PHILO-notes

First, it is always a good idea to start with the articulation of the main intention of the paper and its structure. In this way, we will be guided properly in our engagement with the paper.

In terms of its main intention, Ricoeur’s “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology” attempts to address the origin of evil and the reason why people do evil acts. But in particular, Ricoeur is concerned about how we received the challenge of evil, and as I will show later, how the theodicies in the past offered an unsatisfactory account for the problem of evil. Hence, for Ricoeur, the problem, or better yet, the challenge of, evil provokes us to think further about it because of the failure of the past theodicies. Better ideas, therefore, are required. In fact, in the opening paragraph of this article, Ricoeur shows that the problem of evil remains a challenge for both philosophers and religious thinkers. In the opening paragraph of the essay, Ricoeur writes:

That both philosophy and theolog y encounter evil a s a challenge unlike any other, the greatest thinkers in both these disciplines are willing to admit. What is important is the way in which this challenge, or this failure, is received: d o w e find an invitation to think les s about the problem or a provocation to think more, or to think differently about it?

Ricoeur then poses the classic problem in theodicy: How can we affirm at the same time, without contradiction, the following propositions?

1. God is all powerful.
2. God is absolutely good.
3. Yet evil exists.

For many years, philosophers and religious thinkers always view these propositions as contradictories. But it must be noted that for Ricoeur, they are not contradictories.

Ricoeur then explains his point by way of (and this serves as the structure/flow) of the paper:

1. Phenomenology of the experience of evil.
2. Discussion of the origin of evil.
3. Reconnecting the work of thinking, arising out of the enigma, to other responses, stemming from action and feeling.

As we can see, the first part talks about the magnitude, and complexity of the problem of evil from a phenomenological perspective, while the second part talks about the nature and origin of evil. The last part talks about thinking, acting, and feeling in connection with evil, which I see as an alternative that Ricoeur offers to the problem of evil.

Let me now briefly discuss the key concepts of each part.

On the Phenomenology of the Experience of Evil: Between Blame and Lament

According to Ricoeur, scholars, particularly those from the West, tend to equate evil with sin, suffering, and death. However, for Ricoeur, evil can be viewed in two different senses, namely: evil and wrongdoing and evil as suffering. Ricoeur then argues that these two understandings of evil belong to heterogenous categories, namely: blame and lament.

On the one hand, blame for Ricoeur happens when a human action violates the prevailing code of conduct and is declared guilty and worthy of being punished.

On the other hand, there is lament when one is experiencing or undergoing suffering. It is important to note that for Ricoeur, people do not make lament happen to them. Instead, it befalls them.

It also important to note that for Ricoeur, blame and lament opposed each other. Indeed, blame makes one a culprit, while lament reveals that one is a victim.

Now, given the above points, Ricoeur argues that the thinking of the West, that is, the “theodicies” of the past, are unsatisfactory for three reasons: 1) above all, the theodicies of the past tend to reduce to silence the lamentations of the one who suffers; 2) these theodicies are rooted in grounds where philosophy and theology are superimposed in an unjustifiable fashion; and 3) they don’t take into account the fact that the task to think may not be fulfilled by our reasoning and our systematic totalizations.

And given the failure of the theodicies of the past or classical theodicies to properly address the problem of evil, Ricoeur then urges us to think further about the problem of evil.

But how to we think further than the classical theodicies?

According to Ricoeur, we can think further than the classical theodicies by “thinking differently”.

How is it possible?

According to Ricoeur, by seeking the doctrinal nexus for the thought in Christology, which involves abandoning the speculative thinking of classical theodicies. This is because for Ricoeur, the classical theodicies did not do justice to the complaints (laments) of the victims of suffering.

As we can see, Ricouer wants to give voice to the sufferings in life. Indeed, the act of violence of humans towards each other, that is, the evil committed by someone towards the other causes suffering to the latter, and it is at this point where “laments” take center stage.

Levels of Discourse in Speculation on Evil

After Ricoeur discussed the two categories of evil, he now proceeds with the discussion of its origin and development. Here, Ricoeur introduces three stages of discourse on evil, namely: 1) the stage of myth, 2) of wisdom, and 3) of gnosis. Let me just briefly sketch each stage below.

On Myth

The main point here is that for Ricoeur, myth is a kind of narrative that portrays meaning through a story of origins. It asks the question: From whence comes evil?

And we learn that for Ricoeur, myth tells how the human condition came about as something generally wretched and miserable, the profusion of explanatory schemes, for example, the literatures of the Ancient Near East.

It must be noted that for Ricoeur, myth cannot account for or cannot answer the expectations of acting and suffering human beings. In fact, according to Ricoeur, myth tends to confuse one’s thinking on evil, in at least three different ways: first, myth does not differentiate ethics from cosmos, which means that it always presupposes a common source to both good and bad; second, myth aim is to bring answers to the problem of evil, instead of confessing the scandalous character of all evil; and third, myth invites the listener or reader to think in direction of the origin of things, instead of pushing them to think forward and to react against that which is scandalous.

On Wisdom

As already mentioned, myth brings does answer the problem of evil. In fact, according to Ricoeur, it only offers consolation or order. As Ricoeur writes, myth “leaves unanswered one important part of the question, which is not just ‘Why?’ but ‘Why me?’”. And it is here that laments “turns into an actual complaint”. Indeed, wisdom demands that divinity account for itself.

Hence, there is now a need for a shift from narrative (myth) to argument (wisdom): a demand of an answer to the question “why is such the case for each and every one of us?” As Ricoeur writes, “myth must not only narrate the origins, in order to explain how the original human condition reached its present state, it also has to explain why such is the case for each and every one of us. This shift leads us from myth to the stage of Wisdom. Myth narrates, Wisdom agrues.”

And the first answer is Retribution. It argues that all suffering is deserved as a punishment for some individual or collective sin (known or unknown).

But for Ricoeur, the very notion of retribution loses its spell; the apportioning of misfortune can only appear as arbitrary, indiscriminate, and disproportionate. In short, wisdom also cannot account for the suffering of individuals.

On Gnosis and of Anti-Gnostic Gnosis

For Ricoeur, the gap between wisdom and the classical theodicies has been filled by gnosis. As Ricoeur writes, “Western thought is in debt to gnosticism, broadly conceived, for having conceived the problem of evil in terms of one all-encompassing problematic: Unde malum?”

But in addition to the problem of conceiving the problem of evil in terms of the all encompassing question “Unde malum?” (from whence comes evil?) is St. Agustine’s speculation on the problem of evil.

“Augustine takes the idea that evil cannot be held to be a substance, because to think of being is to think of something one, intelligible, and good. Hence, it is philosophical thought that excludes every phantasy of evil as substantial.”

And then Ricoeur discusses in detail Augustine’s take on evil and its inconsistency. But at end of it all, Ricoeur believes that Augustine’s take on evil leaves unanswered the protest of unjust suffering, by condemning it to silence in the name of a massive indictment of the whole of humanity.

On Theodicy

After Ricoeur discussed the three stages of the discourse on evil, he introduces the stage of theodicy. In other words, Ricoeur now engages theodicy proper, with emphasis on Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Barth.

With Leibniz, we have the “principle of the best”. According to Ricoeur, Leibniz focuses on the calculation of the maximum perfections and minimum defects, wherein our world is the result. Leibniz’s principle then fills the gap between logical possibility (the unthinkable) and contingency (what could have happened differently).

And then we have Kant who dismantled rational theory through this Critique of Pure Reason. With Kant’s critique, according to Ricoeur, theodicy shifts from the theoretical to the practical sphere. Also, Kant’s critique, theodicy is deprived of its ontological support which leads into its reduction to mere “transcendental illusion”. But Ricoeur writes:

This is not to say that the problem of evil disappears from the philosophical scene, however. Quite the contrary, in fact. But it now refers uniquely to the practical sphere, as that which ought not to be, and which action must struggle against. This shift from the theoretical to the practical sphere of reason will provide us later with the needed transition to the last stage of my presentation, dealing with the connection between thought, action, and feeling.

And then Ricoeur closes this section his essay with an engagement with Hegel and Barth.

Ricoeur then zeroed in on Hegel’s concept of “negativity” as the underlying principle of his philosophy. For Hegel, negativity is the essence of being. It is the underlying principle of the development of Spirit (or Reason) from the subjective to the objective, and finally to the absolute Spirit, that is, the reconciliation of the subjective and objective Spirit. But the point that Ricoeur would like to show here is that, in the development of Spirit, suffering is a necessary part; hence, the idea of the painful but victorious work of the Spirit. Indeed, Ricoeur argues that Hegel’s system missed to articulate or heed “suffering” as expression of the voices of lamentations.

Ricoeur then engages Barth’s broken dialectic, which sees in evil a reality that is not in proportion with the goodness of God and of creation. Barth’s broken dialectic also justifies humanity’s suffering because God also suffers. But for Ricoeur, this only reopens doubts and speculation towards God and His goodness.

Thinking, Acting, and Feeling with Regard to Evil

As we can see, for Ricoeur, all the accounts on evil that we have just discussed have not properly addressed the problem of evil. But Ricoeur argues that the problem of evil remains a challenge that needs to be addressed. It is here where Ricoeur introduces his notions of action, feelings, and emotions, as an alternative. It must be noted that for Ricoeur, these concepts should not be viewed as “solutions” but simply as a way of responding to the problem of evil but one with a practical implication.

Ricoeur then appropriates Kant’s move from theory to practice. Here, Ricoeur talks about the response of action to the challenge of evil. This means instead of addressing the problem of evil theoretically, that is, explaining the nature and origin of evil, Ricoeur summons us to act on it. In other words, we must fight against evil, which implies giving voice to suffering, doing justice to the victims of suffering. As Ricoeur writes:

For action, evil is above all what ought not to be, but what must be fought against. In this sense, action inverts the orientation of looking at the world. Myth tends to pull speculative thought back toward the origin of things. From whence comes evil, it asks. The response, not the solution, of action is to act against evil. Our vision is thus turned toward the future, by the idea of a task to be accomplished, which corresponds to that of an origin to be discovered.

But Ricoeur admits that the response of action is not enough. Ricoeur then argues that emotional response is a necessary complement to action.

Ricoeur views this emotional response as a ““catharsis of the emotions that nourish the lament and that transform it into complaint”. Here, Ricoeur talks about three stages of this catharsis.

The first stage is to integrate the ignorance it gives rise to, the docta ignorantia, into the work of mourning. Ricoeurs writes:

To the tendency of survivors to feel guilty about the death of someone they loved, as well as to the tendency of victims to blame themselves and to enter into the cruel game of the expiatory victim, we must reply: “No, God did not want that, even less did God want to punish you. I don’t know why things happened as they did, chance and accident are part of the world.”3 This would be the zero degree, so to speak, in the catharsis of the complaint.

The second stage is to allow the lament to develop into a complaint against God. According to Ricoeur, it invites us to pursue this course even to the point of articulating a “theology of protest”. But this complaint against God turns out to be an impatience of hope.

And the third stage in this catharsis is to discover that the reasons for believing in God have nothing in common with the need to explain the origin of suffering. Hence, for Ricoeur, we believe in God despite evil, in spite of suffering. Ricoeur writes:

Suffering is only a scandal for the person who understands God to be the source of everything that is good in creation, including our indignation against evil, our courage to bear it, and our feeling of sympathy toward victims.