if the human person acts in accordance with duty, her action of preserving the life of the fetus is simply to obey the moral law and appear as a responsible parent or avoid the possible legal implication and the associated stigma in the event that she resorts to abortion. In this way, the human person’s act of preserving the life of the fetus does not have moral worth because she only acts out of inclination to do so.
But Kant is not saying that an action done in accordance with duty is wrong because it still conforms to the law. It simply has no moral worth because it is motivated by inclinations. For Kant, an action can only have a moral worth when it is performed out of something good without qualification, that is, out of a good will, which is then manifested in doing actions for the sake of duty. Hence, the motive of any moral action must be duty, not desires.
Kant’s Moral Law: The Categorical Imperative
We must recall that Kant believes that the human person possesses a noumenal self that is godlike in nature. As such, the human person has a duty to actualize her godlike self by becoming morally perfect. However, because the human person also has a sensuous phenomenal self that is susceptible to desires or inclinations, the human person has to recognize her obligation or duty to resist these inclinations for her to fully attain moral perfection. It is for this reason that Kant conceived of a moral law that should prevail over the inclinations of the sensuous self, and guide the human person in achieving moral perfection (Ross, 2009).
It is important to understand, however, that Kant’s conception of the moral law does not follow the concept of the Scholastics, particularly St. Thomas Aquinas, who believe that the moral law is derived from the Natural law, which originates from God’s Eternal Law (Grisez, 1958). In contradistinction to this concept, Kant believes that the source of the moral law is not God, but the human person himself.
Now, because the human person is a rational being, the source of Kant’s moral law, therefore, is nothing but practical reason. Kant formulates the moral law based on the principles of practical reasoning that apply to all rational human persons, irrespective of their desires or inclinations. This means that the human person should do what is right as prescribed by reason, which all rational beings are bound to accept. Thus, it can be concluded that Kant attaches the criteria of absolute necessity and strict universality to the moral law.
From the fact that it is absolutely binding and does not accept any exceptions (hence, categorical) and, at the same time, directs how human persons ought to act (hence, imperative), Kant calls this moral law the “Categorical Imperative” (Beauchamp & Walters, 1999). And because it is an absolute law, for Kant, there is only one absolute statement of the categorical imperative. However, Kant argues further that the categorical imperative can be formulated in another way to make the moral law more understandable. In this connection, let us briefly discuss two of Kant’s official formulations of the categorical imperative.
Kant’s first and fundamental formulation of the categorical imperative is based on the principle of universality. It states: “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (Kant, 1952).
A maxim, according to Kant, is the principle on which the moral agent acts, or simply put, the principle of actions. In the first formulation, Kant is saying that after the human person determines a principle of action or maxim, she must ask herself whether it is possible for everyone to act in accordance with that maxim. If it is possible for everyone to act according to that maxim, then it is morally acceptable. Otherwise, it is morally unacceptable. Let us consider the maxim of lying to save a relationship. Obviously, such maxim may be acceptable only to the person who lies, and not everyone can consider the act of lying as acceptable. For this reason, the act of lying is never morally acceptable because it fails to satisfy the principle of universality.
The second formulation can be stated as follows: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another never as a means but always as an end.” This formulation of the categorical imperative is based on the principle of humanity. This simply means that the categorical imperative dictates that rational beings must treat each other as ends in themselves, and never as a means to some further end. This is because if we use another rational being merely as a means to a further end, then we have reduced that rational being into a thing. In the same example, that is, lying to save a relationship, it is clear that it involves manipulating the other person, which makes her less of a rational human being. In this sense, we can say that it violates the principle of humanity. For this reason, according to Kant, lying is not morally acceptable even if it is intended to save a relationship.
Lastly, Kant is convinced that the employment of the categorical imperative as a guide to moral actions would ultimately lead to the actualization of a morally perfect community, which he calls as a “Kingdom of Ends” (McCloskey, 1976). Kant envisions this community as one where rational beings are acting with reverence to the moral law, and regard human persons as ends in themselves. In this way, human persons are existing in perfect harmony as they respect the humanity of all its members.
Kant on the Theory of Right: A Brief Sketch
While Kant conceived the moral law, that is, the categorical imperative as an absolute commandment that is binding to all human persons, he insists that this bindingness is self-imposed. This means that the human person autonomously prescribes the moral laws for herself that govern her actions. In other words, although the categorical imperative is a universal law, the human person has the freedom to choose whether or not to obey that moral law of action.
Suffice it to say, the idea of freedom or free will is derived from the notion that the human person is a rational being who possesses the faculty of practical reasoning. As discussed in the previous section, practical reason is the governor of the will. Thus, as a rational being who exercises practical reasoning, the human person can freely choose which laws to adopt and impose in her life. And this exercise is what Kant calls as rational autonomy. Consequently, because the human person aims at attaining moral perfection, by virtue of rational autonomy, it can be surmised that she freely wills to obey the dictates of the categorical imperative any time she is put in a situation wherein the choices of actions need careful deliberation. The idea of free will here leads us to the conception of right.
Now, for Kant, right (Recht), that is, a moral claim to be recognized by others as “a right-bearing person”, is intrinsically related to morality. In fact, both can be expressed as the categorical imperative. Hence, from Kant’s categorical imperative, which is originally conceived as an ethical theory, we can draw a categorical imperative of right, which reads: “Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (Kant, as quoted in Beck 2006, p. 371-401).
As we can see, Kant outlines his theory of right in accordance with freedom. In fact, Kant equated freedom with right. In his The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1996, p. 30) writes: “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity”. What we can draw from this passage is that for Kant, innate freedom is our original birthright, that is, we have the right to freedom by virtue of our humanity. In other words, freedom is the sole original right. And with this conception of original right, Kant was able to formulate the concept of human rights, which now includes the right to life, the right to be independent, and the right to express one’s own thoughts and opinions (in short, freedom of expression). Indeed, Kant says that it is by virtue of our being rational and autonomous that we are entitled to fundamental human rights and other types of external rights.
It is important to note that Kant distinguishes two kinds of right, namely: natural right and acquired right. The idea of freedom as original right belongs to the first. Kant calls this as internal right. But for Kant, the conception of freedom as original right opens the way for acquired right. Kant calls this external right. The examples of human rights mentioned above belong to this kind of right. At the end of it all, with this two conceptions of right, and gain, by virtue of our being rational and autonomous, we possess the fundamental right to have rights.