Category: ETHICS

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John Rawls’s Theory of Justice

John Rawls’ theory of justice attempts to explain why clear social inequalities are unjust and what a just society really is. As we can see, Rawls’ theory of justice as he developed in his seminal work A Theory of Justice is both a work of ethics and politics. Hence, we can glean from Rawls’ theory of justice some kind of an ethical theory. For one, in his A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempted to address the problem of distributive justice. In what follows, these notes will briefly sketch the key concepts of Rawls’ theory of justice.

Some Basic Principles of Rawls’ Theory of Justice

Rawls believes that a just society is one whose characteristics conform to normative rules that everyone would agree. This explains why Rawls’ theory of justice begins by introducing the fundamental principle that every individual is inviolable. Rawls writes: “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of the state cannot override. Therefore, the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest.” From this fundamental principle, we can draw the following implications.

First, for Rawls, life should not be sacrificed for the sake of the majority. For example, suppressing the people’s right to speech and expression for the sake of economic growth is morally wrong for Rawls. As we can see, Rawls’ theory of justice directly attacks consequentialist ethics, especially its most notable representative, that is, utilitarianism.

Second, it would appear that for Rawls, an erroneous theory is tolerable in the absence of a good one. Thus, as Rawls would have us believe, an unjust law is better than no law at all. In other words, an act of injustice is tolerable if and only if it is necessary to avoid greater act of injustice. For example, it might be morally right to incapacitate, if not kill, a notorious serial killer if it is the only way to stop him from killing more innocent people.

And third, individual liberties should be restricted in order to maintain equality of opportunity. For Rawls, restrictions through law preserves freedom in democracy. For example, it is probably morally right to restrict people from owning more than 5 hectares of agricultural lot so that other people will have the chance to own a lot.

With this, we can now come up with two basic principles of justice that Rawls introduced in his seminal work A Theory of Justice. These two principles of justice are expressions of what Rawls calls “justice as fairness”.

The first principle puts emphasis on equal access to the basic human needs, rights, and liberties. Rawls calls this the equal liberty principle. This principle guarantees the right of each person to have the extensive basic liberty compatible with the liberty of others. Some examples of this right are the right to life, the right to vote, the right to speech, and the right to peaceable assembly.

The second principle emphasizes the idea of fair equality of opportunity and the equal distribution of socio-economic inequalities. Rawls calls this the difference principle. This principle implies that social and economic positions are to be to a) everyone’s advantage and b) open to all.

But how can such principles be universally adopted? Or how can we actualize Rawls’ theory of justice?

It is here where Rawls’ notions of the “Veil of Ignorance” and the “Original Position” come in.

Rawls introduces the theoretical “veil of ignorance” in which all players in the social game would be placed in a hypothetical situation called the “original position”. Rawls suggests that in the original position, each individual does not know her sex, race, natural abilities, social status, economic conditions, and the like. In other words, in the original position, individuals hide their identity behind the “veil of ignorance”. Just like in Husserl’s epoche or phenomenological reduction, the individual in the original position sets aside her biases towards and preconceptions about anything.

According to Rawls, out of this veil of ignorance, each individual makes a rational prudential choice concerning the kind of social institution they would enter into contract with. As we can see, Rawls appears to be a moral contractarian and his theory of justice is in itself a kind of social contract. Rawls recommends that individuals in the veil of ignorance ought to adopt a generalized point of view that bears strong resemblance to a moral point of view. And according to Rawls, if everybody in the original position promotes equality then “justice as fairness” is attained. If inequality is upheld, then injustice prevails.

As we can see, justice as fairness is achieved through the notions of the original position and the veil of ignorance. In the original position, individuals agree on specific social rules and institutions and in the veil of ignorance, individuals choose the basic structure of society that they thought is just. This is possible because Rawls argues that selfish but rational people who are detached from their concrete identity and context will freely choose to create a society that is truly just. In fact, Rawls believes that through the veil of ignorance, individuals can identify universal beliefs about how society should be organized.

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Prima Facie Duty: On William David Ross’s Moral Philosophy

As a moral realist, William David Ross argues that there are objective moral truths, that is, objective moral truths exist in reality. However, Ross claims that something is good only if that thing is really good. Hence, the concept of right and good play an important role in Ross’s moral philosophy. As a matter of fact, for Ross, rightness and goodness are the only two moral properties.

It is important to note that for Ross, rightness and goodness are indefinable, that is, they are irreducible objective qualities. Thus, as they are in themselves, rightness and goodness cannot be defined. However, as Ross would have us believe, we can make sense of what rightness and goodness are through their physical manifestation. Consider, for example, the following statement: “I have a good dinner”. Here, we understand the word “good” only in reference to its physical manifestation, that is, the dinner is satisfying. But as it is in itself, Ross argues that we cannot tell what really is goodness.

What the above contention implies is that, for Ross, there is no such thing as “absolute goodness”. Goodness, therefore, depends on a specific situation. For example, when we say “Divorce is good”, then this “good” cannot be absolute. In other words, divorce might be good to some people but bad to others.

Now, Ross contends that “rightness” belongs to an act, while “goodness” belongs to a motive. Thus, rightness is not identical with the act per se, just as goodness in not identical with motive.

But how do we know the rightness of an act and the goodness of its motive?

According to Ross, in order for us to know the rightness of an act and the goodness of its motive, we need to determine the non-moral properties or circumstances that surround the act itself. Let us consider, for example, a physician administering a medicine to a patient. Before we can know that the physician’s act of administering a medicine to a patient is good or not, we need to know: a) what the medicine is and b) why the physician is administering the medicine. If the physician is administering the right medicine in order to cure the patient, and she is doing it out of duty, then we can say that the physician’s act of administering the medicine is “right” and that her motive is “good”.

Conflict of Duties: Prima Facie and Actual Duties

As a non-consequentialist, Ross rejected G. E. Moore’s consequentialist ethics and argues instead that maximizing the good is only one of the several prima facie duties which guide the individual in determining what she ought to do in a given situation. As we can see, Ross’s moral philosophy hinges also on the concept of prima facie duty and actual duty.

In Ross’s moral philosophy, prima facie duty refers to a conditional duty, while actual duty refers to an unconditional duty. According to Ross, an actual duty is one’s “duty proper”. As our duty proper, an actual duty is what we have been referring to as our moral obligation. The actual duty, indeed, is the most stringent duty.

Now, how do we resolve when conflict of duties arise?

According to Ross, when conflict of duties arises, then we ought to do that which is mora of a duty. In words, Ross is telling that when conflict of duties arises, we ought to act in accordance with the prima facie duty which has a greater balance of rightness over wrongness. Let us consider the example below.

Gloria promised her son to be home early from work so they could have dinner together. However, when Gloria is about to go home, her boss had a heart attack. Since nobody is around except herself, Gloria felt obligated to bring his boss to the hospital.

As we can see in the situation above, Gloria is faced with two conflicting duties, namely, her duty to fulfill her promise to her son to be home early so they could have dinner together, and her duty to bring her boss to the hospital.

So, which one of the duties above is Gloria’s actual duty, that is, the most stringent duty, which is Gloria’s moral obligation?

As we can see, there are two prima facie duties here, namely:

Prima Facie Duty #1:  Gloria’s duty to fulfill her promise to her son to be home early so they could have dinner together

Prima Facie Duty #2:   Gloria’s duty to bring her boss to the hospital

Now, which is more of a duty from the two prima facie duties above? Obviously, as Ross would have us believe, prima facie duty #2 is the most stringent duty. Hence, Gloria’s moral obligation (therefore, the actual duty) is to bring her boss to the hospital.

How do we then know that one is more of a duty than the other?  Or how do we know that such duty has a greater balance of rightness over wrongness?

First, Ross believes that one, and only one, of the two prima facie duties is our actual duty. Of course, we cannot do both; this is self-evident. And second, according to Ross, we can absolutely have the right opinion about which is “more of a duty” because it is always self-evident. As in the case of the example above, of course Gloria’s son may get disappointed because her mom breaks her promise, but Ross would have us believe that anybody who is in her sound mind will choose prima facie duty #2 over prima facie duty #1.

As we can see, we can apprehend the actual duty from the two conflicting prima facie duties using our intuition (this explains why Ross was considered as an intuitionist). Hence, in Ross’s moral philosophy, the actual duty appears to be self-evident just as the axioms in mathematics.

At the end of it all, what Ross suggests is that whenever one needs to make a moral decision in which more than one prima facie duties is involved, one needs to study the situation as fully and extensive as she can until she arrives at a sound opinion about which of the conflicting prima facie duties is more of a duty. The prima facie duty that is judged to be “more of a duty”, that is, the most stringent duty, appears to be one’s actual duty. And, according to Ross, there are rules of thumb that will guide us in determining which of the conflicting duties is more of a duty. For example, non-maleficence is more stringent than beneficence.

In his famous work The Right and the Good, Ross listed seven basic types of prima facie duties, like a list of commandments, that will guide us in making moral decisions. As is well known, the correct moral principles in Ross’s moral philosophy are expressed in these seven basic prima facie duties. Because there is no ranking among them, Ross argues that they must be judged separately.

  1. Duty of fidelity: this is our duty to be faithful or be loyal to loyalty to a worthy cause.
  1. Duty of reparation: this is our duty to right the wrongs we have done to others.
  1. Duty of gratitude: this is our duty to appreciate and recognize the services others have done to us.
  2. Duty of justice: this is our duty to be fair with everyone.
  3. Duty of beneficence: this is our duty to do good towards others or our duty to help others.
  4. Duty of self-improvement: this is our duty to improve one’s self with respect to virtue, intelligence, and happiness.
  5. Duty of non-maleficence: this is our duty not to inflict evil, injury, or harm to one’s self and other.

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Utilitarian Ethics: Definition and Key Concepts

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham and developed and popularized by John Stuart Mill. As the term suggests, utilitarianism is founded on the principle of utility, which adheres to the belief that an act is good or morally right if it promotes happiness and bad or immoral if it tends to produce pain.

The key, therefore, in utilitarianism is the principle of happiness. Hence, again, in utilitarianism, an act is good or morally right if it produces greatest happiness to the greatest number of people; and bad or immoral if it produces more harm or pain than benefits or happiness to the greatest number of people. This explains why the utilitarian would not care whether the action is done out of deception, lie or manipulation as long as it produces maximum benefits to many people.

For example, the act of condemning a terrorist to death is morally right (that is, good) for the utilitarian because this action produces equal benefits or greatest happiness to the greatest number of people concerned.

Let us take the famous case of Robinhood as another example. 

As is well known, Robinhood steals properties from wealthy people and give them to the poor. From the vantage point of Christian ethics, Robinhood’s act is immoral because it deprived the wealthy people of the right that is due them. However, from the vantage point of utilitarianism, Robinhood’s act is morally good because it produces maximum benefits, that is, greatest happiness, to the majority of the people.

Jeremy Bentham’s Model of Utilitarianism

How does Bentham view happiness?

For Bentham, happiness is simply the absence of pain. Bentham introduced the “felicific” calculus to measure the degree of happiness or pleasure that a specific action may produce. The felicific calculus is also called the utility calculus or hedonistic calculus. It includes intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.

For Bentham, the intense (intensity) the pleasure, the better; the longer (duration) it lasts, the better; the more certain (certainty) that it will happen, the better; the closer (propinquity) that it will occur, the better; the greater the possibility (fecundity) that it will be followed by another pleasure, the better; the purer (purity) the pleasure, the better; the greater the number of people that it benefits (extent), the better.

The formula of Bentham’s felicific calculus goes like this: 

Happiness – Pain = Balance.

For Bentham, the Balance is the basis of the morality of an action. In other words, for Bentham, if the balance is in favor of happiness, then the act is morally right, and if it is in favor of pain, then it is morally wrong. How do we do this?

Bentham said we just need to sum up all the pleasures and pains produced by the action. If the balance is in favor of please, then the act is morally right. If the balance is in favor of pain, then the action is morally wrong. Put in simple mathematical calculation, 

…if an act produces 12 pleasures and 6 pains, then the balance is 6 which  is in favor of pleasure or happiness. 

Hence, if this is the case, then for Bentham the action is morally right. However, 

…if the act produces 20 pains and just 5 pleasures, then the balance is 15 which is in favor of pain. If this is the case, then for Bentham the act is morally wrong.

John Stuart Mill’s Model of Utilitarianism

Mill disagrees with Bentham. Mill argues that we cannot calculate the amount of pleasure or pain that an act produces. Thus, for Mill, the felicific calculus cannot be the basis of morality but the majority of the people that attains happinessꟷthus the famous utilitarian claim: an act is morally right if it produces greatest happiness to the greatest number of people and it is morally wrong if it produces more pain than pleasure to the greatest number of people concerned.

As we can see, Mill’s utilitarianism is considered qualitative since the philosopher emphasizes intellectual pleasure than sensual pleasure.  Thus, his famous saying goes: “It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”

ACT and RULE Utilitarianism

Act utilitarianism holds that the utilitarian principle should be applied to a particular act in a particular situation or circumstance. It takes into account the possible result of each act. Hence, as the name suggests, in Act utilitarianism, the basis of the morality of an action is the act itself. Hence, in Act utilitarianism, we should perform those “actions” that produce greatest happiness to the greatest number of people concerned.

Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, holds that the principle at issue should be used to test moral rules, and then such rules can be utilized in judging what is right and wrong under the circumstance. Here, we consider the possible results in light of the rule(s). Thus, in Rule utilitarianism, an act is morally right if it conforms to a justified moral rule. And of course, we know that moral rules are justified if such rules produce greatest happiness to the greatest number of people concerned.

Let us take the act of condemning a terrorist to death as an example.

An Act utilitarian would ask the question “What possible good or evil results from this act?”.  If the majority of the people are benefited by the act itself, then it is moral.

A Rule utilitarian, on the other hand, would ask whether there is a rule or law that condemns terrorists to death and whether this rule was formulated based on the utility principle. If this is the case, then it may be morally right to sentence a terrorist to death.

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Pragmatic Ethics: Meaning, Nature, and Dynamics

Pragmatic ethics is the result of the application of the principles of pragmatism to moral issues. Pragmatism was founded by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and was developed by the American philosophers William James and John Dewey.

Pragmatism is epistemological by nature but can be applied to ethics. As an epistemological doctrine, pragmatism holds the belief that the true and meaningful form of knowledge is one that is practical, workable, beneficial, and useful. Thus, in pragmatism, if an idea works or brings good results, then it is true and meaningful. If it does not, then that idea is meaningless, that is, it has no value.

According to the pragmatists, an idea is practical if it produces good results, workable if it can be put to work, beneficial if it benefits people, and useful if it can be used to attain good results.

How do we know that an idea is practical, workable, beneficial, and useful? In other words, how do we know that an idea is true and meaningful?

According to William James, ideas are proven to be true and meaningful through the process of experimentation. Hence, for James, ideas are value-neutral from the beginning; their truth and meaning can be proven through testing or experimentation. For example, how do we know that Coca Cola tastes good? Of course, according to James, by tasting it. Or if someone claims that condoms are the most effective and reliable contraceptive, then its truth and meaning can be proven by using and comparing them with other contraceptives.

John Dewey, on the other hand, argues that ideas are proven to be true and meaningful if they proved to be an effective instrument in attaining something. Thus, Dewey’s model of pragmatism can be viewed as a form of instrumentalism.

Applying Pragmatism to Ethics

When applied to moral issues, a pragmatist may view the morality of a human act from the vantage point of its practicality, workability, beneficiality, and usefulness. Hence, in pragmatic ethics, an action is considered morally right if it is practical, workable, beneficial, and useful; otherwise, it has no moral worth.

Let us take, for example, the moral issue of aborting a deformed fetus.

As we can see, in Christian ethics, particularly St. Thomas Aquinas’s model of ethics, abortion in whatever form is absolutely immoral because in the first place the act is evil because it implies killing. For the pragmatists, however, it is better to abort a deformed fetus than let it suffer for a lifetime. The act of aborting a deformed fetus for the pragmatists, therefore, is:

  1. practical because it will produce good results, such as sparing the parents and the child himself from physical, mental and emotional suffering that may be brought by the deformity;
  1. workable because obviously the act of aborting a deformed fetus can be put to work;
  1. beneficial to both the parents and the child, especially in terms of freedom from physical and emotional suffering that may be brought by the deformity; and
  1. useful because it can be used to attain good results, such as, again, sparing the parents and the child himself from physical, mental and emotional suffering that may be brought by the deformity.

Let us take another example. A medical doctor may say to her patient: “The injection of this chemical compound is good for one who is suffering from diabetes.” For the pragmatists, if the patient regains his health after the injection of the chemical compound, then the act is judged as morally right. This is what William James meant by his famous phrase “truth happens to an idea”. In ethics, the pragmatists claim that “goodness” or the moral worth of action happens to the act itself.

As we can see, in pragmatic ethics, a human act is always value-neutral from the beginning. The morality of a human act depends on the quality of the results, that is, on its practicality, workability, beneficiality, and usefulness. Hence, in pragmatic ethics, morality does not seek final and absolute answers, yet it is not relativistic. Pragmatic ethics is not relativistic in the sense that it recognizes that there are different circumstances and that in different circumstances, different actions might be appropriate.

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Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics

Aristotle’s virtue ethics can be gleaned from his seminal work titled Nichomachean Ethics. This book is undoubtedly the first systematic study of ethics in western civilization. In this book, Aristotle offers principles of conduct that would guide humans in attaining the “good life”.

It is worthwhile to begin our discussion of Aristotle’s virtue ethics by contrasting it with Plato’s take on ethics. As is well known, Plato, following his master Socrates, believed that the moral evaluations of daily life presuppose a “good” which is independent of experience, personality, and circumstances. Aristotle rejected this view. For Aristotle, moral principles are immanent in our daily activities and can be discovered only through a careful study of them. It is for this reason that Aristotle begins his ethical inquiry with an empirical study of what it is that people fundamentally desire.

Aristotle argues that what people fundamentally desire is “happiness” or eudaimonia. And Aristotle believes that happiness or eudaimonia is the ultimate human good; however, Aristotle warns that people’s opinions about the concept of happiness considerably vary.

Now, if we recall, the central question in Plato and Socrates’s ethics is “What kind of life should one live?”. Aristotle followed this line of questioning in his Nichomachean Ethics. As we can see, just as Plato and Socrates, Aristotle was also concerned about the good life. However, instead of asking about “how” should one live, Aristotle was more concerned about the nature of the “good life”. Thus, Aristotle, in effect, asked the question: “What is the nature of happiness?” or “What does happiness consist in?”.

It must be noted that Aristotle did not just ask about the nature of happiness. In Nichomachean Ethics, he also raised the question concerning the conditions of its attainment, which eventually led Aristotle to the discussion of virtue. Aristotle’s virtue ethics, therefore, is ultimately tied to a full understanding of the nature of happiness as humanity’s ultimate goal as well as the concept of virtue.

As a virtue theorist, Aristotle’s concern, therefore, is not only about right and wrong, but with virtues like courage and cowardice, wisdom and ignorance, justice and injustice, weakness of character and strength of character.

From the above discussion, we can now draw two major principles that will guide us in understanding Aristotle’s virtue ethics, namely, Eudaimonia and Virtue. Let us now turn our discussion to these concepts.

Please note that the following discussion will focus on how Aristotle develops a concept of eudaimonia that appeals to a conception of human nature and the way in which Aristotle develops an account of virtue that can show the idea that “the life of virtue” is a “life of eudaimonia”.

Eudaimonia and Virtue

As is well known, Socrates understands virtue as the major source of happiness. Plato continued this tradition and argued that moral virtue is vital to the rational soul of man. Although Aristotle followed Socrates and Plato’s agenda, his concept of happiness differs from Socrates and Plato’s because for Aristotle, happiness consists only in virtuous activity. Happiness, which most of Aristotle’s interpreters call Eudaimonia, is the ultimate end of human life. This happiness or the ultimate end is genuinely desired for its own sake or without qualification. So, actions which precede this end are the most valuable and cannot be superseded by any actions driven by ordinary kinds of ends. Of course, actions which result in honor, wealth and power is definitely part of man’s inclination to seek for happiness (as pleasure), but unfortunately this could not be the end which offers true happiness.

Like Eudaimonia, pleasure is also good. That is why Aristotle does not condemn man for desiring pleasure because it is a significant part of human flourishing. But for Aristotle, the desire and actions that lead to pleasure only presuppose limited value since its end is temporary. Hence, the satisfaction that one gets from these actions cannot be truly called happiness. For Aristotle, these actions, which only lead humans into the pit of the two opposing vices (either excess or deficiency), drive them away from the ultimate end. Hence, for Aristotle, only virtuous acts can lead to true happiness.

Virtue is defined as a behavior showing high moral standards or the general quality of goodness in a person. An example of this is the virtue of patience or truthfulness. Following Aristotle, the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (2006: 678) defines virtue as the opposite of vice. Vice in this context should not be literally understood within the specific context of social vices, like drug addiction, excessive cigarette smoking, and gambling. Rather, according to Aristotle, vices are the two extremes of the spectrum―one is the excess and the other is the deficiency (Ibid: 680). It is for this reason that Aristotle claims that virtues are the mean or the middle ground between the excess at the one side and the deficiency at the other. For instance, if a moral agent maintains patience or good temper (mean) and rejects irascibility (excess) or lack of spirit (deficiency), then he is said to have possessed virtue. Thus, for Aristotle, virtues categorically serve as the essential elements of man’s moral behavior. As we can see, the central concept in Aristotle’s virtue ethics is that virtue or the mean is the key to happiness. The table below helps us understand the relation between virtue and vices in the Aristotelian sense.

Virtue as Good Habit

The formation of a moral virtue is essential to Aristotelian ethics. This is due to the fact that a moral agent can only attain happiness by being consistently living a good life or acting habitually in accordance with the good. Thus, a good habit is instrumental to the development of virtue because it is considered to be the consistent pattern for doing virtuous actions. Aristotle (NE II:1, 1003a) writes, “we are adapted by nature to receive these virtues and are made perfect by habit”.

In this sense, though virtue is already part of our natural inclination, human being still needs the habit of doing good for him to become virtuous. What we must do then is to constantly practice doing virtuous acts to develop a habit. For instance, we acquire the virtue of patience by repeatedly integrating it into our deliberate actions, or by being constantly patient. In similar way, we can obtain the virtue of courage by maintaining it within the purview of the mean while avoiding rashness and cowardice. Therefore, our actions can only be morally good and right if there is a habitual practice of virtues. This is to say that to eventually maintain these moral actions which lead us to attain authentic happiness, the formation of good habits is a requisite.

The formation of virtue or good habit has two stages: first, the habit of contemplation or the education of thought for the formation of intellectual virtue and, second, the habit of the actual practice of moral virtue.

On the one hand, the habit of contemplation is a matter of constantly acquiring knowledge and using one’s mind in the right way that leads to the habitual exercise of virtue (Aristotle: 2004). Through the habit of education of thought, the state of character is constituted by the stable equilibrium of the soul (NE II:1, 1003a). This is to say that the state of character which shapes moral virtue primarily requires proper mental activity aside from the actual performance of moral action. In other words, before we can actually practice virtue, we have to think about practicing virtue all the time.

On the other hand, the habitual actual practice of virtue presupposes that every human being has brought out the contemplated understanding of virtue into actions. In other words, we put into practice what the mind thinks. In addition, the putting into practice of this understanding should be done consistently so that it would lead to the formation of good habit. True enough, virtue is defined as a behavior showing high moral standards, or a good moral quality, or the general quality of goodness in a person. But for Aristotle, we should push this further by developing a habit of doing good all the time.

In summary, we can say that Aristotle’s virtue ethics is built around the premise that humans should aim to achieve excellent character. In other words, for Aristotle, humans should become ethical individuals, and Aristotle construes “ethical individuals” as having virtuous character (“ethikē aretē” in Greek). For Aristotle, an excellent character is the precondition for attaining happiness or eudaimonia, which, as already mentioned, is the ultimate goal of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. And by focusing on happiness or eudaimonia, the “shape of life” as a whole becomes central to his ethical theory. This explains why, as already pointed out above, the key question in Aristotle’s virtue ethics is “What sort of life human beings should live?”. Thus, in the final analysis, practical virtues are the characteristics that humans need to develop to attain happiness. However, these practical virtues must be displayed in action for humans to truly attain happiness.

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Kantian Ethics (Kant’s Categorical Imperative)

Morality for Immanuel Kant means acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. In fact, as is well known, for Kant, the categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality. Hence, for Kant, an act is moral if it is done in accordance with the categorical imperative; otherwise, it is non-moral or immoral.

The Categorical Imperative

What is the categorical imperative?

First, as we know, an imperative is a command. For example, one may say “Don’t cheat” or “You have to fulfill your promises”.

There are two types of imperative, namely, hypothetical and categorical imperative. On the one hand, a hypothetical imperative is one that expresses a conditional command. For example, we may say “If you want to become successful, then you have to work very hard”. As we can see, this example poses a condition, that is, you only have to work very hard if you want to become successful. If you don’t want to become successful, then you can just sit, lie, and relax. On the other hand, a categorical imperative is one that expresses an absolute command. For example, we may say “Do not be late”. As we can see, this command does not pose a condition as it does not contain an “if-then” clause. Even if one is tempted to cheat, she ought not to because she is commanded absolutely not to cheat.

To know the nature and dynamics of the categorical imperative, we need to familiarize ourselves with some of the core concepts in Kantian ethics, namely, the idea of the good will, duty and the moral worth of an act, and the formulations of the categorical imperative.

The Good Will

According to Kant, the good will is the one that facilitates a human act. But what makes a good will good? For Kant, a good will is good not because it produces good results (as in the case of pragmatic ethics) or greatest happiness to the greatest number of people (as in the case of utilitarian ethics), but it is good by virtue of its intrinsic value.

The good will, therefore, is good without qualification. It is good without any condition.

How is the good will manifested?

According to Kant, a good will is manifested when it is done for the sake of duty. Hence, in order for a good will to be called good without qualification, it must be done for the sake of duty.

Let us consider the example of the “will” to help a friend. Kant would have us believe that if one expects something in return when someone helps a friend, then the “will” is not good without qualification because it is not done for the sake of duty. But if someone helps a friend because she believes that it is her duty to do so, then, for Kant, the will here is good without qualification because it is obviously done for the sake of duty.

Now, Kant says that the “will” is autonomous if it is self-legislating. Thus, the concept “autonomy of the will” means that it is not influenced by any outside factors. In other words, when a moral agent performs a particular act, her will is considered “autonomous” if she is not forced to do it.

Duty and the Moral Worth of an Act

Kant argues that duty should be the motive of any moral act. Inclination or self-interest can never be the motive of any moral act. This means, for example, that if a physician treats a patient, her motive should be “duty”, that is, the physician is moved to treat the patient because it is her obligation as a healthcare provider to treat a patient, and not the interest of profiting from the patient herself.

For Kant, therefore, an act has a moral worth (that is, moral) if it is done for the sake of duty. If an act is done out of self-inclination, then it has no moral worth (that is, immoral).

It is interesting to note that for Kant sometimes an act is done in accord with duty. For Kant, this act has no moral worth, though not necessarily immoral, because the act simply accords with duty. Indeed, it is not done for the sake of duty. As we can see, for Kant, there is a difference between “actions that accord with duty”, that is, actions that are done in accordance with duty, and “actions that are done for the sake for duty”. Again, for Kant, only those actions that are done for the sake of duty have moral worth.

Formulations of the Categorical Imperative

First Formulation

The first formulation of the categorical imperative is based on the principle of universality. It reads: “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Put differently, the principle of universality commands that every maxim someone acts on must be such that others are willing to make it the case that everyone always acts on that maxim when in a similar situation. The idea here is that if the maxim, that is, the principle on which the moral agent acts, cannot be universalized, then the action has no moral worth.

Let us consider, for example, the act of stealing the properties of the rich and distribute them to the poor. As we can see, the maxim, which is “stealing” or “to steal” in this case, cannot be universalized. Of course, even if someone is willing to steal, reason tells us that we cannot force all people to will the same. Hence, stealing is always impermissible, according to the categorical imperative.

Let us take another example, such as the act of helping a friend in times of need. The maxim, which is “to help”, is obviously universalizable because we can expect others to will the same. Hence, the act of helping a friend in times of need is morally right according to the categorical imperative.

The Second Formulation

The second formulation of the categorical imperative is famously called the “formula of the end”. Kant formulated the formula of the end as a response to his critics who lamented that the principle of universality is too strict.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative, which is based on the principle of humanity, reads: “So act as to treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of another never as means but always as an end.” It is important to note that Kant believes that human beings have inherent value and should never be treated as means to a particular end. This is because for Kant, if humans are treated as means, then they are reduced into things or on the level of animals. Thus, for Kant, any act that treats humanity as a means is not morally right.

Let us consider the example of cheating someone. For Kant, the act of cheating someone is absolutely immoral because this act treats others as a means, that is, the other is treated as thing. Needless to say, if we cheat on others, then we are treating them as means to our own selfish end.

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Natural Law Ethics (St. Thomas Aquinas’s Christian Ethics)

Natural law ethics is a popular name attributed to the model of ethics developed by St. Thomas Aquinas during the Medieval period. Because it was developed by St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law ethics is also called Thomistic ethics.

The basic idea in natural law ethics is that “Reason” is the source of the moral law and that it directs us towards the “Good”. According to Aquinas, the “Good” is the ultimate goal of the person’s actions. And for Aquinas, the “Good” is discoverable within the person’s nature. This explains why the basic goal of natural law ethics is “to do good and avoid evil”.

Now, how do we know that a person is acting rightly or wrongly?

According to Aquinas, an act is morally right if it is done in accordance with the moral law. But what is the moral law?

As already mentioned, “reason” is the source of moral law; hence, the moral law is the dictate of reason. But for Aquinas, the moral law comes from God’s Eternal Law. Indeed, for Aquinas, the moral law is the Divine Law expressed in human nature, which reads: “Do good and avoid evil.”

If the moral law is “doing good and avoiding evil,” how do we know that one is acting in accordance with the good?

According to Aquinas, the “good” is that which is suitable to human nature or that which is proper to human nature. And for Aquinas, we know that an action is good, that is, suitable to human nature, if it is done in accordance with conscience.

Aquinas understands conscience as the inner voice of the intellect or reason which calls the human person to follow the moral law, that is, to do good and avoid evil. As we can see, in natural law ethics, conscience serves as the guide in making moral decisions.

But how do we know that one’s action obeys conscience?

According to Aquinas, an action obeys conscience if it satisfies the three-fold natural inclination of the human person, namely: 

1) self-preservation, 2) just dealing with others, and 3) propagation of human species.

Self-preservation, for Aquinas, is a natural inclination that urges the human person to take care of her health or not to kill or put herself in danger. This explains why for Aquinas suicide is absolutely wrong.

Just dealing with others urges us to treat others with the same respect that we accord ourselves. Thus, for Aquinas, all forms of inhumanities, such as exploitation, seduction, deception, manipulation, cheating, kidnapping, murder, and intimidation, are absolutely wrong too.

In terms of the propagation of human species, Aquinas believes that the reproductive organ is by nature designed to reproduce and propagate human species. Any act of intervention, therefore, that frustrates the very purpose of the reproductive organ is unnatural, hence immoral. This explains why even masturbation is immoral in natural law ethics.

It must be noted that for Aquinas if at least one of these three natural inclinations of the human person is violated, then an act does not obey conscience; it is therefore immoral. Needless to say, for an action to be considered moral in natural law ethics, it must be done in accordance with conscience. Again, it must be done in accordance with the moral law, that is, “doing good and avoiding evil”.

Three Determinants of Moral Actions

In addition to the three-fold natural inclinations of the human person, Aquinas introduced three things that determine the morality of a human act, namely:

1) object of the human act, 
2) its circumstance, and 
3) its end.

The object of the act refers to that which the will intends primarily and directly. It may either be a thing or an action. Take, for example, the physician’s act of removing a tumor. As we can see, the direct object of the act is “to remove a tumor”. Please note that the circumstance and the end are also intended here, but not directly.

The circumstance refers to the condition which affects the morality of an action. It is important to note that the circumstance may aggravate or mitigate the morality of the human act.

Aquinas classified circumstance into:

1) quality of a person (who), 
2) quality or quantity of the moral object (what), 
3) the circumstance of place (where), 
4) the circumstance of means (by what means), 
5) the circumstance of end (why), 
6) manner in which the action is done (how), and 
7) time element involved in the performance of the action (when).

As to the first, it is bad to rape a woman, but it is worse to rape a daughter.

As to the second, the act of a taxi driver who returns a wallet containing a couple of thousand dollars is good in itself, but that of one who takes the initiative of returning fifty thousand dollars left by a tourist is even better.

As to the third, smoking in public may not be good, but it is worse if one smokes inside a church.

As to the fourth, to pray for a sick person is good in itself, but to give her money for medicine for her medication is better.

As to the fifth, helping an orphan kid finish schooling is good, but doing it with the intention of employing her later is better.

As to the sixth, killing might generally be conceived as evil. But in the case of unjust aggression, it might be morally right to kill the aggressor.

And as to the seventh, it might not be a good idea to smoke inside the church, but it is worse to do it while the mass is going on.

The end of the act refers to the purpose of the doer or the agent of the human act itself. According to Aquinas, it can be taken as a circumstance because the end is an integral part of every moral act. For example, marrying a person one is engaged to is good in itself. But doing so while motivated by the selfish end of, say, taking a big share of an inheritance, makes the whole action morally wrong.

It must be noted that for Aquinas, all the three determinants of a human act must be all good for an act to be considered good or morally right.

Four Principles of Double Effect

Sometimes a human act may produce two conflicting results, that is, one is good and the other is evil. To address this dilemma, Aquinas formulated the four principles of double effect, namely:

  1. The action intended must be good in itself, or at least morally indifferent; otherwise, the act is evil at the very outset;
  2. The good effect must follow the action at least as immediately as the evil effect, or the good and evil effects must occur simultaneously;
  3. The foreseen evil effect should not be intended or approved, but merely permitted to occur; and
  4. There must be a proportionate and sufficient reason for allowing the evil effect to occur while performing the action.

According to Aquinas, all of the 4 principles must be satisfied for an action to be considered morally right.

Let us take for example the act of removing a cancerous uterus of a pregnant woman which necessarily implies abortion. As we can see, the act will produce two results, one good and the other is evil. Of course, the removal of the cancerous uterus of the pregnant woman will definitely save her life (good result) but at the same time, it will kill the fetus (evil result). So, what is the morality of the action if we apply Aquinas’s four principles of double effect?

Please note that the act is simply to remove the cancerous uterus. So, obviously, we satisfy principle #1 because the intention of removing the cancerous uterus is good in itself. We may even view it as morally indifferent.

We also satisfy principle #2 because the good effect, that is, the recovery of the pregnant woman follows the action immediately. And even if the fetus dies after the removal of the cancerous uterus, at least this evil effect occurs simultaneously with the good effect.

Principle #3 is also satisfied because abortion, that is, the death of the fetus, was not intended. It was just allowed to happen. As we can see, the main intention of removing the cancerous uterus of the pregnant woman is to save her life. Even if the death of the fetus was foreseen, according to Aquinas, it was just allowed to occur.

And lastly, principle #4 is also satisfied because there is indeed a sufficient reason for allowing the evil effect, that is, abortion or the killing of the fetus, to happen. Needless to say, if we don’t remove the cancerous uterus, then we lose both the lives of the woman and the fetus. But if we remove the cancerous uterus, at least, as Aquinas would have us believe, we save one life.

As we can see, the removal of a cancerous uterus of a pregnant woman which implies abortion is morally right.

Let us take another example, that of killing a drug lord. As is well known, illegal drugs have been destroying many lives both young and old. So, killing a drug lord will produce a good result. However, the act produces an evil result too, that is, murder. So, what is the morality of the act of killing the drug lord from the vantage point of Aquinas’s 4 principles of double effect?

A utilitarian may argue that the act of killing the drug lord is good as it may produce more benefits, that is, greatest happiness, to the greatest number of people concerned. However, for Aquinas, the act of killing the drug lord is intrinsically immoral because, as we can see, it does not satisfy the first principle of the 4 principles of double effect. The first principle says that the act must be good in itself or at least morally indifferent. But the act of “killing” (the drug lord) is evil in itself. Hence, even if this act produces more benefits to many people concerned, for Aquinas, it is absolutely immoral. This explains why the Roman Catholics, who adhere to Aquinas’s natural law ethics, strongly oppose extrajudicial killing (EJK) in general and killing a drug lord in particular.

Now, since the first principle is violated, we need not proceed and check the remaining principles because in the first place the act is already immoral. `

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Ethical Relativism: Meaning and Types

Ethical relativism or moral relativism is the view that ethical or moral values and beliefs are relative to the various individuals or societies that hold them. Thus, according to the ethical or moral relativists, there is no objective right and wrong. This means that what is right for one person is not necessarily right for another or what is right in some circumstances is not necessarily in another.

Two Forms of Ethical Relativism

There are two forms of ethical relativism, namely: 

1) Personal or Individual Ethical Relativism and 
2) Social or Cultural Ethical Relativism.

On the one hand, personal or individual ethical relativism holds that ethical judgments and beliefs are the expressions of the moral outlook and attitudes of individual persons. Hence, for the individual ethical relativists, there is no objective standard of right and wrong inasmuch as the “individual person” is the basis of moral judgments. The ethical relativist may, therefore, say “I have my own view and you have yours. Neither my view nor yours is better or more correct.”

Let us take, for example, senicide or geronticide, that is, the abandonment to death or killing of the elderly. There was a common belief that during famines or other extremely difficult situations, the Inuit or the indigenous people of Northern America would leave their elderly on the ice to die. If this is indeed the case, the individual relativist would say that no one, especially the outsiders of this culture, has the right to say that the Inuit are wrong because the morality of such action depends entirely on the individual Intuit beliefs. Hence, in individual ethical relativism, any person has no right to say that others are correct or incorrect since to do so would assume an objective standard of right and wrong. As we can see, this example is considered an individual or personal ethical relativism because it is the individual that is the basis of moral judgment.

On the other hand, social or cultural ethical relativism holds that ethical values and beliefs vary from society to society and that the basis of moral judgment lies in these social or cultural views. Thus, in determining the rightness or wrongness of human actions, one must base it on the norms of a particular society. Let us take, for example, the ancient Indian practice of Sati or Suttee.

As is well known, the ancient Indians had the practice of burning the wife alive in the funeral pyre of her deceased husband. Whatever the reasons behind this practice, the act was seen as heroic. In fact, records show that some wives willingly allowed themselves to be burnt alive on their husbands’ funeral pyre. Indeed, if an outsider is to judge this act, she may view this as immoral, especially if she is a Christian. But for the social ethical relativist, that might be the right to do in that particular culture. This is because, for the social ethical relativists, no society’s view is better than any other in a trans-cultural sense.  Hence, no society has the right to say that particular culture of a certain society is wrong.

From what we have just presented above, we can draw three possible reasons that support ethical relativism.

First, on the diversity of moral values. The ethical relativists may have argued that the presence of disagreements on many ethical issues or even on basic moral values or principles will prove the point that we cannot attain objective truth. Hence, the idea of objective right and wrong is inconceivable for ethical relativists.

Second, on moral uncertainty. Because of moral uncertainty, the ethical relativists would have argued that because there is great difficulty in knowing what is the morally right thing to do or believe, then again, we cannot attain objective right or wrong.

Third and last, on situational differences. For the ethical relativists, the situations and life world of different people vary so much that it is difficult to believe that same things that would be right for one would be right for another. Hence, what is right or wrong for one may not be necessarily right or wrong for another.

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Moral Standard versus Non-Moral Standard

Why the need to distinguish moral standards from non-moral ones?

It is important to note that different societies have different moral beliefs and that our beliefs are deeply influenced by our own culture and context. For this reason, some values do have moral implications, while others don’t. Let us consider, for example, the wearing of hijab. For sure, in traditional Muslim communities, the wearing of hijab is the most appropriate act that women have to do in terms of dressing up. In fact, for some Muslims, showing parts of the woman’s body, such as the face and legs, is despicable. However, in many parts of the world, especially in Western societies, most people don’t mind if women barely cover their bodies. As a matter of fact, the Hollywood canon of beauty glorifies a sexy and slim body and the wearing of extremely daring dress. The point here is that people in the West may have pitied the Muslim women who wear hijab, while some Muslims may find women who dress up daringly despicable.

Again, this clearly shows that different cultures have different moral standards. What is a matter of moral indifference, that is, a matter of taste (hence, non-moral value) in one culture may be a matter of moral significance in another.

Now, the danger here is that one culture may impose its own cultural standard on others, which may result in a clash in cultural values and beliefs. When this happens, as we may already know, violence and crime may ensue, such as religious violence and ethnic cleansing.

How can we address this cultural conundrum?

This is where the importance of understanding the difference between moral standards (that is, of what is a moral issue) and non-moral ones (that is, of what is a non-moral issue―thus, a matter of taste) comes in. This issue may be too obvious and insignificant for some people, but understanding the difference between the two may have far-reaching implications. For one, once we have distinguished moral standards from non-moral ones, of course, through the aid of the principles and theories in ethics, we will be able to identify fundamental ethical values that may guide our actions. Indeed, once we know that particular values and beliefs are non-moral, we will be able to avoid running the risk of falling into the pit of cultural reductionism (that is, taking complex cultural issues as simple and homogenous ones) and the unnecessary imposition of one’s own cultural standard on others. The point here is that if such standards are non-moral (that is, a matter of taste), then we don’t have the right to impose them on others. But if such standards are moral ones, such as not killing or harming people, then we may have the right to force others to act accordingly. In this way, we may be able to find a common moral ground, such as agreeing not to steal, lie, cheat, kill, harm, and deceive our fellow human beings.

Now, what are moral standards, and how do they differ from non-moral ones?

Moral Standards and their Characteristics

Moral standards are norms that individuals or groups have about the kinds of actions believed to be morally right or wrong, as well as the values placed on what we believed to be morally good or morally bad. Moral standards normally promote “the good”, that is, the welfare and well-being of humans as well as animals and the environment. Moral standards, therefore, prescribe what humans ought to do in terms of rights and obligations.

According to some scholars, moral standards are the sum of combined norms and values. In other words, norms plus values equal moral standards. On the one hand, norms are understood as general rules about our actions or behaviors. For example, we may say “We are always under the obligation to fulfill our promises” or “It is always believed that killing innocent people is absolutely wrong”. On the other hand, values are understood as enduring beliefs or statements about what is good and desirable or not. For example, we may say “Helping the poor is good” or “Cheating during exams is bad”.

According to many scholars, moral standards have the following characteristics, namely: 

  1. moral standards deal with matters we think can seriously injure or benefit 

humans, animals, and the environment, such as child abuse, rape, and murder; 

  1. moral standards are not established or changed by the decisions of 

authoritative individuals or bodies. Indeed, moral standards rest on the adequacy of the reasons that are taken to support and justify them. For sure, we don’t need a law to back up our moral conviction that killing innocent people is absolutely wrong; 

  1. moral standards are overriding, that is, they take precedence over other 

standards and considerations, especially of self-interest; 

  1. moral standards are based on impartial considerations. Hence, moral 

standards are fair and just; and 

  1. moral standards are associated with special emotions (such as guilt and 

shame) and vocabulary (such as right, wrong, good, and bad).

Non-moral Standards

Non-moral standards refer to standards by which we judge what is good or bad and right or wrong in a non-moral way. Examples of non-moral standards are standards of etiquette by which we judge manners as good or bad, standards we call the law by which we judge something as legal or illegal, and standards of aesthetics by which we judge art as good or rubbish. Hence, we should not confuse morality with etiquette, law, aesthetics or even with religion.

As we can see, non-moral standards are matters of taste or preference. Hence, a scrupulous observance of these types of standards does not make one a moral person. Violation of said standards also does not pose any threat to human well-being.

Finally, as a way of distinguishing moral standards from non-moral ones, if a moral standard says “Do not harm innocent people” or “Don’t steal”, a non-moral standard says “Don’t text while driving” or “Don’t talk while the mouth is full”.

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Moral Dilemmas: Definition and Types

First of all, let us define the term dilemma before we discuss the nature and dynamics of moral dilemmas.

A dilemma is a situation where a person is forced to choose between two or more conflicting options, neither of which is acceptable. As we can see, the key here is that the person has choices to make that will all have results she does not want. For example, a town mayor faces a dilemma about how to protect and preserve a virgin forest and at the same time allow miners and loggers for economic development in the town.

It must be noted, however, that if a person is in a difficult situation but is not forced to choose between two or more options, then that person is not in a dilemma. The least that we can say is that that person is just experiencing a problematic or distressful situation. Thus, the most logical thing to do for that person is to look for alternatives or solutions to address the problem.

When dilemmas involve human actions which have moral implications, they are called ethical or moral dilemmas.

Moral dilemmas, therefore, are situations where persons, who are called “moral agents” in ethics, are forced to choose between two or more conflicting options, neither of which resolves the situation in a morally acceptable manner. Consider the following example:

Lindsay is a deeply religious person; hence, she considers killing humans absolutely wrong. Unfortunately, it is found out that Lindsay is having an ectopic pregnancy. As is well known, an ectopic pregnancy is a type of pregnancy that occurs outside the uterus, most commonly in the fallopian tubes. In other words, in ectopic pregnancy, the fetus does not develop in the uterus. Now, if this happens, the development of the fetus will definitely endanger the mother. Thus, if Lindsay continues with her pregnancy, then there is a big possibility that she will die. According to experts, the best way to save Lindsay’s life is to abort the fetus, which necessarily implies killing the fetus. If we do not abort the fetus, then Lindsay, as well as the fetus, will die.

In the above example of a moral dilemma, Lindsay is faced with two conflicting options, namely, either she resorts to abortion, which will save her life but at the same time jeopardizes her moral integrity or does not resort to abortion but endangers her life as well as the fetus. Indeed, Lindsay is faced with a huge moral dilemma.

According to Karen Allen, there are three conditions that must be present for situations to be considered moral dilemmas. First, the person or the agent of a moral action is obliged to make a decision about which course of action is best. Here, the moral agent must choose the best option and act accordingly. In the case of the example of above, Lindsay may opt to abort the fetus as the best course of action. Second, there must be different courses of action to choose from. Hence, as already pointed out above, there must be two or more conflicting options to choose from for moral dilemmas to occur. And third, no matter what course of action is taken, some moral principles are always compromised. This means that, according to Allen, there is no perfect solution to the problem. And for this reason, according to Benjiemen Labastin, in moral dilemmas, the moral agent “seems fated to commit something wrong which implies that she is bound to morally fail because in one way or another she will fail to do something which she ought to do. In other words, by choosing one of the possible moral requirements, the person also fails on others.”

Types of Moral Dilemmas

There are several types of moral dilemmas, but the most common of them are categorized into the following: 1) epistemic and ontological dilemmas, 2) self-imposed and world-imposed dilemmas, 3) obligation dilemmas and prohibition dilemmas, and 4) single agent and multi-person dilemmas.

Epistemic moral dilemmas involve situations wherein two or more moral requirements conflict with each other and that the moral agent hardly knows which of the conflicting moral requirements takes precedence over the other. In other words, the moral agent here does not know which option is morally right or wrong. For instance, I ought to honor my promise to my son to be home early, but on my way home I saw a sick old man who needs to be brought to the hospital. Where does my actual duty lie? We cannot deny that there are conflicting duties (moral requirements) here, but we need to note that we want a fuller knowledge of the situation: Is an important purpose being served by my getting home early? How serious is the condition of the sick old man? Indeed, I could hardly decide which option is morally right in this situation. However, one option must be better than the other; only, it needs fuller knowledge of the situation―thus the term “epistemic” moral dilemmas. Ontological moral dilemmas, on the other hand, involve situations wherein two or more moral requirements conflict with each other, yet neither of these conflicting moral requirements overrides each other. This is not to say that the moral agent does not know which moral requirement is stronger than the other. The point is that neither of the moral requirements is stronger than the other; hence, the moral agent can hardly choose between the conflicting moral requirements. For instance, a military doctor is attending to the needs of the wounded soldiers in the middle of the war. Unfortunately, two soldiers urgently need a blood transfusion. However, only one bag of blood is available at the moment. To whom shall the doctor administer the blood transfusion? For sure, we could not tell whether administering a blood transfusion to Soldier A is more moral than administering a blood transfusion to Soldier B, and vice versa.

A self-imposed moral dilemma is caused by the moral agent’s wrongdoings. For example, David is running for the position of the town mayor. During the campaign period, he promised the indigenous peoples in his community to protect their virgin forest just to gain their votes, but at the same time, he seeks financial support from a mining corporation. Fortunately, David won the elections, yet he is faced with the dilemma of fulfilling his promised to the indigenous peoples and at the same time allows the mining corporation to destroy their forest. Indeed, through his own actions, David created a situation in which it is impossible for him to be discharged from both obligations. A world-imposed moral dilemma, on the other hand, means that certain events in the world place the agent in a situation of moral conflict. William Styron’s famous Sophie’s Choice is a classic example. “Sophie Zawistowska has been asked to choose which of her two children, Eva or Jan, will be sent to the gas chamber in Auschwitz. An SS doctor, Fritz Jemand von Niemand, will grant a dispensation to only one of Sophie’s children. If she does not choose which one should live, Dr. von Niemand will send both to their death. Sophie chooses her daughter Eva to go to the gas chamber. Her son, Jan, is sent to the Children’s Camp.”

Obligation dilemmas are situations in which more than one feasible action is obligatory, while prohibition dilemmas involve cases in which all feasible actions are forbidden. The famous “Sartre’s Student” is a classic example. It reads:

moral dilemmas

The famous Sophie’s Choice, as mentioned above, is a classic example of prohibition dilemmas.

Finally, in single agent dilemma, the agent “ought, all things considered, to do A, ought, all things considered, to do B, and she cannot do both A and B”. In other words, the moral agent is compelled to act on two or more equally the same moral options but she cannot choose both. For instance, a medical doctor found out that her patient has HIV. For sure, the medical doctor may experience tension between the legal requirement to report the case and the desire to respect confidentiality, although the medical code of ethics acknowledges our obligation to follow legal requirements and to intervene to protect the vulnerable. In multi-person dilemma, on the other hand, “…the situation is such that one agent, P1, ought to do A, a second agent, P2, ought to do B, and though each agent can do what he ought to do, it is not possible both for P1 to do A and P2 to do B.” According to Benjiemen Labastin, “the multi-person does not inasmuch as agents X, Y and Z may possibly have chosen conflicting moral choices – that is, person X chooses A instead of B and C and person Y chooses B instead of A and C, so on and so forth. The multi-person dilemma occurs in situations that involve several persons like a family, an organization, or a community who is expected to come up with consensual decision on a moral issue at hand. A family may be torn between choosing to terminate or prolong the life of a family member. An organization may have to choose between complying with the wage law by cutting its workforce or by retaining its current workforce by paying them below the required minimum wage.  The multi-person dilemma requires more than choosing what is right, it also entails that the persons involved reached a general consensus. In such a manner, the moral obligation to do what is right becomes more complicated. On the one hand, the integrity of the decision ought to be defended on moral grounds. On the other hand, the decision must also prevent the organization from breaking apart”.

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