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Summary of Pope Francis’s “Dialogue and Friendship in Society”

“Dialogue and Friendship” is the 6th chapter of Pope Francis’s Encyclical Letter, Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father Francis on fraternity and social friendship. In this work, Pope Francis proposes a way of life with emphasis on a love that transcends the barrier of geography and distance. And one of the best ways to materialize this vision is through dialogue and the development of friendships within and across borders. Pope Francis writes:

Approaching, speaking, listening, looking at, coming to know and understand one another, and to find common ground: all these things are summed up in the one word “dialogue”. If we want to encounter and help one another, we have to dialogue.

Social Dialogue for a New Culture

Here, Pope Francis enumerates, among other things, the types of dialogue and the people involved in them, the benefits derived from dialogue, and nature and dynamics of dialogue.

To the first, Pope Francis talks about dialogue between generations, dialogue among our people, readiness to give and receive while remaining to the truth.

To the second, Pope Francis argues that a country flourishes when constructive dialogue occurs between its many rich cultural components: popular culture, university culture, youth culture, artistic culture, technological culture, economic culture, family culture and media culture.

But what dialogue is not?

Pope Francis argues that dialogues should not be confused with the feverish exchange of opinions on social networks which are frequently based on media information that is not always reliable. Pope Francis famously calls these exchanges “monologues”. For Pope Francis, monologues are dangerous and divisive because they engage no one, their content are frequently self-serving and contradictory.

Then Pope Francis talks about obstacles to dialogues, such as the media’s noisy potpourri of facts and opinions. For Pope Francis, this makes one clings stubbornly to his or her own ideas, interest, and choices, with the excuse that everyone else is wrong.

Pope Francis further argues that this subjectivist attitude of people in social media tends to be manipulative as it dominates discussions and tilt public opinion. And this manipulation has been used not only by governments, but also by education, economics, politics, and even in religion.

And so, for Pope Francis, what is happening today is not really dialogue. What is happening is that discussions or assemblies are mere negotiating sessions in which individuals attempt to seize every possible advantage, rather than cooperating in the pursuit of the common good.

Pope Francis then talks about the heroes of the future: those who can break with this unhealthy mindset and determine respectfully to promote truthfulness, aside from personal interest. God willing, such heroes are quietly emerging, even now, in the midst of our society.

Building Together

What Pope Francis would to emphasize here is for us to engage in authentic social dialogue, which is characterized by the ability to respect the other’s point of view and to admit that it may include legitimate convictions and concerns. Pope Francis writes:

Indeed, “in a true spirit of dialogue, we grow in our ability to grasp the significance of what others say and do, even if we cannot accept it as our own conviction. In this way, it becomes possible to be frank and open about our beliefs, while continuing to discuss, to seek points of contact, and above all, to work and struggle together”.

Given the complexity of our society today, Pope Francis calls us to appropriate interdisciplinary dialogues. This means using different approaches and methodologies in addressing a single reality. And this also means respecting and learning from other perspectives.

Basis of Consensus

Here, Pope Francis talks about the solution or alternative to the problem of “monologue” as opposed to dialogue. And he clearly emphasized the fact that “relativism” cannot be the solution. This is because, for Pope Francis, relativism “relativism ultimately leaves the interpretation of moral values to those in power, to be defined as they see fit”. Pope Francis writes:

In the absence of objective truths or sound principles other than the satisfaction of our own desires and immediate needs … we should not think that political efforts or the force of law will be sufficient … When the culture itself is corrupt, and objective truth and universally valid principles are no longer upheld, then laws can only be seen as arbitrary impositions or obstacles to be avoided.

And so, if relativism is not the answer, what then is the solution?

According to Pope Francis, the answer is “consensus” and the “truth”, which for Pope Francis is attained through dialogue. Pope Francis contends that if society is to have a future, it must respect the truth of our human dignity and submit to that truth. Hence, to reiterate, dialogue is necessary.

New Culture

Here, Pope Francis calls for a new culture, that is, a culture of encounter. Pope Francis urges people to be passionate about meeting others, seeking points of contact, building bridges, planning a project that includes everyone. According to the Pope Francis, this should become an aspiration and a style of life, and the subject of this culture is the people, not simply one part of society that would pacify the rest with the help of professional and media resources.

And according to Pope Francis, the lasting and enduring result of this new culture is “peace”.

Lastly, on Recovering Kindness

In this concluding section, Pope Francis calls us to be kind. Despite all the evil things around, we can be kind towards other people. And by kindness, Pope Francis means we can be gentle, pleasant, and supportive. We don’t need to be rude or coarse. We need not offend others by word or deed. And we can always help others and ease their burden. We can also speak of words of comfort, strength, consolation, and encouragement, instead of words that demean, sadden, anger, or show scorn. We can smile to people and listen to them.

Concluding Remarks

Indeed, for Pope Francis, dialogue is respectful, strive for consensus, and seeks the truth. Dialogue opens the way to a culture of encounter so that encounter becomes a passion, a desire, and a way of life. Those who dialogue recognize, befriend, and respect other persons.

It also important to remember that life is the art of encounter given that we are social beings. Pope Francis has repeatedly invited us to build a culture of encounter capable of transcending our differences and divisions. This means working to create a many-faceted polyhedron which represents a society where differences coexist, complementing, enriching and reciprocally illuminating one another, even amidst disagreements and reservations. This also means finding ways to include those on the peripheries of life. The word “culture” points to something deeply embedded within a people, its most cherished convictions and its way of life. And finally, to speak of a “culture of encounter” means that we, as a people, should be passionate about meeting others, seeking points of contact, building bridges, planning a project that includes everyone. This should be our aspiration and a style of life.

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Summary of Luc Bovens’s “The Value of Hope”

First, for Bovens, the issue of hope is very important. But for Bovens, hope receives little attention in scholarly discourses outside the ambit of philosophy of religion. Hence, in his seminal work titled “The Value of Hope”, Bovens attempts to address this gap, this philosophical lacuna. In fact, the paper aims to explore the nature and dynamics of hope, including its importance to our existence.

Two Puzzles of Hope

Bovens begins his attempt to address the problem of hope with an engagement with the core concepts of the film Shawshank Redemption, and then proceeds with the articulation of the two puzzles of hope.

Bovens then briefly sketches the story of Andy, the protagonist of the movie, through Red, a friend appears to skeptical about the value of hope.

According to Bovens, the story presents us with two puzzles of hope, namely: first, there is the practical question of how much one should hope in a particular situation, and second, there is a puzzle concerning the nature of inner strength in relation to hope.

The story shows that Andy was very much hopeful, in fact, hope provides Andy with inner strength. Indeed, Bovens shows that there is connection between Andy’s sense of self-worth and hope. This explains why Andy did not adopt the “prison” mentality”.

Then Bovens asks the connection between hope and self-wort. Bovens then addresses the connection through his engagement with the skeptical attitude towards hope.

Skepticism about Hope

Obviously, there are always rooms for skepticism in almost everything, and in this case, a skepticism about hope.

The point that Bovens would like to show here can be captured in two questions:

  1. What if what one hopes for does not come about?
  2. Or, if it comes about but it is not what one hopes for, what’s the point of hoping?

Hence, we may conclude that it’s better not to hope, or hoping is irrational. And then Bovens illustrated this position, but at the end of the day, Bovens shows through the story of Andy and Red that it is always better to hope.

The Instrumental Value of Hope

After engaging the issue of skepticism about hope, Bovens then proceeds the discussion the instrumental value of hope. The point that Bovens would like to show here is that despite the skeptical attack on hope, it is always better to hope because there is an instrumental value in hoping. Indeed, for Bovens, a hopeful attitude is better than a defeatist attitude. As we can see, despite his seemingly hopeless situation in the prison walls, Andy did not succumb to defeat. As already mentioned, Andy remains hopeful, and it gives him inner strength and self-worth.

Bovens then enumerated the instrumental values of hope, namely:

  1. Hope has enabling function.
  2. Hope counteracts risk aversion.
  3. Hope engenders new constitutive hope.

Hope and Intrinsic Value

Again, for Bovens, the skeptics (including the negative people) always argue that there is no point of hoping because maybe we just get frustrated at the end of the day. But Bovens argues that there is always an “intrinsic” value of hope, and hence, to hope is the best available alternative.

And then Bovens discusses what it is like to hope for. In doing so, Bovens discusses:

  1. The Nature of Hope. Here, Bovens shows that to hope for something means one is convinced that it will come about. When one is hoping, then s/he is expecting that it will come about.
  2. The Pleasure of Anticipation and the Epistemic Value of Hope. Needless to say, for Bovens, once someone is convinced that what she is hoping for will come about, then it will provide some kind of pleasure on the part of the person hoping despite the difficult situation. Bovens brings here the idea of “mental imaging”, that is, anticipating at least mentally the thing one hopes for. Again, for Bovens, this anticipation provide pleasure and satisfaction especially in times of hardships or difficulties.
  3. Hope, Love, and Self-worth. The idea here is that for Bovens, hope is directly connected to love and self-worth. In fact, Bovens says that love vindicates attitude of hoping and fearing.

Hope and Epistemic Rationality

Before Bovens finally address the puzzles of hope, he engages hope and epistemic rationality.

Bovens says that when we hope for something, we assign to some extent subjective probabilities, which is determined by available evidence. But for Bovens, hope is thought to be epistemically rational if one’s belief about the possibility of the outcome is correct in light of the available evidence. Hence, Bovens suggests that we guard ourselves against wishful thinking which violated the rationality of hope.

Finally, on Resolving the Puzzle of Hope

Bovens succinctly articulated his main arguments in this concluding part, and summarizing will distort its main thoughts. Let me just read the concluding part then:

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Summary of Paul Ricoeur’s “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology”

First, it is always a good idea to start with the articulation of the main intention of the paper and its structure. In this way, we will be guided properly in our engagement with the paper.

In terms of its main intention, Ricoeur’s “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology” attempts to address the origin of evil and the reason why people do evil acts. But in particular, Ricoeur is concerned about how we received the challenge of evil, and as I will show later, how the theodicies in the past offered an unsatisfactory account for the problem of evil. Hence, for Ricoeur, the problem, or better yet, the challenge of, evil provokes us to think further about it because of the failure of the past theodicies. Better ideas, therefore, are required. In fact, in the opening paragraph of this article, Ricoeur shows that the problem of evil remains a challenge for both philosophers and religious thinkers. In the opening paragraph of the essay, Ricoeur writes:

That both philosophy and theolog y encounter evil a s a challenge unlike any other, the greatest thinkers in both these disciplines are willing to admit. What is important is the way in which this challenge, or this failure, is received: d o w e find an invitation to think les s about the problem or a provocation to think more, or to think differently about it?

Ricoeur then poses the classic problem in theodicy: How can we affirm at the same time, without contradiction, the following propositions?

  1. God is all powerful.
  2. God is absolutely good.
  3. Yet evil exists.

For many years, philosophers and religious thinkers always view these propositions as contradictories. But it must be noted that for Ricoeur, they are not contradictories.

Ricoeur then explains his point by way of (and this serves as the structure/flow) of the paper:

  1. Phenomenology of the experience of evil.
  2. Discussion of the origin of evil.
  3. Reconnecting the work of thinking, arising out of the enigma, to other responses, stemming from action and feeling.

As we can see, the first part talks about the magnitude, and complexity of the problem of evil from a phenomenological perspective, while the second part talks about the nature and origin of evil. The last part talks about thinking, acting, and feeling in connection with evil, which I see as an alternative that Ricoeur offers to the problem of evil.

Let me now briefly discuss the key concepts of each part.

On the Phenomenology of the Experience of Evil: Between Blame and Lament

According to Ricoeur, scholars, particularly those from the West, tend to equate evil with sin, suffering, and death. However, for Ricoeur, evil can be viewed in two different senses, namely: evil and wrongdoing and evil as suffering. Ricoeur then argues that these two understandings of evil belong to heterogenous categories, namely: blame and lament.

On the one hand, blame for Ricoeur happens when a human action violates the prevailing code of conduct and is declared guilty and worthy of being punished.

On the other hand, there is lament when one is experiencing or undergoing suffering. It is important to note that for Ricoeur, people do not make lament happen to them. Instead, it befalls them.

It also important to note that for Ricoeur, blame and lament opposed each other. Indeed, blame makes one a culprit, while lament reveals that one is a victim.

Now, given the above points, Ricoeur argues that the thinking of the West, that is, the “theodicies” of the past, are unsatisfactory for three reasons: 1) above all, the theodicies of the past tend to reduce to silence the lamentations of the one who suffers; 2) these theodicies are rooted in grounds where philosophy and theology are superimposed in an unjustifiable fashion; and 3) they don’t take into account the fact that the task to think may not be fulfilled by our reasoning and our systematic totalizations.

And given the failure of the theodicies of the past or classical theodicies to properly address the problem of evil, Ricoeur then urges us to think further about the problem of evil.

But how to we think further than the classical theodicies?

According to Ricoeur, we can think further than the classical theodicies by “thinking differently”.

How is it possible?

According to Ricoeur, by seeking the doctrinal nexus for the thought in Christology, which involves abandoning the speculative thinking of classical theodicies. This is because for Ricoeur, the classical theodicies did not do justice to the complaints (laments) of the victims of suffering.

As we can see, Ricouer wants to give voice to the sufferings in life. Indeed, the act of violence of humans towards each other, that is, the evil committed by someone towards the other causes suffering to the latter, and it is at this point where “laments” take center stage.

Levels of Discourse in Speculation on Evil

After Ricoeur discussed the two categories of evil, he now proceeds with the discussion of its origin and development. Here, Ricoeur introduces three stages of discourse on evil, namely: 1) the stage of myth, 2) of wisdom, and 3) of gnosis. Let me just briefly sketch each stage below.

On Myth

The main point here is that for Ricoeur, myth is a kind of narrative that portrays meaning through a story of origins. It asks the question: From whence comes evil?

And we learn that for Ricoeur, myth tells how the human condition came about as something generally wretched and miserable, the profusion of explanatory schemes, for example, the literatures of the Ancient Near East.

It must be noted that for Ricoeur, myth cannot account for or cannot answer the expectations of acting and suffering human beings. In fact, according to Ricoeur, myth tends to confuse one’s thinking on evil, in at least three different ways: first, myth does not differentiate ethics from cosmos, which means that it always presupposes a common source to both good and bad; second, myth aim is to bring answers to the problem of evil, instead of confessing the scandalous character of all evil; and third, myth invites the listener or reader to think in direction of the origin of things, instead of pushing them to think forward and to react against that which is scandalous.

On Wisdom

As already mentioned, myth brings does answer the problem of evil. In fact, according to Ricoeur, it only offers consolation or order. As Ricoeur writes, myth “leaves unanswered one important part of the question, which is not just ‘Why?’ but ‘Why me?’”. And it is here that laments “turns into an actual complaint”. Indeed, wisdom demands that divinity account for itself.

Hence, there is now a need for a shift from narrative (myth) to argument (wisdom): a demand of an answer to the question “why is such the case for each and every one of us?” As Ricoeur writes, “myth must not only narrate the origins, in order to explain how the original human condition reached its present state, it also has to explain why such is the case for each and every one of us. This shift leads us from myth to the stage of Wisdom. Myth narrates, Wisdom agrues.”

And the first answer is Retribution. It argues that all suffering is deserved as a punishment for some individual or collective sin (known or unknown).

But for Ricoeur, the very notion of retribution loses its spell; the apportioning of misfortune can only appear as arbitrary, indiscriminate, and disproportionate. In short, wisdom also cannot account for the suffering of individuals.

On Gnosis and of Anti-Gnostic Gnosis

For Ricoeur, the gap between wisdom and the classical theodicies has been filled by gnosis. As Ricoeur writes, “Western thought is in debt to gnosticism, broadly conceived, for having conceived the problem of evil in terms of one all-encompassing problematic: Unde malum?”

But in addition to the problem of conceiving the problem of evil in terms of the all encompassing question “Unde malum?” (from whence comes evil?) is St. Agustine’s speculation on the problem of evil.

“Augustine takes the idea that evil cannot be held to be a substance, because to think of being is to think of something one, intelligible, and good. Hence, it is philosophical thought that excludes every phantasy of evil as substantial.”

And then Ricoeur discusses in detail Augustine’s take on evil and its inconsistency. But at end of it all, Ricoeur believes that Augustine’s take on evil leaves unanswered the protest of unjust suffering, by condemning it to silence in the name of a massive indictment of the whole of humanity.

On Theodicy

After Ricoeur discussed the three stages of the discourse on evil, he introduces the stage of theodicy. In other words, Ricoeur now engages theodicy proper, with emphasis on Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Barth.

With Leibniz, we have the “principle of the best”. According to Ricoeur, Leibniz focuses on the calculation of the maximum perfections and minimum defects, wherein our world is the result. Leibniz’s principle then fills the gap between logical possibility (the unthinkable) and contingency (what could have happened differently).

And then we have Kant who dismantled rational theory through this Critique of Pure Reason. With Kant’s critique, according to Ricoeur, theodicy shifts from the theoretical to the practical sphere. Also, Kant’s critique, theodicy is deprived of its ontological support which leads into its reduction to mere “transcendental illusion”. But Ricoeur writes:

This is not to say that the problem of evil disappears from the philosophical scene, however. Quite the contrary, in fact. But it now refers uniquely to the practical sphere, as that which ought not to be, and which action must struggle against. This shift from the theoretical to the practical sphere of reason will provide us later with the needed transition to the last stage of my presentation, dealing with the connection between thought, action, and feeling.

And then Ricoeur closes this section his essay with an engagement with Hegel and Barth.

Ricoeur then zeroed in on Hegel’s concept of “negativity” as the underlying principle of his philosophy. For Hegel, negativity is the essence of being. It is the underlying principle of the development of Spirit (or Reason) from the subjective to the objective, and finally to the absolute Spirit, that is, the reconciliation of the subjective and objective Spirit. But the point that Ricoeur would like to show here is that, in the development of Spirit, suffering is a necessary part; hence, the idea of the painful but victorious work of the Spirit. Indeed, Ricoeur argues that Hegel’s system missed to articulate or heed “suffering” as expression of the voices of lamentations.

Ricoeur then engages Barth’s broken dialectic, which sees in evil a reality that is not in proportion with the goodness of God and of creation. Barth’s broken dialectic also justifies humanity’s suffering because God also suffers. But for Ricoeur, this only reopens doubts and speculation towards God and His goodness.

Thinking, Acting, and Feeling with Regard to Evil

As we can see, for Ricoeur, all the accounts on evil that we have just discussed have not properly addressed the problem of evil. But Ricoeur argues that the problem of evil remains a challenge that needs to be addressed. It is here where Ricoeur introduces his notions of action, feelings, and emotions, as an alternative. It must be noted that for Ricoeur, these concepts should not be viewed as “solutions” but simply as a way of responding to the problem of evil but one with a practical implication.

Ricoeur then appropriates Kant’s move from theory to practice. Here, Ricoeur talks about the response of action to the challenge of evil. This means instead of addressing the problem of evil theoretically, that is, explaining the nature and origin of evil, Ricoeur summons us to act on it. In other words, we must fight against evil, which implies giving voice to suffering, doing justice to the victims of suffering. As Ricoeur writes:

For action, evil is above all what ought not to be, but what must be fought against. In this sense, action inverts the orientation of looking at the world. Myth tends to pull speculative thought back toward the origin of things. From whence comes evil, it asks. The response, not the solution, of action is to act against evil. Our vision is thus turned toward the future, by the idea of a task to be accomplished, which corresponds to that of an origin to be discovered.

But Ricoeur admits that the response of action is not enough. Ricoeur then argues that emotional response is a necessary complement to action.

Ricoeur views this emotional response as a ““catharsis of the emotions that nourish the lament and that transform it into complaint”. Here, Ricoeur talks about three stages of this catharsis.

The first stage is to integrate the ignorance it gives rise to, the docta ignorantia, into the work of mourning. Ricoeurs writes:

To the tendency of survivors to feel guilty about the death of someone they loved, as well as to the tendency of victims to blame themselves and to enter into the cruel game of the expiatory victim, we must reply: “No, God did not want that, even less did God want to punish you. I don’t know why things happened as they did, chance and accident are part of the world.”3 This would be the zero degree, so to speak, in the catharsis of the complaint.

The second stage is to allow the lament to develop into a complaint against God. According to Ricoeur, it invites us to pursue this course even to the point of articulating a “theology of protest”. But this complaint against God turns out to be an impatience of hope.

And the third stage in this catharsis is to discover that the reasons for believing in God have nothing in common with the need to explain the origin of suffering. Hence, for Ricoeur, we believe in God despite evil, in spite of suffering. Ricoeur writes:

Suffering is only a scandal for the person who understands God to be the source of everything that is good in creation, including our indignation against evil, our courage to bear it, and our feeling of sympathy toward victims.

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Summary of J. L. Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence”

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First of all, let me provide the context of Mackie’s take on evil so we will be able to follow the trajectory of his arguments and fully make sense of the main purpose of the paper.

It must be noted that the question about the existence of God remains to be one of the recurring topics in philosophical discussions and debates. And in the debate about the existence of God, there are always two opposing camps. On the one hand, there are those who argue for the existence of God, and on the other hand, there are those who argue that God does not exist. But as we can see, Mackie argues that those who argue for the existence of God missed to provide enough evidence to convince everyone that God really exists. In fact, as Mackie argues, all the arguments for God’s existence that philosophers in the past had made were faulty. However, Mackie was quick to note that this position should not be used as a reason for someone not to believe in God. Again, it’s just that for Mackie, this argument is irrational. And for Mackie, those who argue for the non-existence of God have not been successful in persuading the believers no matter how they tried. And this is where Mackie comes in.

In his seminal essay titled “Evil and Omnipotence”, Mackie attempts to prove that the belief in a good God is irrational. And Mackie uses the existence of evil as a proof to it. This is because the existence of evil, as a direct opposite of good, will discount the existence of a good God.

As we can see, Mackie’s main argument is that if an all-good God exists, then why the existence of so much evil in the world? Again, Mackie believes that the existence of evil is a direct contradiction of God being absolutely good. As Mackie writes:

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.

Mackie adds:

However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms ‘good’, ‘evil’, and ‘omnipotent’. These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.

Mackie then claims that the propositions: “God is omnipotent”, “God is wholly good”, and “Evil exists” cannot be all true. In fact, Mackie added two more principles which make the three propositions logically contradictory, namely:

  1. If something is wholly good, it always eliminates as much evil as it can.
  2. If something is omnipotent, it can do anything.

And Mackie was convinced that these two principles, which are clear definitions of the concept of good/evil and omnipotence, appear to be reasonable and that most believers would agree with them.

Now, Mackie shows that the three propositions and the two added principles do imply a contradiction, and that at least one of them must be false. Mackie then engages the responses to this problem, and in doing so, he distinguishes two major types of solutions, namely, adequate solutions and fallacious solutions.

To the first, Mackie agrees that the problem for the theist can be solved by giving up one of the three propositions, that is, deny that God is “omnipotent” or good, or deny that there is “evil” in the world. As Mackie writes:

Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one gives up at least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not quite omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise for you.

However, Mackie thinks that most believers will be unwilling to take this approach. For doing so leaves them with a conception of a God that isn’t worthy of worship, and therefore not religiously significant. Hence, although these solutions are “adequate“, for Mackei, they are not really successful.

To the second, Mackie then proceeds with the examination of the so-called solutions to this problem which purport to remove the contradiction without abandoning any of its constituent propositions. In other words, for Mackie, these solutions remain to be unsuccessful as they are in themselves fallacious. Let me now briefly engage each solution.

The first solution reads:

“Good cannot exist without evil.” Or ” Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good.”

​The idea here is that God could not have made a world which had any good without allowing some evil, since it is impossible for goodness to exist without evil. But Mackie argues that this argument is indeed a “limitation” on God’s omnipotence. Mackie says that this

… sets a limit to what God can do, saying that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil, and this means either that God is not omnipotent or that there are some limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.

Now, Mackie writes:

It may be replied that these limits are always presupposed, that omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the present view the existence of good without evil would be a logical impossibility.

In other words, what Mackie tries to say here is that the believers may resort to the argument that omnipotence does not extend to doing logically impossible things. As St. Thomas Aquinas argues, “God can do all things that are possible”.

In response to this, Mackie uses the analogy of size. He asks: “Does (relative) greatness require (relative) smallness?”

Mackie then concludes that good things are only relatively good, even that God is only relatively good. Hence, it would appear that God is trying to maximize relative goodness. But if one thinks of God trying to make everything in the universe relatively bigger, one realizes that this does not make much sense. In fact, Mackie argues that this does not work if one imagines something to be absolutely good or big. This is because, as Mackie would have us believe, an absolutely big thing like the universe does not require smaller things to exist in order for it to be big. The same would be true of an absolutely good thing.

Indeed, for Mackie, the argument that goodness requires evil as a counterpart does not hold water.

The second solution reads:

“Evil is necessary as a means to good.”

The basic idea here is that God uses evil to bring about goodness. In other words, evil is a means to an end. The classic example is the argument that “suffering”, such as becoming broke or losing a loved one, is necessary for personal development.


For Mackie, this argument implies a restriction on God’s omnipotence. If it is a law of cause-and-effect that evil has to cause goodness, then, for Mackie, omnipotence ought to be able to break this law. Most believers think God created the laws of causality in the first place and miracles are supposed to show God breaking causal laws. Mackie writes:

In its simple form this has little plausibility as a solution of the problem of evil, since it obviously implies a severe restriction of God’s power. It would be a causal law that you cannot have a certain end without a certain means, so that if God has to introduce evil as a means to good, he must be subject to at least some causal laws.

The third solution reads:

“The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil.”

The basic idea here is that certain kinds of evil are necessary for certain kinds of good. Mackie uses the analogy of pain and disease to drive his point. Indeed, without disease and pain, it would be impossible to have medical advances and feelings of sympathy for the sick. Mackie mentions the analogy used by Augustine of Hippo of an artist who includes ugly features in his work, such as discordant notes and dark colors, for an overall pleasing effect.

Mackie then makes an important distinction between first and second-order goods and evils: 

…evil (1) is pain and good (1) is happiness, but good (2) involves compassion and courage which are only possible in a world with evil (1) in it.

Mackie then explains the “fatal objection” to this:

…there must also be evil (2), such as cruelty. If the theist argues that there is good (3), which is increasing the amount of good (2) in the world, then there is also evil (3), which is increasing the amount of evil (2). This leads to an infinite regress.

And so, again, solution number 3 does not hold water.

The fourth solution reads:

“Evil is due to human freewill.”

The idea here is that many kinds of evil are not the result of God’s actions, but of the free actions of human beings.


Mackie asks how can this count as a solution to the problem of evil, given that God created the free willed creatures? The theist’s reply has to be something like this:

  1. Free will is a great good; creatures that lack freewill are automata and a world of automata would be worse than a world with evil in it.
  2. It is impossible, even for God, to create a being which has free will and to ensure that it never brings about evil.

It is better that God made us with freewill and not as robots or automata who are kind or brave in a machine-like way. An all-powerful, good God would make a world in which human beings have freewill and can choose kindness over cruelty. Mackie’s main objection is to question why God didn’t create us so that we always choose good over evil of our own freewill. Why couldn’t we have been created morally stronger beings? It’s possible to be free willed and yet always choose good actions instead of evil ones. Mackie writes:

God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.

As we can see, when theists say that making wrong choices is necessary for freedom, Mackie accuses them of confusing freewill with randomness. Mackie thinks freewill involves acting in accord with our character. We only blame a person if we think their actions come from a bad character. If free actions were random, we would have no reason to condemn people. But if freewill is based on character, it does not solve the problem of evil because God creates us with our characters, so he is ultimately responsible for our choices.

Mackie concludes that the “Freewill Defence” only works if you assume God is not omnipotent. He explains the Paradox of Omnipotence with the idea of God creating something he can’t control, that is, first, if God can’t create truly free creatures, there is a limit to his power, and second, if God can create truly free creatures, there is something he can’t control and therefore a limit to his power. Either way, omnipotence is impossible.

Conclusion

It must be noted that Mackie did not offer any solution to the problem of evil and omnipotence. What Mackie did is simply examine the solutions theists offered to the problem of evil and omnipotence. Let me end this lecture by reading Mackie’s conclusion:

“Of the proposed solutions of the problem of evil which we have examined, none has stood up to criticism. There may be other solutions which require examination, but this study strongly suggests that there is no valid solution of the problem which does not modify at least one of the constituent propositions in a way which would seriously affect the essential core of the theistic position. Quite apart from the problem of evil, the paradox of omnipotence has shown that God’s omnipotence must in any case be restricted in one way or another, that unqualified omnipotence cannot be ascribed to any being that continues through time. And if God and his actions are not in time, can omnipotence, or power of any sort, be meaningfully ascribed to him?”

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Informal Fallacies: Appeal to Force (Argumentum ad Baculum)

An appeal to force is a type of informal fallacy that arises when the arguer, instead of showing the evidence, appeals to intimidation or use force to gain acceptance of his or her argument. In other words, the appeal to force fallacy happens when the arguer tries to persuade the other (or the listener) by pointing out his or her power over the other or warning the other of the bad consequences if he or she refuses to accept his or her argument. 

Let us consider the examples below.

Example 1

College Dean to a teacher: You better think twice before giving that student a failing grade. Remember, he is the nephew of the university president.


Example 2

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you do not bring in a verdict of guilty, you may be the killer’s next victim.


Example 3

Mr. Ambassador, I’m sure you will agree that your coming does not have a legitimate claim to the disputed territory along our borders. After all, we have divisions of troops ready to protect our interest at all times.

Example 4

Father to a daughter: You should study Nursing; otherwise, I will not send you to college.

Example 5

Smith, we cannot have this statement on expenditures coming to the attention of the president. You have been the accountant here for nearly twenty years. It would be a shame to ruin all that now. I think it would be wise of you to take another look at the book, don’t you?

Now, if we analyze the examples above, we can notice that the arguer poses a threat to the listener, saying, in effect: “Accept my conclusion or you will be sorry.” 

As we can obviously see, the fact that the arguer intimidates or poses a threat to the listener does not make her conclusion true.

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Informal Fallacies: Argument Against the Person (Argumentum ad Hominem)

An argument against the person (ad hominem) is a type of informal fallacy that arises when the arguer ignores the real claims or issues in the argument so that what is emphasized is the character, personality, or belief of the opponent. In other words, in the argument against the man, the arguer attacks the person rather than the person’s ideas in order to drive his point. 

Let us consider the example below.

Example 1

You honor, it is impossible for us not to believe that the accused of this murder case is not guilty because his father and grandfather had been convicted of murder several years ago. And besides, the accused is of bad moral reputation.

As we can see, the arguer in the example above attacks the personality of the accused instead of providing the proofs or evidence that indeed it is the accused has committed the crime. For sure, we cannot say that the accused is guilty of the crime of murder simply because he is of bad moral reputation or his father and grandfather had been convicted of murder several years ago. Again, the arguer needs to show the proofs in order to say that the accused is guilty of the crime of murder.

The following examples may help further illustrate the fallacy of argument against the person (ad hominem):

Example 2

Well now, you have heard Professor Smith tell us about the theory of evolution. But I am not surprised that he neglected to tell you that he is an atheist. How can this man speak the truth, I ask you?


Example 3

I’m not surprised that your mechanic recommends a complete engine overhaul. Do you know how much money he gets from that?

Example 4

It was his fault, officer. You can tell me by the kind of car I am driving and the kind of clothing I am wearing that I am a good citizen and would not lie. Look at the rattletrap that he is driving, and look at how he dressed. You can’t believe anything that a dirty, long-haired hippie like that man might tell you. Search his car; he probably has a pot in it.


Example 5

Franklin Putnam says he would make a good president. But he is no man for the White House; not only has he been divorced, but he is a Catholic and divorced.

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Informal Fallacies: Appeal to Pity (Argumentum ad Misericordiam)

An appeal to pity is a type of informal fallacy that arises when an appeal to evidence is replaced by an appeal to pity or mercy. The point here is that in making an argument, we are supposed to provide evidence or proofs to our claim or conclusion. 

But in an appeal to pity, as already pointed out, the arguer does not have the evidence or proofs for his claim; hence, he is forced to invoke pity to win the sympathy of the listener. 

Let us consider the example below.

Example 1

There is no question that what this young man did is intolerable and repugnant. He admits it himself. But you are not here to evaluate this man’s conduct morally; you are here to try him and determine his guilt or innocence. And as you think this over, I want you to think hard about this young man, his home and his future, which you now hold in your hands. Think about his broken home, never knowing his father, being left by his mother. Think about the poverty he has known, the foster homes, the birthdays go unnoticed, and the Christmas he has never had. And think hard about the life in prison will do to him. Think about these things, and I know you will acquit him of this crime.

As we can see in the example above, the lawyer argues that his client should be acquitted because he is miserable and is a victim of an unfortunate life. However, even if it is true that indeed the accused is miserable and is a victim of an unfortunate life, it would be fallacious to conclude that the accused is not guilty or he should be acquitted simply because his life had been hard or because bringing in a verdict of guilty would add to his misery. 

For sure, the lawyer needs to provide strong proofs that would show that the accused has not committed the crime (for example, of a felony) before he may conclude that his client is not guilty.

The following examples may help further illustrate the fallacy of appeal to pity:

Example 2

Your honor, the accused of this robbery case must not be put to jail because he is a father of 12 children and a husband of a woman who is suffering from cancer. Besides, he is the only breadwinner in the family.

Example 3

Greg should not be given a failing grade in Calculus 101 because he has taken the subject thrice already.

Example 4

I know my paper is late, Prof. Smith, but my roommate was sick last night and I had to help her. Also, my folks will kill if I flunk this course.

Example 5

I appeal to you, not for Thomas Kidd, but I appeal to you for the long line―the long line reaching back through the ages and forward to the years to come―the long line of despoiled and downtrodden people of the earth. I appeal to you for those men who rise in the morning before daylight comes and who go home at night when the light has faded from the sky and give their life, their strength, their toil to make others rich and great. I appeal to you in…the name of those little children, the living and the unborn.

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Informal Fallacies: Appeal to Ignorance (Argumentum ad Ignorantiam)

An appeal to ignorance is a type of informal fallacy that arises when an argument is taken as true because it has not proven to be false, or an argument is false because it has not proven to be true. 

Put differently, in an appeal to ignorance fallacy, the arguer claims that some statement P is true because someone failed to prove that P is false, or statement P is false because no one has proven that it is true. Hence, in each case, the lack of evidence or proof that P is true or false is used as a reason for concluding that P is true or false. 

The form of an appeal to ignorance fallacy looks like this:

We do not know that P is false.
Therefore, P must be true.

or

We do not know that P is true.
Therefore, P must be false.

Let us consider this example to clearly illustrate this point:


Example 1

Well, I have examined all the arguments for the existence of God, and I have seen that none of them proves that God exists. That’s reason enough for me: there is no God!

In the example above, the arguer concludes that there is no God because there are no successful proofs of God’s existence. But the absence of a successful proof of God’s existence does not justify the conclusion that there is no God. What the arguer is justified in the example above is that we cannot know God.

The following examples will further illustrate the fallacy appeal to ignorance:

Example 2

The existence of heaven must be true because nobody has ever successfully defended that it is just a product of one’s imagination.

Example 3

Scientists have not proven that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual contact. Therefore, there is no need for us to keep away from suspected AIDS carriers.

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Informal Fallacies: Appeal to People (Argumentum ad Populum)

The appeal to people fallacy is a variation of the appeal to authority. It consists in arguing that some statement p is true because most people believe p. In other words, an appeal to people fallacy arises when one who, instead of concentrating on the relevant facts of the argument, gives more emphasis on the emotions and opinions of the people as the basis of her conclusion. 

According to logicians, the fallacy of appeal to people is in effect an appeal to commonly or traditionally held beliefs.

This type of informal fallacy is commonly found in advertisements where products are recommended by asserting that “everyone uses it” or “a majority of the population use it”. Let us consider the example below.

“Budweiser is better than any other beer in the world because 90% of the Americans drink it.”

In the example above, one is arguing that Budweiser is the best beer in the world because many or almost all of the Americans drink it. Put differently, the unstated premise here is that the best-selling beer is the best beer, and the conclusion is that since we ought to buy the best beer, then we ought to buy Budweiser. 

Obviously, this is not a sound or valid argument. The fact that 90% of the Americans drink Budweiser entails neither that Budweiser is the best nor we ought to drink one.

Just as in many other types of informal fallacy, what we notice in the appeal to people fallacy is that it lacks the necessary evidence that we can appropriate to prove that indeed that claim is true. Hence, in the example above, we ought to provide the proof for us to be able to conclude that Budweiser is the best beer in the world. 

For example, we may say that 90% of the people in the world said that Budweiser tastes better than any other beer available in the market or it is proven that Budweiser contains more vitamins and minerals than any other beer available in the market. 

In this way, it is logical to conclude that indeed, Budweiser is the best beer in the world.

Below are some of the examples of the fallacy of appeal to people.

Example 1:

Tide Ultra is better than Surf because many Filipinos used it.

Example 2:

Well, for centuries people have believed in God, and I just don’t see how so many people could be mistaken. So that’s why I choose to believe.

Example 3:

Working one’s way through college is a cherished American concept, according to Dr. Newman, former president of the University of Rhode Island.

To recognize the fallacy of appeal to people, we need only to look for an argument in which the conclusion is based on assertions about commonly or traditionally held beliefs. We may also look for solid evidence that can back up the claim; if there is none, then it is safe to conclude that the claim or argument is fallacious.

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Hasty Generalization

The fallacy of hasty generalization occurs when a generalization is formed on the basis of an unrepresentative sample. As we may already know, to be accurate, a generalization about a group should be based upon a sample that reflects the diversity of that group. One way of ensuring a representative sample, in some cases, is to select as large a sample as possible. The more people polled, for example, the more likely it is that the results truly represent the group. However, an accurate generalization does not necessarily require a large sample. In Gallup opinion polls, generalizations are typically based on surveys of a very small number of people. However, the pollsters are careful to select a typical or representative group of people for their sample. Let us consider the following examples below.

Example 1

I have surveyed twenty-five students―each from a different campus organization―out of a student body of two thousand, and all of them prefer to use the activity fund for a film series. So, probably the majority of all students would prefer a film series.

Example 2

I have spoken to the members of the campus Glee Club, and they prefer to use the activity fund for a film series on birds. So, probably a majority of the two thousand students would prefer a film series on birds.

As we can see, the arguer in the first example forms a generalization about the preferences of two thousand students on the basis of a sample drawn from various campus groups. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that this sample accurately reflects the diversity of opinion among the students. Thus, this generalization does not commit the fallacy of hasty generalization.

However, in the second example, the generalization is based solely upon a survey of one, rather select group, the members of the Glee Club. Although their preferences should be considered, it is not likely that their group is representative of the student body as a whole; neither is it a random sample of opinions. Hence, the generalization rests on an unrepresentative sample.

Let us consider another example. Columnist Ann Landers conducted an informal survey in which she asked her women readers to reply to this question: “Would you be content to be held close and treated tenderly and forget about “the act”? She reports that 100, 000 women responded, with 72 percent answering yes. Among the conclusions:

Example 3

The most surprising aspect of this survey was that 40 percent of the yes votes were from women under forty years of age. What does this say about the sexual revolution? It says, in the boudoir at least, it has been an abysmal failure.

Landers reports that 72, 000 women answered yes and that of that group, 42 percent, or 28, 800, were under forty years of age. She concludes that the sexual revolution “has been an abysmal failure” on the basis of the 28, 800 women under age forty who answered yes. Setting aside the problems with the survey questions itself and, in particular, the meaning of a yes answer, can we say that her sample of 28, 800 women is large enough to support a generalization about a majority of the nation’s approximately 2 million women under the age forty years? Although it is a significant sample, we may wonder whether it is indeed representative of the nation’s women under forty. Landers provide no further information about the makeup of the sample. We know only that it is composed of women forty years or under who read the survey and responded. Lacking such information we cannot conclude that is an accurate generalization, and we may suspect the fallacy of hasty generalization.

To identify the fallacy of hasty generalization, we need to look for a conclusion that generalizes over a group, and notice whether the basis for the generalization is both representative of the group and sufficiently large to justify the generalization; otherwise, a fallacy of hasty generalization may have been committed.

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