Category: Theodicy

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Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane: Key Concepts

Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane: Key Concepts

In this lecture notes, I will present the overall idea and key concepts of Eliade’s seminal work titled, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion.

But before we dive into the discussion, let me talk very briefly about Eliade’s background and famous works.

Mircea Eliade was born in Romania in 1907. He was one of the most influential scholars of comparative religion in the twentieth century. Eliade loves to study ancient religious practices, which he called archaic religion, and spent his life promoting the field of the history of religion, or comparative religion. As a historian of religion, Eliade observes that even people today who proclaim themselves residents of a completely profane world are still unconsciously nourished by the memory of the sacred. In other words, for Eliade, while contemporary people believe their world is entirely profane or secular, they still at times find themselves connected unconsciously to the memory of something sacred. And it is interesting to note that it is this very idea that both 1) drives Eliade’s exhaustive exploration of the sacred, as it has manifested in space, time, nature and the cosmos, and life itself, and 2) underpins his expansive view of the human experience.

It also this very idea that inspires Eliade to write about the two modes of being in the world, that is, “one being sacred” on the one hand, and being “the profane” on the other hand. It must also be note that Eliade advocates for the merits of maintaining religious practice and belief in a secular world.

Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane is a book of great scholarship and originality. In fact, it serves as an excellent introduction to the history of religion, but its perspective also encompasses philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology.

The book traces manifestations of the sacred from primitive to modern times in terms of space, time, nature, and the cosmos. In doing so he shows how the total human experience of the religious man compares with that of the nonreligious. Indeed, The Sacred and the Profane illustrates Eliade’s views on what it means to be religious.

In what follows, I will sketch very briefly the overall idea and key concepts of this seminal work on the meaning, nature, and dynamics of religion.

Eliade begins by describing a binary view of the sacred and the profane, or the religious and the secular, drawing clear differences between “homo religiosus” (religious people) and non-religious people. But it must be noted that by the end of the book, he blurs the bright line between these two, and he finishes by promoting a vastly inclusive understanding of what it means to be religious and what it means to be human. Hence, Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane revises the meanings of the words “sacred” and “religious”, which is critical to the modern study of religion and has had a strong influence on our understanding of how religion and humanity intersect.

Now, crucial to an understanding of Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane are three categories, namely: 1) the sacred, 2) hierophay, and 3) homo religiosus.

For Eliade, the sacred is something that causes one to stop and take notice, just as Moses stopped when he saw the burning bush. Eliade writes, “Man [sic] becomes aware of the sacred because it manifests itself, shows itself, as something wholly different from the profane.” So, if the sacred is something that causes one to stop and take notice, in other words, something that causes us to gaze in awe and wonder, the profane is the homogeneity of normal, quotidian mundaneness. More importantly, Eliade uses the term sacred to refer to transcendent being, like the gods or God. This explains why Eliade also argues that the sacred is the ultimate cause of all real existence.

Hierophany refers to the breakthrough of the sacred into human experience. In other words, hierophany is the revelation, or the unconcealment of the sacred to humans, or the manifestation of the divine. For Eliade, the term hierophany is broader than the more familiar term, theophany, it allows non-personal forms of the divine to become manifest. We should not miss to consider the fact that for Eliade, hierophany does not only involve the manifestation of the divine, but also humans’ awareness of the divine, of the sacred the moment the latter reveals itself to the former.

For Eliade, the sacred can manifest itself through different parts or mediums of the physical world, such as forests, rivers, mountains, stones, and the like.

Homo religiosus refers to the being who is prepared or ready to appreciate and make sense of the hierophany, of the manifestation of the divine. As homo religiosus, therefore, for Eliade, human beings are inherently religious. But for Eliade, this inherent religiosity does not refer to a person’s creedal beliefs or institutional commitments per se, but to our existential drive toward transcendence, freedom, and meaning-making, no matter the differences of religious or areligious backgrounds, orientations, or convictions.

In relation to these three categories, we may now mention that one of the primary objectives of Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane is to define the fundamental opposition between the sacred and the profane. Eliade did this by showcasing the very perception of human mind towards the sacred and by categorizing persons into “sacred or archaic beings” and “profane or modern beings”. And for Eliade, the sacred being is one who seeks, creates, and needs the sacred space in order to exist meaningfully, while the profane being does not.

Another intention of Eliade in introducing these three categoris is to acquaint his readers with the idea of the numinous, a concept provided in Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy. The numinous experience is that experience of the sacred which is particular to religious human beings in that it is experientially overwhelming, encompassing the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, both the awesomely fearful and the enthrallingly captivating aspects of the Holy, or, the Wholly Other. In expanding and expounding the phenomenological dimensions of the sacred, Eliade points out that the sacred appears in human experience as a crucial point of orientation at the same time it provides access to the ontological reality which is its source and for which homo religiosus thirsts or longs for.

As we can see, for Eliade, the homo religiosus thirsts or longs for being, for meaning. And in terms of space, the sacred delineates the demarcation between the sacred and the profane, and thus, locates the axis mundi as center. This is the reason why temples, churches, and other places became sacralized for homo religiosus. But since cosmogonic activities as were done in the beginning of human civilization are recapitulated periodically in rituals and myths, then, for Eliade, it’s not only space that has become sacralized but time as well. Think, for example, of how the Sabbath has been sacralized in Jewish (and some Christian) traditions.

On Sacredness of Nature and Cosmic Religion

Eliade argues that nature is fraught with religious values. Hence, for Eliade, nature is “never only natural”. It must be noted that for Eliade, this sacrality is not simply based on a divine communication that has designated it or consecrated it as sacred, but within nature are manifestations of the different modalities of the sacred in the very structure of the world and of cosmic phenomena. Eliade writes:

The cosmos as a whole is an organism at once real, living, and sacred; it simultaneously reveals the modalities of being and of sacrality. Ontophany and hierophany meet.

As we can see, as Eliade would have us believe, for the homo religiosus, the supernatural shines through the natural, that nature always expresses something that transcends it.

On Aquatic Symbolism

Eliade turns to the discussion on aquatic symbolism as a rich source of religious symbolism. For Eliade, the waters not only pre-exist the earth as in the Genesis account, but water is one of the symbolisms through which a variety of religious expressions elucidate and make transparent the world and portray the transcendent. As Eliade writes: “The waters symbolize the universal sum of virtualities; they are fons et origo, ‘spring and origin’, the reservoir of all the possibilities of existence; they precede every form and support every creation.” Lands, especially but not exclusively, islands, emerge from the waters. Immersion causes the dissolution of forms. Water implies both death and rebirth. The Flood, Periodical Submersion of the Continents such as in the Atlantis Myth, Baptisms, and a variety of hylogonies, that is, formation of humanity from water, involve, display, and recapitulate “temporary reincorporation into the indistinct, followed by a new creation, a new life, or a ‘new man,’ according to whether the moment involved is cosmic, biological, or soteriological.” In fact, Eliade points out in several examples that “The Fathers of the Church did not fail to exploit certain pre-Christian and universal values of aquatic symbolism, although enriching them with new meanings connected with the historical existence of Christ.”

It must be noted that for Eliade, symbols, such as the aquatic symbol, are pregnant with messages. Indeed, symbols showed the sacred through the cosmic rhythms.

Also, the symbolizations of Terra Mater (or Mother Earth) are replete and pregnant with symbolic implications. It is the womb, nourisher, sustainer of life par excellence that draws hymns of praise and gratitude to the Great and Primordial Mother world-wide. The symbolizations of Mother Earth also convey fecundity, generation, life, and abundance. For homo religiosus “the appearance of life is the central mystery of the world. Life comes from somewhere that is not this world and finally depart from here and goes to the beyond, in some mysterious way continues in an unknown place inaccessible to the majority of mortals. This explains why believers or religious people are convinced that death does not put a final end to life. Death, for them, is but another modality of human existence.

On Human Existence and Sanctified Life

It must be remembered that one of Eliade’s primordial aims in the book is to understand, and to make understandable to others, religious person’s behavior and mental universe. Eliade contends that an existence open to the world is not an unconscious existence “buried in nature”. Openness to the world enables religious person to know herself in knowing the world and this knowledge is precious to her because it is religious, because it pertains to being. Eliade also contends that in the contemporary world, religion as a form of life and Weltanschauung (or worldview) is represented by Christianity. Now, Eliade believes that the whole of human existence is capable of being sanctified. Of course, the means by which its sanctification is brought about are various, but the result is always the same: life is lived on a twofold plane; it takes its course as human existence and, at the same time, shares in a transhuman life, that of the cosmos or the gods. Indeed, homo religiosus lives in an open cosmos and is in turn open to the world. And for Eliade, this means that, first, he is in communication with the gods; and second, he shares in the sanctity of the world.

Final Remarks

On a final note, it must be emphasized that it is in the nature of the human person as a conscious being to create, as Eliade puts it, a cosmos out of chaos. The inescapable human distinction between sacred and profane occurs when the human person attempts to ground herself in her world, to recognize both her own subjectivity and the subjective importance of the physical and temporal spaces she inhabits. Hence, where the profane rules, there is chaos. In a profane universe, there are no values, no distinctions. But the notion of the sacred emerges with consciousness itself, with the realization that this person, who I am, is not like everyone else, because it is me. And this space I inhabit is not like other spaces, because it is the center of my world; and this time is not like other times, because it is the time I am experiencing right now.

So, at the end of the day, even if one claims to have no formal religious beliefs, the sacred/profane distinction still makes itself known. Some places and times, like the neighborhood of one’s youth or a memory of a first love, have an extraordinary personal significance which elevates them above the normal spectrum of space and time. Religious customs, from the most primitive to the most sophisticated, are in essence an acting out of this sacralization of the world; and this sacralizing tendency is as fundamental to human nature as consciousness itself.

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Summary of Pope Francis’s “Dialogue and Friendship in Society”

“Dialogue and Friendship” is the 6th chapter of Pope Francis’s Encyclical Letter, Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father Francis on fraternity and social friendship. In this work, Pope Francis proposes a way of life with emphasis on a love that transcends the barrier of geography and distance. And one of the best ways to materialize this vision is through dialogue and the development of friendships within and across borders. Pope Francis writes:

Approaching, speaking, listening, looking at, coming to know and understand one another, and to find common ground: all these things are summed up in the one word “dialogue”. If we want to encounter and help one another, we have to dialogue.

Social Dialogue for a New Culture

Here, Pope Francis enumerates, among other things, the types of dialogue and the people involved in them, the benefits derived from dialogue, and nature and dynamics of dialogue.

To the first, Pope Francis talks about dialogue between generations, dialogue among our people, readiness to give and receive while remaining to the truth.

To the second, Pope Francis argues that a country flourishes when constructive dialogue occurs between its many rich cultural components: popular culture, university culture, youth culture, artistic culture, technological culture, economic culture, family culture and media culture.

But what dialogue is not?

Pope Francis argues that dialogues should not be confused with the feverish exchange of opinions on social networks which are frequently based on media information that is not always reliable. Pope Francis famously calls these exchanges “monologues”. For Pope Francis, monologues are dangerous and divisive because they engage no one, their content are frequently self-serving and contradictory.

Then Pope Francis talks about obstacles to dialogues, such as the media’s noisy potpourri of facts and opinions. For Pope Francis, this makes one clings stubbornly to his or her own ideas, interest, and choices, with the excuse that everyone else is wrong.

Pope Francis further argues that this subjectivist attitude of people in social media tends to be manipulative as it dominates discussions and tilt public opinion. And this manipulation has been used not only by governments, but also by education, economics, politics, and even in religion.

And so, for Pope Francis, what is happening today is not really dialogue. What is happening is that discussions or assemblies are mere negotiating sessions in which individuals attempt to seize every possible advantage, rather than cooperating in the pursuit of the common good.

Pope Francis then talks about the heroes of the future: those who can break with this unhealthy mindset and determine respectfully to promote truthfulness, aside from personal interest. God willing, such heroes are quietly emerging, even now, in the midst of our society.

Building Together

What Pope Francis would to emphasize here is for us to engage in authentic social dialogue, which is characterized by the ability to respect the other’s point of view and to admit that it may include legitimate convictions and concerns. Pope Francis writes:

Indeed, “in a true spirit of dialogue, we grow in our ability to grasp the significance of what others say and do, even if we cannot accept it as our own conviction. In this way, it becomes possible to be frank and open about our beliefs, while continuing to discuss, to seek points of contact, and above all, to work and struggle together”.

Given the complexity of our society today, Pope Francis calls us to appropriate interdisciplinary dialogues. This means using different approaches and methodologies in addressing a single reality. And this also means respecting and learning from other perspectives.

Basis of Consensus

Here, Pope Francis talks about the solution or alternative to the problem of “monologue” as opposed to dialogue. And he clearly emphasized the fact that “relativism” cannot be the solution. This is because, for Pope Francis, relativism “relativism ultimately leaves the interpretation of moral values to those in power, to be defined as they see fit”. Pope Francis writes:

In the absence of objective truths or sound principles other than the satisfaction of our own desires and immediate needs … we should not think that political efforts or the force of law will be sufficient … When the culture itself is corrupt, and objective truth and universally valid principles are no longer upheld, then laws can only be seen as arbitrary impositions or obstacles to be avoided.

And so, if relativism is not the answer, what then is the solution?

According to Pope Francis, the answer is “consensus” and the “truth”, which for Pope Francis is attained through dialogue. Pope Francis contends that if society is to have a future, it must respect the truth of our human dignity and submit to that truth. Hence, to reiterate, dialogue is necessary.

New Culture

Here, Pope Francis calls for a new culture, that is, a culture of encounter. Pope Francis urges people to be passionate about meeting others, seeking points of contact, building bridges, planning a project that includes everyone. According to the Pope Francis, this should become an aspiration and a style of life, and the subject of this culture is the people, not simply one part of society that would pacify the rest with the help of professional and media resources.

And according to Pope Francis, the lasting and enduring result of this new culture is “peace”.

Lastly, on Recovering Kindness

In this concluding section, Pope Francis calls us to be kind. Despite all the evil things around, we can be kind towards other people. And by kindness, Pope Francis means we can be gentle, pleasant, and supportive. We don’t need to be rude or coarse. We need not offend others by word or deed. And we can always help others and ease their burden. We can also speak of words of comfort, strength, consolation, and encouragement, instead of words that demean, sadden, anger, or show scorn. We can smile to people and listen to them.

Concluding Remarks

Indeed, for Pope Francis, dialogue is respectful, strive for consensus, and seeks the truth. Dialogue opens the way to a culture of encounter so that encounter becomes a passion, a desire, and a way of life. Those who dialogue recognize, befriend, and respect other persons.

It also important to remember that life is the art of encounter given that we are social beings. Pope Francis has repeatedly invited us to build a culture of encounter capable of transcending our differences and divisions. This means working to create a many-faceted polyhedron which represents a society where differences coexist, complementing, enriching and reciprocally illuminating one another, even amidst disagreements and reservations. This also means finding ways to include those on the peripheries of life. The word “culture” points to something deeply embedded within a people, its most cherished convictions and its way of life. And finally, to speak of a “culture of encounter” means that we, as a people, should be passionate about meeting others, seeking points of contact, building bridges, planning a project that includes everyone. This should be our aspiration and a style of life.

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Summary of Luc Bovens’s “The Value of Hope”

First, for Bovens, the issue of hope is very important. But for Bovens, hope receives little attention in scholarly discourses outside the ambit of philosophy of religion. Hence, in his seminal work titled “The Value of Hope”, Bovens attempts to address this gap, this philosophical lacuna. In fact, the paper aims to explore the nature and dynamics of hope, including its importance to our existence.

Two Puzzles of Hope

Bovens begins his attempt to address the problem of hope with an engagement with the core concepts of the film Shawshank Redemption, and then proceeds with the articulation of the two puzzles of hope.

Bovens then briefly sketches the story of Andy, the protagonist of the movie, through Red, a friend appears to skeptical about the value of hope.

According to Bovens, the story presents us with two puzzles of hope, namely: first, there is the practical question of how much one should hope in a particular situation, and second, there is a puzzle concerning the nature of inner strength in relation to hope.

The story shows that Andy was very much hopeful, in fact, hope provides Andy with inner strength. Indeed, Bovens shows that there is connection between Andy’s sense of self-worth and hope. This explains why Andy did not adopt the “prison” mentality”.

Then Bovens asks the connection between hope and self-wort. Bovens then addresses the connection through his engagement with the skeptical attitude towards hope.

Skepticism about Hope

Obviously, there are always rooms for skepticism in almost everything, and in this case, a skepticism about hope.

The point that Bovens would like to show here can be captured in two questions:

  1. What if what one hopes for does not come about?
  2. Or, if it comes about but it is not what one hopes for, what’s the point of hoping?

Hence, we may conclude that it’s better not to hope, or hoping is irrational. And then Bovens illustrated this position, but at the end of the day, Bovens shows through the story of Andy and Red that it is always better to hope.

The Instrumental Value of Hope

After engaging the issue of skepticism about hope, Bovens then proceeds the discussion the instrumental value of hope. The point that Bovens would like to show here is that despite the skeptical attack on hope, it is always better to hope because there is an instrumental value in hoping. Indeed, for Bovens, a hopeful attitude is better than a defeatist attitude. As we can see, despite his seemingly hopeless situation in the prison walls, Andy did not succumb to defeat. As already mentioned, Andy remains hopeful, and it gives him inner strength and self-worth.

Bovens then enumerated the instrumental values of hope, namely:

  1. Hope has enabling function.
  2. Hope counteracts risk aversion.
  3. Hope engenders new constitutive hope.

Hope and Intrinsic Value

Again, for Bovens, the skeptics (including the negative people) always argue that there is no point of hoping because maybe we just get frustrated at the end of the day. But Bovens argues that there is always an “intrinsic” value of hope, and hence, to hope is the best available alternative.

And then Bovens discusses what it is like to hope for. In doing so, Bovens discusses:

  1. The Nature of Hope. Here, Bovens shows that to hope for something means one is convinced that it will come about. When one is hoping, then s/he is expecting that it will come about.
  2. The Pleasure of Anticipation and the Epistemic Value of Hope. Needless to say, for Bovens, once someone is convinced that what she is hoping for will come about, then it will provide some kind of pleasure on the part of the person hoping despite the difficult situation. Bovens brings here the idea of “mental imaging”, that is, anticipating at least mentally the thing one hopes for. Again, for Bovens, this anticipation provide pleasure and satisfaction especially in times of hardships or difficulties.
  3. Hope, Love, and Self-worth. The idea here is that for Bovens, hope is directly connected to love and self-worth. In fact, Bovens says that love vindicates attitude of hoping and fearing.

Hope and Epistemic Rationality

Before Bovens finally address the puzzles of hope, he engages hope and epistemic rationality.

Bovens says that when we hope for something, we assign to some extent subjective probabilities, which is determined by available evidence. But for Bovens, hope is thought to be epistemically rational if one’s belief about the possibility of the outcome is correct in light of the available evidence. Hence, Bovens suggests that we guard ourselves against wishful thinking which violated the rationality of hope.

Finally, on Resolving the Puzzle of Hope

Bovens succinctly articulated his main arguments in this concluding part, and summarizing will distort its main thoughts. Let me just read the concluding part then:

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Summary of Paul Ricoeur’s “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology”

First, it is always a good idea to start with the articulation of the main intention of the paper and its structure. In this way, we will be guided properly in our engagement with the paper.

In terms of its main intention, Ricoeur’s “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology” attempts to address the origin of evil and the reason why people do evil acts. But in particular, Ricoeur is concerned about how we received the challenge of evil, and as I will show later, how the theodicies in the past offered an unsatisfactory account for the problem of evil. Hence, for Ricoeur, the problem, or better yet, the challenge of, evil provokes us to think further about it because of the failure of the past theodicies. Better ideas, therefore, are required. In fact, in the opening paragraph of this article, Ricoeur shows that the problem of evil remains a challenge for both philosophers and religious thinkers. In the opening paragraph of the essay, Ricoeur writes:

That both philosophy and theolog y encounter evil a s a challenge unlike any other, the greatest thinkers in both these disciplines are willing to admit. What is important is the way in which this challenge, or this failure, is received: d o w e find an invitation to think les s about the problem or a provocation to think more, or to think differently about it?

Ricoeur then poses the classic problem in theodicy: How can we affirm at the same time, without contradiction, the following propositions?

  1. God is all powerful.
  2. God is absolutely good.
  3. Yet evil exists.

For many years, philosophers and religious thinkers always view these propositions as contradictories. But it must be noted that for Ricoeur, they are not contradictories.

Ricoeur then explains his point by way of (and this serves as the structure/flow) of the paper:

  1. Phenomenology of the experience of evil.
  2. Discussion of the origin of evil.
  3. Reconnecting the work of thinking, arising out of the enigma, to other responses, stemming from action and feeling.

As we can see, the first part talks about the magnitude, and complexity of the problem of evil from a phenomenological perspective, while the second part talks about the nature and origin of evil. The last part talks about thinking, acting, and feeling in connection with evil, which I see as an alternative that Ricoeur offers to the problem of evil.

Let me now briefly discuss the key concepts of each part.

On the Phenomenology of the Experience of Evil: Between Blame and Lament

According to Ricoeur, scholars, particularly those from the West, tend to equate evil with sin, suffering, and death. However, for Ricoeur, evil can be viewed in two different senses, namely: evil and wrongdoing and evil as suffering. Ricoeur then argues that these two understandings of evil belong to heterogenous categories, namely: blame and lament.

On the one hand, blame for Ricoeur happens when a human action violates the prevailing code of conduct and is declared guilty and worthy of being punished.

On the other hand, there is lament when one is experiencing or undergoing suffering. It is important to note that for Ricoeur, people do not make lament happen to them. Instead, it befalls them.

It also important to note that for Ricoeur, blame and lament opposed each other. Indeed, blame makes one a culprit, while lament reveals that one is a victim.

Now, given the above points, Ricoeur argues that the thinking of the West, that is, the “theodicies” of the past, are unsatisfactory for three reasons: 1) above all, the theodicies of the past tend to reduce to silence the lamentations of the one who suffers; 2) these theodicies are rooted in grounds where philosophy and theology are superimposed in an unjustifiable fashion; and 3) they don’t take into account the fact that the task to think may not be fulfilled by our reasoning and our systematic totalizations.

And given the failure of the theodicies of the past or classical theodicies to properly address the problem of evil, Ricoeur then urges us to think further about the problem of evil.

But how to we think further than the classical theodicies?

According to Ricoeur, we can think further than the classical theodicies by “thinking differently”.

How is it possible?

According to Ricoeur, by seeking the doctrinal nexus for the thought in Christology, which involves abandoning the speculative thinking of classical theodicies. This is because for Ricoeur, the classical theodicies did not do justice to the complaints (laments) of the victims of suffering.

As we can see, Ricouer wants to give voice to the sufferings in life. Indeed, the act of violence of humans towards each other, that is, the evil committed by someone towards the other causes suffering to the latter, and it is at this point where “laments” take center stage.

Levels of Discourse in Speculation on Evil

After Ricoeur discussed the two categories of evil, he now proceeds with the discussion of its origin and development. Here, Ricoeur introduces three stages of discourse on evil, namely: 1) the stage of myth, 2) of wisdom, and 3) of gnosis. Let me just briefly sketch each stage below.

On Myth

The main point here is that for Ricoeur, myth is a kind of narrative that portrays meaning through a story of origins. It asks the question: From whence comes evil?

And we learn that for Ricoeur, myth tells how the human condition came about as something generally wretched and miserable, the profusion of explanatory schemes, for example, the literatures of the Ancient Near East.

It must be noted that for Ricoeur, myth cannot account for or cannot answer the expectations of acting and suffering human beings. In fact, according to Ricoeur, myth tends to confuse one’s thinking on evil, in at least three different ways: first, myth does not differentiate ethics from cosmos, which means that it always presupposes a common source to both good and bad; second, myth aim is to bring answers to the problem of evil, instead of confessing the scandalous character of all evil; and third, myth invites the listener or reader to think in direction of the origin of things, instead of pushing them to think forward and to react against that which is scandalous.

On Wisdom

As already mentioned, myth brings does answer the problem of evil. In fact, according to Ricoeur, it only offers consolation or order. As Ricoeur writes, myth “leaves unanswered one important part of the question, which is not just ‘Why?’ but ‘Why me?’”. And it is here that laments “turns into an actual complaint”. Indeed, wisdom demands that divinity account for itself.

Hence, there is now a need for a shift from narrative (myth) to argument (wisdom): a demand of an answer to the question “why is such the case for each and every one of us?” As Ricoeur writes, “myth must not only narrate the origins, in order to explain how the original human condition reached its present state, it also has to explain why such is the case for each and every one of us. This shift leads us from myth to the stage of Wisdom. Myth narrates, Wisdom agrues.”

And the first answer is Retribution. It argues that all suffering is deserved as a punishment for some individual or collective sin (known or unknown).

But for Ricoeur, the very notion of retribution loses its spell; the apportioning of misfortune can only appear as arbitrary, indiscriminate, and disproportionate. In short, wisdom also cannot account for the suffering of individuals.

On Gnosis and of Anti-Gnostic Gnosis

For Ricoeur, the gap between wisdom and the classical theodicies has been filled by gnosis. As Ricoeur writes, “Western thought is in debt to gnosticism, broadly conceived, for having conceived the problem of evil in terms of one all-encompassing problematic: Unde malum?”

But in addition to the problem of conceiving the problem of evil in terms of the all encompassing question “Unde malum?” (from whence comes evil?) is St. Agustine’s speculation on the problem of evil.

“Augustine takes the idea that evil cannot be held to be a substance, because to think of being is to think of something one, intelligible, and good. Hence, it is philosophical thought that excludes every phantasy of evil as substantial.”

And then Ricoeur discusses in detail Augustine’s take on evil and its inconsistency. But at end of it all, Ricoeur believes that Augustine’s take on evil leaves unanswered the protest of unjust suffering, by condemning it to silence in the name of a massive indictment of the whole of humanity.

On Theodicy

After Ricoeur discussed the three stages of the discourse on evil, he introduces the stage of theodicy. In other words, Ricoeur now engages theodicy proper, with emphasis on Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Barth.

With Leibniz, we have the “principle of the best”. According to Ricoeur, Leibniz focuses on the calculation of the maximum perfections and minimum defects, wherein our world is the result. Leibniz’s principle then fills the gap between logical possibility (the unthinkable) and contingency (what could have happened differently).

And then we have Kant who dismantled rational theory through this Critique of Pure Reason. With Kant’s critique, according to Ricoeur, theodicy shifts from the theoretical to the practical sphere. Also, Kant’s critique, theodicy is deprived of its ontological support which leads into its reduction to mere “transcendental illusion”. But Ricoeur writes:

This is not to say that the problem of evil disappears from the philosophical scene, however. Quite the contrary, in fact. But it now refers uniquely to the practical sphere, as that which ought not to be, and which action must struggle against. This shift from the theoretical to the practical sphere of reason will provide us later with the needed transition to the last stage of my presentation, dealing with the connection between thought, action, and feeling.

And then Ricoeur closes this section his essay with an engagement with Hegel and Barth.

Ricoeur then zeroed in on Hegel’s concept of “negativity” as the underlying principle of his philosophy. For Hegel, negativity is the essence of being. It is the underlying principle of the development of Spirit (or Reason) from the subjective to the objective, and finally to the absolute Spirit, that is, the reconciliation of the subjective and objective Spirit. But the point that Ricoeur would like to show here is that, in the development of Spirit, suffering is a necessary part; hence, the idea of the painful but victorious work of the Spirit. Indeed, Ricoeur argues that Hegel’s system missed to articulate or heed “suffering” as expression of the voices of lamentations.

Ricoeur then engages Barth’s broken dialectic, which sees in evil a reality that is not in proportion with the goodness of God and of creation. Barth’s broken dialectic also justifies humanity’s suffering because God also suffers. But for Ricoeur, this only reopens doubts and speculation towards God and His goodness.

Thinking, Acting, and Feeling with Regard to Evil

As we can see, for Ricoeur, all the accounts on evil that we have just discussed have not properly addressed the problem of evil. But Ricoeur argues that the problem of evil remains a challenge that needs to be addressed. It is here where Ricoeur introduces his notions of action, feelings, and emotions, as an alternative. It must be noted that for Ricoeur, these concepts should not be viewed as “solutions” but simply as a way of responding to the problem of evil but one with a practical implication.

Ricoeur then appropriates Kant’s move from theory to practice. Here, Ricoeur talks about the response of action to the challenge of evil. This means instead of addressing the problem of evil theoretically, that is, explaining the nature and origin of evil, Ricoeur summons us to act on it. In other words, we must fight against evil, which implies giving voice to suffering, doing justice to the victims of suffering. As Ricoeur writes:

For action, evil is above all what ought not to be, but what must be fought against. In this sense, action inverts the orientation of looking at the world. Myth tends to pull speculative thought back toward the origin of things. From whence comes evil, it asks. The response, not the solution, of action is to act against evil. Our vision is thus turned toward the future, by the idea of a task to be accomplished, which corresponds to that of an origin to be discovered.

But Ricoeur admits that the response of action is not enough. Ricoeur then argues that emotional response is a necessary complement to action.

Ricoeur views this emotional response as a ““catharsis of the emotions that nourish the lament and that transform it into complaint”. Here, Ricoeur talks about three stages of this catharsis.

The first stage is to integrate the ignorance it gives rise to, the docta ignorantia, into the work of mourning. Ricoeurs writes:

To the tendency of survivors to feel guilty about the death of someone they loved, as well as to the tendency of victims to blame themselves and to enter into the cruel game of the expiatory victim, we must reply: “No, God did not want that, even less did God want to punish you. I don’t know why things happened as they did, chance and accident are part of the world.”3 This would be the zero degree, so to speak, in the catharsis of the complaint.

The second stage is to allow the lament to develop into a complaint against God. According to Ricoeur, it invites us to pursue this course even to the point of articulating a “theology of protest”. But this complaint against God turns out to be an impatience of hope.

And the third stage in this catharsis is to discover that the reasons for believing in God have nothing in common with the need to explain the origin of suffering. Hence, for Ricoeur, we believe in God despite evil, in spite of suffering. Ricoeur writes:

Suffering is only a scandal for the person who understands God to be the source of everything that is good in creation, including our indignation against evil, our courage to bear it, and our feeling of sympathy toward victims.

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Summary of J. L. Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence”

First of all, let me provide the context of Mackie’s take on evil so we will be able to follow the trajectory of his arguments and fully make sense of the main purpose of the paper.

It must be noted that the question about the existence of God remains to be one of the recurring topics in philosophical discussions and debates. And in the debate about the existence of God, there are always two opposing camps. On the one hand, there are those who argue for the existence of God, and on the other hand, there are those who argue that God does not exist. But as we can see, Mackie argues that those who argue for the existence of God missed to provide enough evidence to convince everyone that God really exists. In fact, as Mackie argues, all the arguments for God’s existence that philosophers in the past had made were faulty. However, Mackie was quick to note that this position should not be used as a reason for someone not to believe in God. Again, it’s just that for Mackie, this argument is irrational. And for Mackie, those who argue for the non-existence of God have not been successful in persuading the believers no matter how they tried. And this is where Mackie comes in.

In his seminal essay titled “Evil and Omnipotence”, Mackie attempts to prove that the belief in a good God is irrational. And Mackie uses the existence of evil as a proof to it. This is because the existence of evil, as a direct opposite of good, will discount the existence of a good God.

As we can see, Mackie’s main argument is that if an all-good God exists, then why the existence of so much evil in the world? Again, Mackie believes that the existence of evil is a direct contradiction of God being absolutely good. As Mackie writes:

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.

Mackie adds:

However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms ‘good’, ‘evil’, and ‘omnipotent’. These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.

Mackie then claims that the propositions: “God is omnipotent”, “God is wholly good”, and “Evil exists” cannot be all true. In fact, Mackie added two more principles which make the three propositions logically contradictory, namely:

  1. If something is wholly good, it always eliminates as much evil as it can.
  2. If something is omnipotent, it can do anything.

And Mackie was convinced that these two principles, which are clear definitions of the concept of good/evil and omnipotence, appear to be reasonable and that most believers would agree with them.

Now, Mackie shows that the three propositions and the two added principles do imply a contradiction, and that at least one of them must be false. Mackie then engages the responses to this problem, and in doing so, he distinguishes two major types of solutions, namely, adequate solutions and fallacious solutions.

To the first, Mackie agrees that the problem for the theist can be solved by giving up one of the three propositions, that is, deny that God is “omnipotent” or good, or deny that there is “evil” in the world. As Mackie writes:

Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one gives up at least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise for you.

However, Mackie thinks that most believers will be unwilling to take this approach. For doing so leaves them with a conception of a God that isn’t worthy of worship, and therefore not religiously significant. Hence, although these solutions are “adequate“, for Mackei, they are not really successful.

To the second, Mackie then proceeds with the examination of the so-called solutions to this problem which purport to remove the contradiction without abandoning any of its constituent propositions. In other words, for Mackie, these solutions remain to be unsuccessful as they are in themselves fallacious. Let me now briefly engage each solution.

The first solution reads:

“Good cannot exist without evil.” Or ” Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good.”

​The idea here is that God could not have made a world which had any good without allowing some evil, since it is impossible for goodness to exist without evil. But Mackie argues that this argument is indeed a “limitation” on God’s omnipotence. Mackie says that this

… sets a limit to what God can do, saying that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil, and this means either that God is not omnipotent or that there are some limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.

Now, Mackie writes:

It may be replied that these limits are always presupposed, that omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the present view the existence of good without evil would be a logical impossibility.

In other words, what Mackie tries to say here is that the believers may resort to the argument that omnipotence does not extend to doing logically impossible things. As St. Thomas Aquinas argues, “God can do all things that are possible”.

In response to this, Mackie uses the analogy of size. He asks: “Does (relative) greatness require (relative) smallness?”

Mackie then concludes that good things are only relatively good, even that God is only relatively good. Hence, it would appear that God is trying to maximize relative goodness. But if one thinks of God trying to make everything in the universe relatively bigger, one realizes that this does not make much sense. In fact, Mackie argues that this does not work if one imagines something to be absolutely good or big. This is because, as Mackie would have us believe, an absolutely big thing like the universe does not require smaller things to exist in order for it to be big. The same would be true of an absolutely good thing.

Indeed, for Mackie, the argument that goodness requires evil as a counterpart does not hold water.

The second solution reads:

“Evil is necessary as a means to good.”

The basic idea here is that God uses evil to bring about goodness. In other words, evil is a means to an end. The classic example is the argument that “suffering”, such as becoming broke or losing a loved one, is necessary for personal development.


For Mackie, this argument implies a restriction on God’s omnipotence. If it is a law of cause-and-effect that evil has to cause goodness, then, for Mackie, omnipotence ought to be able to break this law. Most believers think God created the laws of causality in the first place and miracles are supposed to show God breaking causal laws. Mackie writes:

In its simple form this has little plausibility as a solution of the problem of evil, since it obviously implies a severe restriction of God’s power. It would be a causal law that you cannot have a certain end without a certain means, so that if God has to introduce evil as a means to good, he must be subject to at least some causal laws.

The third solution reads:

“The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil.”

The basic idea here is that certain kinds of evil are necessary for certain kinds of good. Mackie uses the analogy of pain and disease to drive his point. Indeed, without disease and pain, it would be impossible to have medical advances and feelings of sympathy for the sick. Mackie mentions the analogy used by Augustine of Hippo of an artist who includes ugly features in his work, such as discordant notes and dark colors, for an overall pleasing effect.

Mackie then makes an important distinction between first and second-order goods and evils: 

…evil (1) is pain and good (1) is happiness, but good (2) involves compassion and courage which are only possible in a world with evil (1) in it.

Mackie then explains the “fatal objection” to this:

…there must also be evil (2), such as cruelty. If the theist argues that there is good (3), which is increasing the amount of good (2) in the world, then there is also evil (3), which is increasing the amount of evil (2). This leads to an infinite regress.

And so, again, solution number 3 does not hold water.

The fourth solution reads:

“Evil is due to human freewill.”

The idea here is that many kinds of evil are not the result of God’s actions, but of the free actions of human beings.


Mackie asks how can this count as a solution to the problem of evil, given that God created the free willed creatures? The theist’s reply has to be something like this:

  1. Free will is a great good; creatures that lack freewill are automata and a world of automata would be worse than a world with evil in it.
  2. It is impossible, even for God, to create a being which has free will and to ensure that it never brings about evil.

It is better that God made us with freewill and not as robots or automata who are kind or brave in a machine-like way. An all-powerful, good God would make a world in which human beings have freewill and can choose kindness over cruelty. Mackie’s main objection is to question why God didn’t create us so that we always choose good over evil of our own freewill. Why couldn’t we have been created morally stronger beings? It’s possible to be free willed and yet always choose good actions instead of evil ones. Mackie writes:

God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.

As we can see, when theists say that making wrong choices is necessary for freedom, Mackie accuses them of confusing freewill with randomness. Mackie thinks freewill involves acting in accord with our character. We only blame a person if we think their actions come from a bad character. If free actions were random, we would have no reason to condemn people. But if freewill is based on character, it does not solve the problem of evil because God creates us with our characters, so he is ultimately responsible for our choices.

Mackie concludes that the “Freewill Defence” only works if you assume God is not omnipotent. He explains the Paradox of Omnipotence with the idea of God creating something he can’t control, that is, first, if God can’t create truly free creatures, there is a limit to his power, and second, if God can create truly free creatures, there is something he can’t control and therefore a limit to his power. Either way, omnipotence is impossible.

Conclusion

It must be noted that Mackie did not offer any solution to the problem of evil and omnipotence. What Mackie did is simply examine the solutions theists offered to the problem of evil and omnipotence. Let me end this lecture by reading Mackie’s conclusion:

“Of the proposed solutions of the problem of evil which we have examined, none has stood up to criticism. There may be other solutions which require examination, but this study strongly suggests that there is no valid solution of the problem which does not modify at least one of the constituent propositions in a way which would seriously affect the essential core of the theistic position. Quite apart from the problem of evil, the paradox of omnipotence has shown that God’s omnipotence must in any case be restricted in one way or another, that unqualified omnipotence cannot be ascribed to any being that continues through time. And if God and his actions are not in time, can omnipotence, or power of any sort, be meaningfully ascribed to him?”

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William Rowe’s Argument from Evil

In his work titled Arguments/Ruminations from Evil, William Rowe presents an argument against the existence of God that had been captured in two succinct premises, namely:

1) Probably, there is pointless suffering in the world.

2) If God exists, there is no pointless suffering.

3) Thus, probably, God does not exist.

As stated in the first premise, Rowe began his argument by proving his claim that there are instances of pointless suffering, more specifically, suffering that could have been prevented by an omnipotent and caring God without losing something for the greater good or permitting something worse to happen. His famous example of this is the pointless and agonizing suffering of a fawn that had been badly burned in a forest fire. Rowe sees the suffering of the fawn as pointless in the sense that God, or any divine deity out there, could have prevented the fire or the innocent fawn from dying or at least put it out of its misery, without causing any hindrance to any possible greater good or causing something far worse to happen. It’s a dying fawn, if He killed it now, it obviously dies; if He makes it suffer for hours, it still dies. The lack of any divine intervention begs the question of what reason does God have to deny the fawn of death.

While a theist may insist that there is a reason for Him letting the pointless suffering to happen, Rowe opens the possibility that it could be that He doesn’t have one or that He hadn’t stopped it either because he did not want to or because he wasn’t there. However, the point was set; there are instances of pointless suffering in the world and that these pointless sufferings prompt the inquiry into the justifications behind His actions. Curiously, despite his example of the burned deer, Rowe admits that it wasn’t conclusive that the first premise was true but that it was a reasonable case enough to accept, a point which will be discussed later on.

With his first premise explained and defended, he moves on to question the nature of God. Despite his refutation of the existence of the Christian God, his inductive argument which is directed against the former actually relies on the traditionally held idea that God is a being with omni-attributes, that is, He is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent. It is with these attributes in mind that theists and atheists alike can concede that if evil is to be permitted then there must be a form of “divine justification” since their God is loving and kind.  Rowe cites instances where He can allow evil to exist, and they are as follows:

– A greater good occurs in such a case where evil occurs,

– A greater good occurs in such a case where evil, or some evil equally bad or 

      worse occurs,

– Or, evil is preventable only in such a case which God permits some evil equally 

      bad or worse.

– So, if some evil occurs, then either (i), (ii), or (iii) must obtain.

If one agrees to these points, one affirms the validity of the second premise that there is no cases of pointless suffering since God has justification. However, this particular premise is quickly invalidated by Rowe through the mere affirmation of the first premise wherein he has already proven that there are instances of pointless suffering wherein God could have prevented without violating his divine justifications but didn’t.

In addition to the attack on the “divine justifications” that have been forwarded in defense of God, the omni-nature of God came under fire seeing as there are instances of pointless suffering that He could have prevented without contradicting himself. The lack of intervention, for Rowe, shows that He is not as omnipotent or as omnibenevolent as the theists have suggested since he would have either seen the being suffering pointlessly and had chosen not to intervene, contradicting his all-kindness, or he had not seen him at all and thusly could not do anything, contradicting his all-seeing nature.

Therefore, with the first premise reasonably accepted, the second conclusion is invalidated and the conclusion logically states that God does not exist because the instances of pointless suffering evident in the world proves that not only is his nature contradictory and flawed in the face of evil, but the claim that there is no suffering that is pointless is just implausible.

As well-received, logical and succinct Rowe had been with this argument against God, there is one point in his argumentation that poses a very stark threat to his entire case. This apparent flaw lies at the very core of his first premise, more specifically in his justification of his readers accepting the first premise on the grounds that it is reasonable enough to believe or accept. It becomes problematic in that this statement itself is questionable. People may not easily find the first premise reasonable enough to accept due to the circumstantial nature of his main example (the burnt and dying deer) and may request a more concrete instance to be presented before agreeing to Rowe’s claim. They may also doubt the premise simply because it is a conclusion that had been drawn from just one cited circumstance. If the reader is not convinced in his examples or pieces of evidence, they are more likely to not accept or to not affirm the first premise. With this, his whole argumentation becomes less significant as the reader may not see the value of the first premises invalidation of the second premise.

Another aspect that Rowe had glossed over is the nature of the evil that he is referring to in support of his case. The evil that befell the fawn is more likely to be considered as something that could be classified as a “natural evil” which means that it is something that man cannot control. It begets the question of why he did not consider including moral and physical evils in the banner of pointless evils. There are notable instances of pointless moral evils in the world even during his time but it seems odd that he did not engage them. Rowe’s case may or may not had opted out of using moral and psychological evils for fear of falling under the argument of free will, however, this does leave an unexplored point in his argument.

Though his argument can be summarized within three lines of arguments, the implication and significance of his claim has prompted a new perspective in the ongoing debate on God’s existence. His inductive arguments not only helped solidify the need for more logical analysis of the discourse as opposed to historical re-tracings but it also introduced a new point of departure for succeeding philosophers, that is, the presence of cases of pointless sufferings being an indispensable proof for both the flawed nature of the Christian Omni-God but also of his non-existence.

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John Hick’s Soul-Making Theodicy

In direct contrast to William Rowe is the soul-making theodicy put forward by John Hicks, a 20thcentury philosopher. In his theodicy, Hick not only claims that there is no such thing as pointless suffering in the world, but that despite there being evil in the world, God still exists and he is still kind and omnipotent since the evil that he allowed helps people in their development and soul-making.

The discussion on Hick’s theodicy began with a clarification of what the former thinks about the “Fall of Man” and how it shaped our conception of human nature. His view on the “Fall of Man” is quite notable as it presents his denial of the traditional Augustinian account of the fall of man. Traditional Augustinian philosophy/theology would tell us that the main reason as to why moral evils exist in the world is mainly due to our God-given freedom, and that the “original sin” (Adam and Eve’s sin of disobeying God) is the cause of all of the world’s natural and psychological evils since it caused us to drift away from God. The only way for us to be reconciled with Him is through atonement and redemption through His grace, which we can find in the Church.

For Hick, this account of the fall of man is inconsistent for three reasons:

  1. Scientifically, pain and sorrow have existed even before the supposed fall of 

man. The mere existence of man and the world already indicates the existence of fear, pain, agony, and hunger, among others.

  1. Morally, Hick finds it unfair to have an entire race suffer for the sins of two 

individuals (Adam and Eve). With this, even a baby is considered a sinner even before he had learned how to walk! This only serves to paint God as a vengeful, unjust and immoral Being.

  1. Lastly, Hick finds this account logically inconsistent seeing as man and the 

world, in Augustine’s account, is described as perfect and almost god-like. By all accounts, that also goes to imply that they are flawless and are perfect enough not to perform actions that are obvious violations of God’s orders. Augustine’s version of man then after the fall is not a developed one but is one that has regressed from being perfect to antiquated.

With the idea of the “original sin” denied, sinning, then, for Hicks is something that was influenced by an inner or outer flaw. This led to Hick claiming that humans and the world were created by God, before or after the fall, imperfectly or unfinished. This claim would prove significant in his theodicy as it is because of our imperfectness or our being created unfinished by God that gives us the need to have evil exist.

For Hick, evil or suffering is not exactly pointless or unnecessary since it is vital to God’s “master plan,” and so it does not contradict God’s nature but in one way or another, it actually supports the omni-attributes. Since humans are created unfinished, then they are still in the process of creation and one way in which God gives man the avenue for development is by letting evil exist. With God allowing it to be in the world, Hick claims that it serves as the catalyst for man to become virtuous beings through becoming people that are more than capable of following His will. Suffering then is not exactly pointless or there is no such thing as pointless suffering since it helps ‘perfect’ man, which is the express purpose of what Hick calls soul-making.

The concept of soul-making is the core of Hick’s theodicy. As mentioned before, the main objective of pain and suffering is to help mankind become perfect. By this, Hick doesn’t mean to become flawless and ethereal beings but to become beings that are not only virtuous (as mentioned before) but are also conscious and aware of their dependence on God. This need for God is emphasized when Hick states that it is through the man being ignorant of this dependence on Him that he falls into sin and fall away from Him (this may be the internal or external flaw that he was referring to in his refutation of traditional Augustinian perspectives).

With this awareness of our relationship with God, one can begin to understand why Hick says that a sinner can have their sins done away with through redemption that is freely chosen seeing as man now knows that to be perfect is to be one that aligns their will to His. The perfect man or the perfect child of God is not something that is created but is something that is developed, nurtured, or perhaps fostered.  The world, therefore, does not only allow for the cultivation of this idea of perfection but is “…a valley of soul-making,” which means that it is a place where self and spiritual development is always happening.

But, according to Hick, the soul-making process is not one that we can complete on Earth. It may be due to the natural life-span of man or to the unpredictability of our environment, but the process of self -development, and soul making is one that will reach completion in the afterlife despite the fact that it begins on Earth. It is a process that will occupy man for the entirety of his mortal life and perhaps even after it. Nonetheless, John Hick’s soul-making theodicy does present a more optimistic and positive perspective of God’s position and actions in the face of evil being present in the world. His theodicy does not necessitate a compromise of the three omni-attributes but invokes the idea of a God that is as loving as he is patient. However, this does not mean that it is beyond critique.

One of the criticisms that makes itself apparent is the scope of the soul-making process. As we have understood from Hick, one of the main motivation for God to let the world experience suffering is to help them develop and become virtuous beings that acknowledge their dependence on Him. Does this also mean that this soul-making process also extends to the non-human beings? If not, then it begs the question of why God allowed these non-human beings (which includes, but are not limited to, animals, plants, insects, and microorganisms) to suffer the same evil as human beings if they are not included in the development. Following his inclination to using scientific evidence, the inclusion of the non-humans would imply that God unfairly subjected the non-human beings to pain and suffering as far back as Mesozoic Era in anticipation of the human race’s development despite the fact that they do not come into existence for at least several billion years later. This line of argumentation not only works against the idea of a kind God but also of an omnipotent God.

Another point of contention in Hick’s theodicy concerns the duration of the soul-making process. If the person at the beginning of the process is the same at the end of it in the sense that they were still both developing, then what does the completion of the process entail? If it truly did entail the development of man into a perfect being, then why does God want to wait for a person to die before he can become someone reconcilable to Him? Pragmatically-speaking, it would make more sense to have man return and believe in Him while they were still alive as to assist others in reaching God-consciousness? This line of questioning, in turn, invokes the idea of an afterlife wherein man can actually ‘reap’ the results of his life-long struggle for development and ‘be with’ his/her creator. Sadly, Hick was silent about the idea of a life after death nor did he clarify why the process had to end in death and not when a person reaches an epiphany.

Yet, by the end of it all, John Hick’s idea of a life-long process of self and spiritual development is one that gives a more positive perspective of an evil-filled world. Suffering does exist, but it is not detrimental to both man and his world as it is through pain and suffering that they learn to become better versions of themselves, to be virtuous, God-conscious, and perfect beings that are on their way to being reconciled with Him in this life or the next.

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St. Anselm’s Argument for God’s Existence

One of the famous arguments for the existence of God is the ontological argument. And, as is well known, of all the versions of the ontological argument, it is Anselm’s argument for God’s existence that stands out the most.

What is common among these versions of ontological argument, including Anselm’s argument for God’s existence, is the claim that it is self-contradictory to deny the existence of a greatest possible being. In other words, for the adherents of the ontological argument, the existence of a greatest possible being is necessary, and He is God. Therefore, God exists.

On a side note, according to Norman Melchert (1999), the term “ontological” comes from the ancient Greek word onto, which means being. The term “ontological argument” was given such name in the eighteenth century by one of its critics, namely, Immanuel Kant. This is because, unlike the argument of St. Thomas Aquinas, it does not begin from facts about the world from which the term “cosmological arguments” was derived. Instead, it goes straight from the idea of God to the conclusion about his being and his necessary existence.

According to Melchert, many thinkers find it important to distinguish two, or even more, distinct arguments because at least one form of the argument is pretty obviously invalid. In his version of the ontological argument, Anselm does not do so. Many thinkers interpret Anselm’s argument as one argument. Let us now briefly sketch Anselm’s argument for God’s existence.

Anselm’s Argument for God’s Existence: A Brief Sketch

For Anselm, God does not just exist, but God “truly and necessarily” exists so that it is impossible for us to think that He does not exist. According to Melchert, this apparently simple, yet deeply perplexing argument is called in the history of philosophy as ontological argument.

Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, which he developed in his famous work titled Proslogium, begins with a definition of God. But the idea of definition here does not necessarily refer to the “idea” of something as produced by experience. By “definition” Anselm means our rather abstract conception of God when we utter the word God.

For Anselm, God is a being in which nothing greater can be thought of or, in Anselm’s own words, “than, that which no greater can be conceived” (Melchert, p. 270). According to Melchert, Anselm used this convoluted phrase for two reasons. On the one hand, Anselm does not want the idea of God to be limited by what we may be able to conceive. On the other hand, Anselm does not want to suggest that a positive conception of God can be entirely comprehensible by us. Suppose we are thinking or conceiving of a certain being. According to Anselm, if the mind can still conceive of something greater than what we have just thought, then it is not yet God that we have conceived. This is because it is not yet “that, than which no greater can be conceived”. Hence, as we can see, Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence rests entirely on the conception of a being in which nothing greater can be thought of or, again, in Anselm’s own words, “that, than which no greater can be conceived”.

It is important to note that this line of thinking was framed in terms of the Augustinian notion of a Great Chain of Being. As we may already know, the Great Chain of Being is a hierarchical structure of all matter and life, which, in medieval Christianity, has been understood as being decreed by God. This means that the world is ordered by the degrees of being and value (or greatness) in its various parts. For example, the tree is higher than the stone, while humans are higher than the trees, and so on. Now, if we move up and down the chain, it would appear pretty obvious that we can easily conceive of lesser and greater beings; and in doing so, we are inevitably led to think of an idea of something that is not only greater than other beings, but of an idea of something that we cannot even think of a greater. As Anselm would have us believe, this being, which is at the highest point of the Great Chain of Being, is God.

Now, if God is a being in which nothing greater can be conceived, is there such being in reality? Of course, it might be the case that this being in which nothing greater can be thought of exists only in the mind, like the idea of a golden mountain or a unicorn. As we can see, this calls to mind the contention of the atheists that “There is no God”.

In response to this, Anselm argues that the claim that God does not exist in reality is absurd because while we can utter the words “There is no God” or “God does not exist”, we cannot clearly think what we mean without falling into the pit of contradiction. This is because the idea of God appears to be self-evident. If we think of the Great Chain of Being, we cannot help but affirm the existence of a being in which nothing greater can be conceived. God, therefore, necessarily exists.

As we can see, the atheists are wrong, at least for Anselm. Indeed, for Anselm, the statement “There is no God” or “God does not exist” is absolutely false. Hence, as Anselm argues, it follows not only that God exists but also that it is impossible that He does not exist. Melchert (p. 273) puts Anselm’s argument for God’s existence this way:

Anselm’s argument for God’s existence, as we can see above, moves from God’s essence to God’s existence. In other words, it moves from our understanding of what God is to the fact that God is. “In certain clear sense, the argument is a claim that the existence of God is self-evident. What that means is that it is enough to understand the conception of God to know that God must exist. Nothing else is required. God’s essence entails God’s existence.” (Melchert, p. 273)

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Descartes’ Proofs for God’s Existence

Descartes’ proofs for God’s existence came after he had proven that it is his ability to doubt that proved his very own existence. The argument that culminated in his most famous dictum, “cogito ergo sum,” is what some scholars would call the first certitude in his philosophy. The second certitude is the proof for God’s existence or that he exists despite our doubting of everything else in our immediate world, and Descartes’ argument promptly “starts off” where the first certitude ends. He proves His existence using the idea of perfection.

At this point in his philosophy, it is a fact that man has the ability to doubt everything that surrounds him. Due to the fact that man has this said ability, Descartes believes that he is an imperfect being. But despite his being imperfect, he can still think of perfection and he can still conceive of a more perfect being than himself which is God. This would not make sense because an imperfect being cannot think of or know of perfection and of such a perfect being, that is, unless there is someone or something out there that had given or bestowed upon him this idea of perfection, allowing him to be able to know it or conceive it.

According to Descartes, for man to be able to do that, it must also follow that this being must also be perfect to be able to impart the idea of perfection since it makes no logical sense for an imperfect being to impart knowledge of perfection to anyone else. The only perfect being that can do this is God; and since we can conceive him and know of his perfection-therefore, God exists.

His argument was short, concise and impactful but continued to be logical and sensible. But as well-written and elucidated it is, there remains several points of clarification and considerations. Firstly, Descartes has to defend or clarify whether God is necessarily perfect. In his argument, it is because of our ability to conceive of perfection that necessitated the existence of a perfect being but how will Descartes’ argumentation hold if the very being that imparts the knowledge of his existence to man, the imperfect being, is not the perfect being that the philosopher was describing?

If his answer would still be in the affirmative, that God is perfect, it would also be logical to say that it still wouldn’t necessarily follow that man would, each and every time, hold the idea of God as a being that is perfect. Several sects of the faith do believe in God, however, they do not see him as the omni-God or the perfect God but they see him as the imperfect God or a God that suffers and bleeds with them. An Atheist can still think of and conceive of God but they see him as a flawed being; a being that isn’t just, that doesn’t listen, and so on and so forth. Man would then still know of God but we then have an imperfect idea of God. Such an idea would make it hard to continue to call that deity “God” seeing as that God would then be seen as a Being that is just as vulnerable and erroneous as man which is the complete opposite to the idea of the Christian God.

Secondly, is man’s capability to conceive ideas of perfection and of God really evidence enough to declare the existence of God? As Descartes himself has said, men are imperfect beings that still use their unreliable senses to gain knowledge and understanding of their world, regardless of whether that knowledge is true or not. It is then reasonable to see man having different or deviant ideas of perfection. In the very first place, it is difficult to get to one idea of perfection seeing as man can think of many ways that perfection can be characterized, so is it really the best idea of concept to use in justifying the existence of a transcendent Being? If man’s ability to know of perfection can lead to the conclusion that there is a being that is more perfect than us, does that also mean that man’s ability to think of and conceive of evil and unjustness also lead to the existence of a perfectly evil and unjust being? If so, wouldn’t that defeat the purpose for his having included the defense of God in his works when it would also defend the existence of His counterpart?

Still, despite the fact that his argument kept being questioned at every possible opportunity, his defense of God’s existence through the consideration of man’s imperfect nature and his ability to conceive of perfection and the idea of God by itself is a testament to his sound and resourceful logic. Considering that this has been conceived of and written in the 17th century, it is a feat then that Descartes’ philosophy continues to find relevance in modern society and thought and that it has paved the way for man’s reconsideration of what truth actually is and how we can attain it.

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St. Thomas Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence

To answer the question concerning God’s existence, St. Thomas Aquinas presented five ways or proofs in his most notable work, the Summa Theologica. This is also called “Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence”. These five arguments draw proof or evidence from man’s experience with the world, which are noticeably influenced by Aristotle and his concept of the four causes.

The first argument that Aquinas formulated is the argument from motion. After observing objects in motion, Aquinas was convinced that whatever is currently in motion were once at rest but had changed states when it was moved by something else. This mover was something once at rest as well but was also moved by something else. This line of thought would go on and on until it forms an almost infinite series of concurrent events where the objects are both movers and moved. But if this series of events needed something to begin the movement, then, it is logical to assume that at the very beginning of this infinite series is the first mover, which starts the movement.  Aquinas describes this first mover as the “unmoved mover,” a label which is quite similar to Aristotle’s “prime mover.” As we can see, both see this mover as one that is not caused or moved by anything other than itself. And for Aquinas, this is God.

The second argument is the argument from causation, which builds upon Aristotle’s concept of the efficient cause. The main idea here is that every object, action, or event, according to Aristotle, has an efficient cause or an entity or event responsible for its creation or change. Just like how a baby finds their efficient cause in their parents and their parents in their own parents and so on and so forth, Aquinas uses these examples of dependent relationships to show that every person or object in the world depends on a creator (efficient cause) and that this creator also has its own creator, and this new creator also has its own efficient cause. This cycle, much like the argument from motion, can go on infinitely but, according to Aquinas, it should not be so since in the first place the series would not have begun.

It is then logical to assume that at the very beginning, there is the existence of a “First Maker” or an “Uncaused Cause,” which, as the name suggests, is the efficient cause that is not caused by others or anything but itself. This “Uncaused Cause” is, of course, attributed by Aquinas to the Christian God.

The third argument is the argument from contingency which necessitates the distinction between “necessary” and “possible” beings. “Possible” beings, simply put, are beings that can be created and corrupted or are beings that can exist and not exist. An example of a possible being is man. Man is a possible being because we have the potential to exist (birth) and the same potential to not exist (death). Plants, animals, and structures are among some of the other beings included in this category.

With this in mind, it is then reasonable to think that since most beings in the world are possible beings, then there must have been a time that they had not existed at all, which means that nothing ever existed. And if there truly was a time of pure non-existence, then nothing could currently exist because nothingness can only yield nothingness. The only way that our existence at this very moment could be explained, for Aquinas, is if there was a being that already exists despite the nothingness of the possible beings.

This being is called a necessary being. Necessary beings, on the other hand, are beings that necessarily exist or are beings that cannot be nonexistent. For Aquinas, there must be at least one necessary being to exist at the very beginning for the rest of the beings to be able to exist. This being is, of course, God.

The fourth argument is the argument from degrees of perfection. This argument makes use of man’s knowledge of perfection and his tendency to judge or evaluate whether an object or person is more or less perfect. This action of judging something to be more or less perfect means that there is a standard that is used for the said evaluation. But how could man ever have such standards unless there is a being that is all-perfect to compare it to? Aquinas affirms the existence of such a perfect being and says that if any other being would be compared or evaluated against such perfection, they would always be judged as less perfect. He calls this all-perfect being God.

The fifth and last argument in St. Thomas Aquinas’s five proofs for God’s existence is the argument from final causes or design. Some scholars would also call this as the teleological argument. Aquinas once again drew on the notions of causality as presented by Aristotle to justify this argument. The “final cause,” as described by Aristotle, is the fourth cause and is one that refers to “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done.” Some scholars would describe it, rather simply, as the cause that refers to the purpose of which a specific object or entity has been created to fulfill.

Humans and most natural beings in the world have been “designed” to have a purpose and we behave or act according to that purpose. For instance, the bird’s wings behave in accordance with its design which allows it to fly. Humans talk using their mouths because this is in accordance with their body’s design which allows them to utilize air and various muscles in their body to create sounds.

For Aquinas, if there is some sort of design that is set in our world, then there must be a designer. This designer cannot possibly just be humans or other natural beings themselves as he describes man as imperfect and not intelligent enough to set such a grand design. Some of the natural beings, Aquinas tells us, are not even capable enough to know what their end is. The design of the world, therefore, must have been set by a being that is vastly more intelligent than humans and knowledgeable enough to guide them towards their end. This, of course, is God.

Aquinas’ five proofs for God’s existence, during, of course, Aquinas’ time, were found to be compelling enough and soon grew to be influential in religious discourses. For some religious denominations, these arguments still remain significant in defense of the Faith up until the 21st century, where most of them have been incorporated into doctrines and statements. But as groundbreaking as St. Thomas Aquinas’ arguments were and are, there is still room for critique.

St. Thomas Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence: A Brief Critique

The main criticism that one can immediately infer from these arguments is the fact that a majority of them remain as assumptions. Though St. Thomas Aquinas did invoke observations from man’s experience with natural phenomena as well as logic to prove his point, there is no concrete way of knowing whether these events do happen in the manner that the theologian-philosopher has described it.  In the case of the first proof, there is no concrete explanation as to whether every single movement in this world can be traced back to one single cause nor is there enough proof to determine that an event or an object is necessarily moved or affected by the simultaneous movement of another object or entity. In the case of the fifth argument, it is simply too illogical to immediately assume that just because the bird’s wings are aerodynamic or that humans are capable of speech it automatically suggests the presence of both a grand design and of a grand intelligent mind when, in the same paradigm, the notion of spontaneity and adaption exists.

Interestingly, he did speak of this same point in the Summa Theologica as Objection #2 and his response to this response is as follows: “For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature, and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason. Therefore, there is no need to suppose God’s existence.”  Though the reduction does serve the purpose of trying the establish concrete principles where he can root his arguments on, the idea that natural and voluntary things can be reduced into just nature and reason is still an assumption by itself.

It is tempting to think that there is indeed such a connection between the beings in the world, but as far as human knowledge is concerned, these conclusions are merely a product of inference and are not concretely proven.

This then leads to the second point of my criticism. Should a person not be satisfied with the assumptions forwarded by St. Thomas Aquinas and decides to do away with them, then Aquinas’s five proofs will become irrelevant. The arguments would not be able to stand once you remove the assumptions, such as the assumption that the one thing is caused by another or that if the notion of a grand design necessitates the existence of a grand designer, as these are the logical links between his premises. To continue to believe in these arguments without said assumptions, one must somehow either see it in a dogmatic light or ignore contrary logical proof.

Despite these criticisms, St. Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy has withstood time and continues to play a significant role in the development of both the Church and modern theology. By incorporating human experience, logic, and Aristotle in his attempt of proving His existence, he not only formulated five succinct and insightful arguments but he had also brought theology further than what his time had expected.

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