Reformed epistemology is a philosophical approach that seeks to defend the rationality and justification of belief in God without relying on traditional philosophical arguments or evidential proofs. While Alvin Plantinga is often associated with the development of reformed epistemology, philosopher William Hasker has made significant contributions to the field. Hasker offers a nuanced perspective that emphasizes the cognitive faculties and the role of religious experience in supporting belief in God. This essay aims to explore Hasker’s insights into reformed epistemology, evaluate the strength of his arguments, and discuss relevant criticisms and counterarguments.
Overview of Reformed Epistemology
Reformed epistemology challenges the assumption that belief in God requires evidential or logical proofs. It argues that belief in God can be properly basic, meaning it is justified without the need for inferential justification or empirical evidence. Reformed epistemology asserts that belief in God is akin to other properly basic beliefs, such as belief in the external world or the existence of other minds.
Reformed epistemologists emphasize the reliability of cognitive faculties, asserting that they can provide warranted beliefs without the need for inferential justification. They argue that belief in God can be grounded in religious experience, which is seen as a source of knowledge and justification. Religious experiences, such as encounters with the divine or a deep sense of God’s presence, are considered to be direct encounters with the divine reality, warranting belief in God.
Hasker’s Perspective on Reformed Epistemology
Hasker builds upon the foundations of reformed epistemology, offering his own insights into the rationality of belief in God. He focuses on the role of cognitive faculties and argues that they can provide a reliable basis for belief in God. Hasker contends that belief in God is justified when it is formed through properly functioning cognitive faculties, which are designed to apprehend the divine reality.
Hasker emphasizes the notion of “sensus divinitatis,” a natural human faculty that enables individuals to have a basic awareness of God’s existence. He argues that this faculty, akin to perception or memory, allows humans to have an immediate and non-inferential grasp of God’s reality. This direct awareness of God is an innate capacity, and individuals possess it by virtue of their cognitive faculties.
Furthermore, Hasker discusses the role of religious experience in reformed epistemology. He argues that religious experiences can provide compelling evidence for belief in God. These experiences can be transformative, deeply meaningful, and offer a sense of encounter with the divine. Hasker contends that these experiences, when properly functioning, can provide direct knowledge of God’s reality and justify belief in God.
Hasker also addresses objections to reformed epistemology. He acknowledges that some critics argue that religious experiences are subjective and lack objective value. They contend that these experiences cannot provide genuine knowledge about the divine reality.
In response, Hasker asserts that subjective does not equate to irrational or unreliable. He points out that many beliefs we consider reliable and justified are subjective in nature, such as beliefs about the external world or moral values. Hasker suggests that the transformative and meaningful nature of religious experiences lends credence to their reliability and warrant. While these experiences may vary among individuals, they still serve as evidence for the existence of God.
Criticism and Counterarguments
While Hasker’s perspective on reformed epistemology is thought-provoking, it has faced criticisms and alternative explanations. One objection raised against the notion of “sensus divinitatis” is the challenge of religious diversity. Critics argue that if belief in God is based on an innate faculty, it should lead individuals to have similar religious beliefs. The existence of conflicting religious beliefs and experiences raises questions about the reliability and universality of the “sensus divinitatis.”
In response, Hasker and defenders of reformed epistemology contend that the “sensus divinitatis” does not guarantee identical religious beliefs. They argue that while the faculty may be universally present, its operation can be influenced by various factors, such as culture, upbringing, or personal disposition. They contend that the core belief in God remains intact, while specific religious beliefs and interpretations may vary.
Another criticism of reformed epistemology is the challenge of epistemic parity. Critics argue that if belief in God can be properly basic, then other religious beliefs or even atheistic beliefs can also be considered properly basic. They suggest that reformed epistemology lacks the ability to differentiate between warranted religious beliefs and unwarranted ones.
In response, Hasker and defenders of reformed epistemology argue that while other beliefs may be properly basic, they may not have the same level of warrant or epistemic support as belief in God. They contend that the nature of religious experience, along with its transformative and meaningful aspects, provides a unique and strong warrant for belief in God. Hasker asserts that other beliefs, including atheistic ones, do not possess the same experiential foundation and transformative power as belief in God.
Moreover, critics have raised objections regarding the subjectivity of religious experiences. They argue that religious experiences can be influenced by psychological and cultural factors, making them unreliable sources of knowledge. They suggest that religious experiences may be mere products of individual psychology or cultural conditioning, rather than genuine encounters with the divine.
In response, defenders of reformed epistemology acknowledge the subjective nature of religious experiences but argue that subjectivity does not negate their reliability or justification. They contend that subjectivity is a feature of many properly basic beliefs, such as our trust in memory or sense perception. They assert that religious experiences, when properly functioning, provide a strong and reliable foundation for belief in God.
Conclusion
William Hasker’s perspective on reformed epistemology offers valuable insights into the rationality of belief in God. His emphasis on cognitive faculties, the “sensus divinitatis,” and religious experience contributes to the robustness of reformed epistemology. While criticisms have been raised, defenders argue that reformed epistemology provides a compelling framework for understanding the rationality and justification of belief in God. The evaluation of Hasker’s perspective on reformed epistemology ultimately rests on individual philosophical perspectives and the weight assigned to the various premises and objections.