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Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy: Key Concepts

In these notes, I will briefly sketch the key concepts of Martin Heidegger’s existential philosophy. However, it must be noted that Heidegger is a huge philosopher and difficult to understand. Thus, I will only present the key concepts of his existential philosophy.

To begin with, it is important to note that Heidegger offers a new conception of philosophy, which, according to some scholars, such as Werner Marx, aims ultimately to attain a “second beginning” at this late stage (20th century) of human development. Thus, Heidegger’s effort must be seen as composing in a new different way the question concerning the “Essence of Being”, and, at one with this, articulating the “Essence of Man”. It appears therefore that Heidegger’s main intention in rekindling the question concerning the “Essence of Being” is to really articulate the essence and meaning of being human.

Why the “second beginning” of philosophy and the task of composing anew the “Essence of Being” and the “Essence of Man”?

For Heidegger, this question has long been stalemated and yet the question of Being, that is, the Essence of Being and the Essence of Man, remains the original question. Indeed, it is the “first” question concerning the meaning of our own Being (that is, the meaning of being human) vis-à-vis the meaning of Being (that is, Being in general or the entirety of Nature).

The attempt to rekindle the question of Being implies for Heidegger not only a “going back” (that is, remembering) to the original question and appropriating what this serious question itself had revealed to human beings (Dasein), but also a “going back” to those thinkers who first raised the question concerning the Being of beings, that is, the pre-Socratics. In other words, for Heidegger, if we want to understand the essence of Being, then we need to revisit the pre-Socratic philosophers and know what they said about “Being”.

As is well known, the pre-Socratics were the first to raise the question concerning the Essence of Being and of Man. Thus, they were referred to as the “first philosophers”. With this, they were said to have set the “first beginning” of philosophy.

We must note, however, that the term “pre-Socratics” does not refer only to the set of philosophers from Thales to the Sophists (for example, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Thracymachus), but also to the philomythoi (that is, the lovers of myth, like Hesiod and Homer), as Aristotle would call them. Thus, in this context, philosophy could be said to have begun with the philomythoi and the pre-Socratics. Let me briefly explain the difference between the philomythoi and the Pre-Socratics’ way of philosophizing.

On the one hand, the philomythoi addressed the question concerning Being through their mythical songs. According to Werner Marx, through the mythical songs of the philomythoi, the great and terrifying powers that formed and ruled the cosmos came to light and shone forth in the brilliance of the beautiful and the terror of the numinous. In other words, the philomythoi explained the meaning of Being (that is, the entirety of Nature) through mythical songs and poems.

If it helps, we have to remember that the ancient people (the philomythoi and the Pre-Socratics in this case) found the cosmos or Nature to be mysterious. For example, it’s difficult for the ancient people to make sense of darkness, lightning, the four seasons, the, and the like. But as records show, they attempted to explain the mysteriousness of these phenomena, and, in doing so, the philomythoi used their mythical songs and poems. Concrete example to this is the Genesis (the first part of the Bible). As we know, the authors of the Genesis explained the origin and development of the world through myth.

It is interesting to note that during this time, “myth” is the best available method in explaining the mysteriousness of the world.

It is also important to note that in and through the simplicity and immediacy of the speech (saying and singing) of the philomythoi, a whole meaningful order arose out of the darkness that had shrouded all-that-is (Being). In other words, it is through their mythical songs and poems that the philomythoi was able to make sense of the mysteriousness of the world.

Lastly, the philomythoi in awe and wonder felt themselves as simply servants or instruments or and voices of the powers about which they sang. In other words, the philomythoi believed that they were simply “recipients” of thoughts or knowledge, that they did not invent thoughts; instead, thoughts or knowledge were simply revealed to them. As we can see later, this is the basis of Heidegger’s famous line “we do not come to thoughts; thoughts come to us”.

The pre-Socratics, on the other hand, addressed the question concerning Being through reason. Hence, it was with the pre-Socratics that reason was first used in in thinking of the mysteriousness of the world. For Heidegger, the thinking of the pre-Socratics was simple, immediate, and poetic (that is, creative). Hence, for Heidegger, the thinking of the pre-Socratics is a thinking of and toward that which enables, empowers, and forms all-that-is, that is, the thinking of and toward the logos or underlying principle of the world.

Like the philomythoi, the pre-Socratic thinkers felt themselves as servants, instruments, and voices of that power they deserved most―that is, of Nous, the light-giving Reason.

Blessed with Nous (light-giving Reason), the pre-Socratic thinkers were gifted with noises, that is, the capacity to apprehend intuitively and, thereby, to bring the meaning of Reason into the fullness of its light. And through these elucidations, the cosmos become more lucid.

Now, it must be noted that the pre-Socratics did not try to elucidate the various meanings of all the many “particular beings”. Instead, they tried to understand the meaning of Being holistically. Hence, the pre-Socratics most of all attempted to understand the entirety of Nature through the conception of the phenomenal elementary powers of Nature―the elements of water, fire, air, and earth. And in doing so, the pre-Socratics attempted to let emerge that which held all these elements together and empowered them: namely, physis―that is, the natureness of Nature.

For the pre-Socratics, physis is the great unifying mother and is conceived as Eon or “to einai”, that is, Being or “to be”. This is because the way physis unfolds itself was seen by the pre-Socratics as the way Being unfolds itself, or the way Being allows the physei onta, the natural beings, to “be” or “not be”. In this way, physis is understood as that which allows Being to make itself appear, but in the act of “appearing” Being passes again into darkness of their past. Again, as we can see later, this is the basis of Heidegger’s famous claim that the moment Being reveals itself, it automatically withdraws itself.

Indeed, in their “philosophizing poems”, the pre-Socratics elucidated poetically a certain “Essence of Being”, and at one with the Essence of Being, the Essence of Man was poetically composed as that natural being that can think the Essence of Being. Put differently, as Martin Heidegger sees it, through the thinking of the pre-Socratics we are therefore able to make sense of the mysteriousness of Nature; and part of this understanding is the realization that indeed man (which Heidegger calls Dasein) has the capability of understanding reality.

The discussion above indeed provides the context of Heidegger’s existential philosophy and the reason why Heidegger appropriated the “thinking” of the pre-Socratics in making sense of the meaning of Being. As Werner Marx writes:

“It is therefore not surprising to find in analyzing the writings of Heidegger that his new conception of philosophy seems to demand that the self-understanding of the philosopher be changed to the kind of self-understanding which the pre-Socratics had, that is, that the new philosopher feel himself again as intermediary, instrument, and voice and the style of philosophizing again become simple, immediate, and poetic like the singing and thinking of the pre-Socratics. And finally,

Heidegger―as the first thinkers did―now sees the foremost task or subject matter of philosophy not as the explanation of the meaning of “particular beings”, but as the elucidation, articulation, and poetic composition of a new Essence of Being, and thereby of a new Essence of Man”. See Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

The Metaphysics of Heidegger

At this point, I need to briefly present the key intuition of Heidegger’s brand of metaphysics because we cannot fully understand Heidegger’s existential philosophy without understanding the key intuition of his metaphysics.

It must be noted that Martin Heidegger rejects the whole enterprise of “metaphysics” in the traditional sense of this word where it indicates something eternal, infinite, and perfect. Heidegger’s metaphysics is a “finite metaphysics of finiteness”.

What Heidegger calls metaphysics, therefore, is bound up with the structure of man’s finite existence in the world. And so Heidegger proposes to understand man’s being in particular and Being in general within the horizon of Time. Thus, the idea of going beyond Time and coming back to Time (i.e., Transcendence) is a misunderstanding of Heidegger. Transcendence for Heidegger is Transcendence within immanence, that is to say, Transcendence within Time.

Again, the point of Heidegger’s metaphysics is that the meaning of Being in general and the meaning of man’s existence should be understood in the context of time. There is no outside of time for Heidegger. And this is one of the proper angles in understanding Heidegger’s existential philosophy.

Thus, for Heidegger, man (Dasein) transcends itself, but not toward a perfect Being (like God of Kierkegaard and Jaspers). Man transcends itself toward its own world, and nothing else. We can fully understand this concept once we have understood the key concepts of Heidegger’s existential philosophy.

Key Concepts in Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy

1) Facticity and Deliverance

The result of Heidegger’s inquiry into the meaning of Being (that is, existential phenomenology) is that Dasein is being-there-in-the-world and that it has come to be in the world through “deliverance”―“thrownness,” to use Heidegger’s word. As Heidegger says, Dasein is “thrown” into the world and that being-in-the-world is a “thrownness”.

Heidegger writes:

“This characteristic of Dasein’s Being – this ‘that it is’ – is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there’. The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.”

For Heidegger, this “thrownness” into the world necessarily implies that Dasein always exists with other entities in the world and, hence, as a being with-others-in-the-world, Dasein is entirely submerged in the immediate care and concern of the everyday world into which it is thrown. Evidently, being with-others-in-the-world suggests that the existence of Dasein in the world is an existence with the “they” (das Man) or the anonymous anyone. Thus, when Heidegger says that Dasein is submerged in the immediate care and concern of the everyday world into which it is thrown, this means that Dasein is constantly related to other human beings in the form of concern and care.

As a thrown being, Dasein is not simply extant (vorhanden or present-at-hand) like a stone, nor Dasein is determined by an alien purpose (zuhanden or ready-to-hand) like a hammer which is what it is as something “to hammer with” and which only man can handle.

In contradistinction from these two other ways of being, the merely extant (vorhanden) and the functional being (zuhanden), man (Dasein) has the privilege of being in such a way that he is thrust upon himself, and yet owns his own existence. And unlike all other beings, man is so constituted that through most of his actions, he stands in some awareness of his being, of “that and how he is”. This means that man (Dasein) is conscious not only of the things around him, but also of his own existence.

For this reason, almost all of man’s act is an act in some awareness of the Essence of Being. In other words, for Heidegger, the awareness of one’s being (that is, self-consciousness) is also at the same time an awareness of the Essence of Being (or Essence of Reality). In fact, Heidegger believes that man is so constituted that he is “open” not only for his own Being (the character and meanings of his own existing) but also for the Being of other human and non-human “particular beings”.

2) Overtness and World:

The idea that man (Dasein) is open to the Essence of Being (i.e., his own Being and the Being of other beings) gives way to the concept of “overtness” as one of the conditions of the possibility of truly existing as a human being.

But what is “overtness” and how does man make himself open to the Essence of Being?

Heidegger understands “overtness” as “consciousness”, but he avoids using the term not only because of its Cartesian implications, but because it prevents us from realizing that each individual lucidity or overtness is part and parcel of a wide and general overtness, of an elementary sort of Truth. Thus, “overtness” as consciousness simply refers to the “manifestness” of Being or things. Thus, for Heidegger, this “overtness” is an a priori condition for any so-called subject-object relationships.

Thus, for Heidegger, no subject could refer itself to an object, no act of experiential knowledge about an object could take place, and no statement or judgment could be arrived at about an object, if such prior statement of manifestness had not come about, embracing both subject and object.

Now, again, how does man make himself open to the Essence of Being?

First, we need to note that for Heidegger man (Dasein) is gifted with understanding, mood, and speech. But for Heidegger, these gifts are not gifts from someone, say, God. In fact, Heidegger hardly believes in God. Heidegger simply calls these gifts as “existential givens”. They were there the moment man was born.

According to Heidegger, in and through these existential givens, man discloses or illuminates himself. This is because, with these existential givens, man (Dasein) can understand, feel (mood), and articulate (speech). Hence, through these existential givens, overtness is brought into the fore, and man (Dasein) is able to understand himself and the things around him.

Lastly, with overtness, it is therefore possible for man (Dasein) to become truly himself, to truly exist as a human being.

In addition to overtness, Heidegger introduced the concept of “world” as another important condition of the “possibility” of truly existing as a human being.

For Heidegger, “world” refers to that which constitutes the unity of significances, that is, the context of meanings in which man moves. Thus, “world” for Heidegger is not a blind mass of things (or the totality of nature), but an existential structure that defines or constitutes man’s way of Being. Put simply, “world” for Heidegger could refer to a socio-cultural “context” upon which man draws meaning or that which shapes one’s behavior. For example, consider the phrase “The Germans’ way of doing things” or “The Americans’ way of doing things”. For sure, the Germans or the Americans have their specific way of doing things because they have been defined by their own context. Hence, it is unnatural for the Germans to do the Americans way of doing things because they it’s outside of their own context.

For Heidegger, man refers to this context of intersubjective meanings because he is always already within and amidst “beings” and moves around them with ease and familiarity.

Thus, for Heidegger, it is in and through the “world” that man projects and charts his own life for pragmatic reasons, but does so within this context of meanings and always guided by it.

In this sense, we can infer that man is determined by “world” and, therefore, on this ground alone, it is quite wrong to assert that Heidegger has conceived of a man as “sovereign” or a self-creator.

Now, the two notions of “overtness” and “world” constitute man as an entity that stands in an intimate and immediate awareness of Being in its character and meanings. Only when “overtness” and “world” occur can all-that-is (Essence of Being) and particular beings (ontic) be encountered as “be-ings”. It is only through “overtness” and “world” therefore that the “unconcealment of Being” becomes possible.

3) The Problem of Authenticity and Inauthenticity

In the previous discussion, we learned that through “overtness” and “world” man can gain a high degree of understanding of itself and the things around him, and, thereby, experience his true Being, that of others and of his things.

However, man in his everyday life fails to realize that his mood, understanding and speech are “necessary ways of Being”. This is due to the fact that man’s thrownness into the world implies deliverance or “fallenness”.

Man’s failure to realize that his mood, understanding and speech are “necessary ways of Being” suggests that man is “lost” in the world. For Heidegger, this “lostness”or “fallenness” in the world means that it is now the world that prescribes the path for man of which he succumbed (surrendered) his creative abilities to worldly things. This is exactly characterizes Heidegger’s notion of “inauthenticity” or an inauthentic or meaningless existence.

Hence, inauthenticity for Heidegger means being not free because we let others (das Man) decide for ourselves. Indeed, inauthenticity means not owning one’s own existence.

Now, in order for man (Dasein) to be authentic, therefore, it has to own its existence again, that it has to regain its existence that is lost in the “they”. And for Heidegger, this implies that Dasein has to gain somehow full awareness of the significance of what it means “to be”, of what it means to be a self with others and objects in the world.

If inauthenticity is understood as the fallenness of Dasein into the “world”, and if authenticity means full awareness of what it means to be a self with others and objects in the world, then this implies a “becoming” or the realization of Dasein’s possibilities.  For Heidegger, such realization of Dasein’s possibilities occurs through the experience of angst which mobilizes other key categories, such as, death, conscience, and decidedness.

Heidegger understands angst as the authentic sensibility that discloses Dasein’s finite existence in the world. This disclosure allows Dasein to understand itself as a finite being thrown toward its own-most possibility, which is death. Through death, understood as the paradoxical possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there, Dasein is thrown back onto its own resources. This movement then discloses Dasein as an individual self thrown into the world, whose task in the world is to exist as itself, that is to say, to be authentic. For Heidegger, therefore, death is the ultimate basis of authenticity.

For Heidegger, the categories of conscience and decidedness answer the question concerning the possibility of authentic existence. Heidegger understands conscience as the inner voice within Dasein itself that calls Dasein to “come back to itself and seize the authentic possibility of truly being itself”.  Conscience appears to be an “ought” on the part of Dasein to own his existence again.  Once Dasein heeds the call of conscience, decidedness ensues.  Authenticity, therefore, as the full awareness of the significance of what it means to be a self also means an “awareness of one’s own-most possibilities and the firm resolve to realize them in the future.” Authenticity is thus tied to one’s possibilities and to possible future ways of being.  For Heidegger, this makes manifest the “temporal” axis of existential phenomenology─Dasein is in the present, indebted to the past, and oriented toward the future (death).  Indeed, the threefold structure of care turns out to be also the structure of existence: the human being is a being in time.

However, for Heidegger, authenticity requires a kind of mood, understanding, and speech that are attuned to the Essence of Being, and this is possible in the “thinking of the philosopher”. And man as Dasein and as thinker will realize that his thinking is a way of Being, that the Essence of Being unfolds in it, and that he is therefore a necessary instrument, that he is needed for the articulation of the Essence of Being.

Heidegger, however, believes that Aristotle and the philosophers after him failed to think about the Essence of Being because they had only articulated the meaning of “particular beings”. Because of this, Heidegger believes, philosophers hitherto could not realize themselves as Dasein, as authentic beings.

This is precisely the reason why Heidegger calls for a second beginning of philosophy. And for Heidegger, this is the new task of philosophy: to think of Being holistically.

But what is the character of this new philosophizing?

Heidegger calls this andenken, which means a thinking “toward and of”, and in this sense a “remembering” kind of thinking―remembering because the moment Being reveals itself, it automatically withdraws itself.

But toward what and of what? In other words, what is the subject matter of this kind of thinking?

According to Heidegger, man should think toward and of the Essence of Being and of the Essence of Man. This is what we meant attuning oneself to Being. And as we already know, it is only when we attuned ourselves to Being that we become ready of the unconcealment of Being and our eventual appropriation of that which is unconcealed by Being. As Heidegger formulates it: “Being commands and directs the thinker”, or “Being claims the thinking of the thinker so that it thereby may conceal itself in its truth”. This is what Heidegger calls “essential or meditative thinking” as opposed to “calculative or scientific thinking”.

On a final note, it must be remembered that Heidegger did not pretend to have solved the problem of Being. Toward the end of his magnum opus Being and Time, Heidegger says explicitly that its only purpose is to rekindle the question of Being and to bring into motion what has become stalemated. In fact, Heidegger concludes this work not with ready-made answers, but with a series of open questions.

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How to Attain a Meaningful Life? Kierkegaard’s 3 Stages of Life

Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy revolves around the idea of existentialism or, as others would say, existential philosophy where individuals find meaning in their life through a leap of faith.

Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy or brand of existentialism is first and foremost a reaction to Hegel’s speculative philosophy. As is well known, in Hegel’s system, what matters is the realization of the Absolute upon which the individual is merely subsumed in the entire process of the development of Reason. In other words, as we can see in Hegel’s seminal work The Phenomenology of Spirit, in the development of Reason, everything that happens (for example, world wars) is just a necessary part of history and individuals do not play an active role in it. In Kierkegaard’s interpretation, the individual’s existence is being left out and reduced to passivity in this process. With this, as Kierkegaard sees it, the individual is unfree. Her life becomes meaningless.

As opposed to Hegel, what matters to Kierkegaard is concrete existence. It is important to note that the term existence for Kierkegaard is proper only to human beings. In fact, in existentialism, other entities, such as plants and animals, do not exist; they only “live”. This explains why for Kierkegaard, to exist means to strive, to consider alternatives, to choose, to decide, and most of all, to commit. As we can see, virtually all of this, as Kierkegaard may have argued, is not captured in Hegel’s system. This is precisely the reason why Kierkegaard rejected the system-building approach of Hegel and argued instead that the quest for truth involves personal choice, grounded in religious faith.

Kierkegaard also shared the conviction of the major philosophers reacting against Kant, Hegel, and the rest of the German Idealist (so famous during this time) that the 19th century European culture was terribly dysfunctional.

Furthermore, Kierkegaard also shared the argument that the individual will come to a proper understanding of human existence and society only when she radically breaks from the prevailing cultural attitudes.

But how can the individual truly exist? Or in what way can she attain authentic or meaningful existence?

According to Kierkegaard, authentic existence is attained when the individual realizes herself through the choice between alternatives and the subsequent self-commitment.

But how is self-realization possible?

According to Kierkegaard, self-realization can be attained through the three stages of life, namely, aesthetic stage, ethical stage, and religious stage. These three stages of life, which Kierkegaard calls “stages on life’s way”, involve a process whereby the true self or authentic existence is actualized in the form of individuality.

The Three Stages of Life according to Kierkegaard

Aesthetic Stage

According to Kierkegaard, the aesthetic stage is ruled by passion; it is indeed the realm of sensory experience and pleasure. As we can see, the aesthetic life for Kierkegaard is characterized by pleasure, and if one wants to live the aesthetic life to the fullest, she must maximize this pleasure.

The main goal of the aesthetic stage, therefore, is to satisfy one’s desires. Hedonism is a perfect example of this stage. And because the person in this stage is driven by desires only, according to Kierkegaard’s philosophy, she is not truly free. Even if she gets what she wants, such as food, drink, sex, and the like, still her life remains empty as her desires can never be fully satisfied. She needs more: more food, more drinks, more sex.

Kierkegaard acknowledges the importance of the aesthetic life. As a human flesh, we need to satisfy our physiological needs. However, because this stage lacks commitment to ideals, the aesthetic life will necessarily result in boredom, boredom not only with the activity but with self.

Boredom, according to Kierkegaard, is like a poison that flows through the veins of each individual, whether poor or rich no one escapes this “psychic-emotional state”. Boredom, therefore, plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. This is because through boredom, the individual realizes that her desires can never be fully satisfied and, thus, she must change.

Now, according to Kierkegaard, when the individual experiences this situation, she is faced with a choice, that is, either she remains in the pursuit of sensual pleasures or to seek higher forms of pleasuresꟷ thus Kierkegaard’s work famous work Either/Or.

Ethical Stage

The ethical stage is the result of the individual’s decision to commit herself to the moral ideals of the society. Here, unlike the aesthetic stage, the individual considers the effects her actions will have on others and gives more emphasis on promoting social justice and equality.

For Kierkegaard, the primary goal of this stage is to live according to ethical standards, that is, to become an ethical person. Thus, the individual who lives in this stage takes responsibility for herself (including her choices and actions) and seeks to become what she ought to be. For this reason, the individual seeks to fulfill her duties and responsibilities related to her work, to her fellowmen, and the society as a whole. Thus, in the ethical stage, the self is no longer the center of everything as it was in the aesthetic stage. It is also in the ethical stage that the idea of “sacrifice” is introduced.

But there is a problem here.

Kierkegaard thought that the ethical individual will eventually reflect and realize that she does not always do what she ought to do―in fact, no one does. According to Kierkegaard, this eventually leads to the experience of guilt and despair.

In Kierkegaard’s philosophy, the experience of guilt and despair shows that the individual needs further change, and this is necessary if one wants to attain true fulfillment or a meaningful existence. As we can see, the individual cannot find real satisfaction in the ethics stage. In other words, one cannot find a meaningful existence in the ethical stage.

In response to this, according to Kierkegaard, the individual can either 1) simply try harder to do the right thing, that is, to be an ethical person, or 2) move to the third and final stage, through a leap of faith.

Religious Stage

According to Kierkegaard, as already mentioned above, we cannot find true fulfillment in the ethical stage. No matter how hard we try to be righteous, we always end up doing the wrong thing. Thus, again, we inevitably experience guilt and despair.

We know that the individual eventually becomes aware that she indeed cannot always do the right thing, but what is important in the ethical stage is that she accepts the fact that not doing the right thing is part of the nature of man―that we always commit mistakes, that we always commit sin.

Now, for Kierkegaard, it is only religion that can offer the possibility of a true fulfillment, of a meaningful or authentic existence. This is because, for Kierkegaard, it is only God’s forgiveness that can eradicate guilt and despair.

It must be noted, however, that the religious stage is not simply an alternative of the ethical. In fact, the ethical and religious stages may even be incompatible, for example, as to the demands of morality. The famous God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac is a typical example.

Issued without apparent justification or reason, this command goes against both the natural emotional ties of parental love and the basic moral principle of any conceivable human society. In its absoluteness and unconditionality, God’s commands mark the strict separation of the religious and the ethical spheres. As we can see, Abraham has faith and acts to obey God’s will, but in the end he is not required to sacrifice his son. For Kierkegaard then, we must believe even though faith violates human rationality, nature, and morality. This is because for Kierkegaard, a faith which conforms to moral intuition does not have any significance. Thus, it is the absurdity of religion that proves its unique value.

But why should humans believe in what they must find as irrational, unnatural and immoral?

This is exactly what Kierkegaard calls a “leap of faith”, which happens only when a choice in favor of faith has been made. Kierkegaard, however, emphasized that this choice or act of choosing must be based on SELF-CONSCIOUS and AUTHENTIC DECISION, rather than the effect of conformism.

This is what Kierkegaard calls inwardness or truth as subjectivity: when one becomes more of an individual through conscious choices and a full self-awareness before God.

Finally, the religious stage is where the individual finds true fulfillment and attains an authentic or meaningful existence, and, in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, this is made possible through a leap of faith.

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William Rowe’s Argument from Evil

In his work titled Arguments/Ruminations from Evil, William Rowe presents an argument against the existence of God that had been captured in two succinct premises, namely:

1) Probably, there is pointless suffering in the world.

2) If God exists, there is no pointless suffering.

3) Thus, probably, God does not exist.

As stated in the first premise, Rowe began his argument by proving his claim that there are instances of pointless suffering, more specifically, suffering that could have been prevented by an omnipotent and caring God without losing something for the greater good or permitting something worse to happen. His famous example of this is the pointless and agonizing suffering of a fawn that had been badly burned in a forest fire. Rowe sees the suffering of the fawn as pointless in the sense that God, or any divine deity out there, could have prevented the fire or the innocent fawn from dying or at least put it out of its misery, without causing any hindrance to any possible greater good or causing something far worse to happen. It’s a dying fawn, if He killed it now, it obviously dies; if He makes it suffer for hours, it still dies. The lack of any divine intervention begs the question of what reason does God have to deny the fawn of death.

While a theist may insist that there is a reason for Him letting the pointless suffering to happen, Rowe opens the possibility that it could be that He doesn’t have one or that He hadn’t stopped it either because he did not want to or because he wasn’t there. However, the point was set; there are instances of pointless suffering in the world and that these pointless sufferings prompt the inquiry into the justifications behind His actions. Curiously, despite his example of the burned deer, Rowe admits that it wasn’t conclusive that the first premise was true but that it was a reasonable case enough to accept, a point which will be discussed later on.

With his first premise explained and defended, he moves on to question the nature of God. Despite his refutation of the existence of the Christian God, his inductive argument which is directed against the former actually relies on the traditionally held idea that God is a being with omni-attributes, that is, He is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent. It is with these attributes in mind that theists and atheists alike can concede that if evil is to be permitted then there must be a form of “divine justification” since their God is loving and kind.  Rowe cites instances where He can allow evil to exist, and they are as follows:

– A greater good occurs in such a case where evil occurs,

– A greater good occurs in such a case where evil, or some evil equally bad or 

      worse occurs,

– Or, evil is preventable only in such a case which God permits some evil equally 

      bad or worse.

– So, if some evil occurs, then either (i), (ii), or (iii) must obtain.

If one agrees to these points, one affirms the validity of the second premise that there is no cases of pointless suffering since God has justification. However, this particular premise is quickly invalidated by Rowe through the mere affirmation of the first premise wherein he has already proven that there are instances of pointless suffering wherein God could have prevented without violating his divine justifications but didn’t.

In addition to the attack on the “divine justifications” that have been forwarded in defense of God, the omni-nature of God came under fire seeing as there are instances of pointless suffering that He could have prevented without contradicting himself. The lack of intervention, for Rowe, shows that He is not as omnipotent or as omnibenevolent as the theists have suggested since he would have either seen the being suffering pointlessly and had chosen not to intervene, contradicting his all-kindness, or he had not seen him at all and thusly could not do anything, contradicting his all-seeing nature.

Therefore, with the first premise reasonably accepted, the second conclusion is invalidated and the conclusion logically states that God does not exist because the instances of pointless suffering evident in the world proves that not only is his nature contradictory and flawed in the face of evil, but the claim that there is no suffering that is pointless is just implausible.

As well-received, logical and succinct Rowe had been with this argument against God, there is one point in his argumentation that poses a very stark threat to his entire case. This apparent flaw lies at the very core of his first premise, more specifically in his justification of his readers accepting the first premise on the grounds that it is reasonable enough to believe or accept. It becomes problematic in that this statement itself is questionable. People may not easily find the first premise reasonable enough to accept due to the circumstantial nature of his main example (the burnt and dying deer) and may request a more concrete instance to be presented before agreeing to Rowe’s claim. They may also doubt the premise simply because it is a conclusion that had been drawn from just one cited circumstance. If the reader is not convinced in his examples or pieces of evidence, they are more likely to not accept or to not affirm the first premise. With this, his whole argumentation becomes less significant as the reader may not see the value of the first premises invalidation of the second premise.

Another aspect that Rowe had glossed over is the nature of the evil that he is referring to in support of his case. The evil that befell the fawn is more likely to be considered as something that could be classified as a “natural evil” which means that it is something that man cannot control. It begets the question of why he did not consider including moral and physical evils in the banner of pointless evils. There are notable instances of pointless moral evils in the world even during his time but it seems odd that he did not engage them. Rowe’s case may or may not had opted out of using moral and psychological evils for fear of falling under the argument of free will, however, this does leave an unexplored point in his argument.

Though his argument can be summarized within three lines of arguments, the implication and significance of his claim has prompted a new perspective in the ongoing debate on God’s existence. His inductive arguments not only helped solidify the need for more logical analysis of the discourse as opposed to historical re-tracings but it also introduced a new point of departure for succeeding philosophers, that is, the presence of cases of pointless sufferings being an indispensable proof for both the flawed nature of the Christian Omni-God but also of his non-existence.

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John Hick’s Soul-Making Theodicy

In direct contrast to William Rowe is the soul-making theodicy put forward by John Hicks, a 20thcentury philosopher. In his theodicy, Hick not only claims that there is no such thing as pointless suffering in the world, but that despite there being evil in the world, God still exists and he is still kind and omnipotent since the evil that he allowed helps people in their development and soul-making.

The discussion on Hick’s theodicy began with a clarification of what the former thinks about the “Fall of Man” and how it shaped our conception of human nature. His view on the “Fall of Man” is quite notable as it presents his denial of the traditional Augustinian account of the fall of man. Traditional Augustinian philosophy/theology would tell us that the main reason as to why moral evils exist in the world is mainly due to our God-given freedom, and that the “original sin” (Adam and Eve’s sin of disobeying God) is the cause of all of the world’s natural and psychological evils since it caused us to drift away from God. The only way for us to be reconciled with Him is through atonement and redemption through His grace, which we can find in the Church.

For Hick, this account of the fall of man is inconsistent for three reasons:

  1. Scientifically, pain and sorrow have existed even before the supposed fall of 

man. The mere existence of man and the world already indicates the existence of fear, pain, agony, and hunger, among others.

  1. Morally, Hick finds it unfair to have an entire race suffer for the sins of two 

individuals (Adam and Eve). With this, even a baby is considered a sinner even before he had learned how to walk! This only serves to paint God as a vengeful, unjust and immoral Being.

  1. Lastly, Hick finds this account logically inconsistent seeing as man and the 

world, in Augustine’s account, is described as perfect and almost god-like. By all accounts, that also goes to imply that they are flawless and are perfect enough not to perform actions that are obvious violations of God’s orders. Augustine’s version of man then after the fall is not a developed one but is one that has regressed from being perfect to antiquated.

With the idea of the “original sin” denied, sinning, then, for Hicks is something that was influenced by an inner or outer flaw. This led to Hick claiming that humans and the world were created by God, before or after the fall, imperfectly or unfinished. This claim would prove significant in his theodicy as it is because of our imperfectness or our being created unfinished by God that gives us the need to have evil exist.

For Hick, evil or suffering is not exactly pointless or unnecessary since it is vital to God’s “master plan,” and so it does not contradict God’s nature but in one way or another, it actually supports the omni-attributes. Since humans are created unfinished, then they are still in the process of creation and one way in which God gives man the avenue for development is by letting evil exist. With God allowing it to be in the world, Hick claims that it serves as the catalyst for man to become virtuous beings through becoming people that are more than capable of following His will. Suffering then is not exactly pointless or there is no such thing as pointless suffering since it helps ‘perfect’ man, which is the express purpose of what Hick calls soul-making.

The concept of soul-making is the core of Hick’s theodicy. As mentioned before, the main objective of pain and suffering is to help mankind become perfect. By this, Hick doesn’t mean to become flawless and ethereal beings but to become beings that are not only virtuous (as mentioned before) but are also conscious and aware of their dependence on God. This need for God is emphasized when Hick states that it is through the man being ignorant of this dependence on Him that he falls into sin and fall away from Him (this may be the internal or external flaw that he was referring to in his refutation of traditional Augustinian perspectives).

With this awareness of our relationship with God, one can begin to understand why Hick says that a sinner can have their sins done away with through redemption that is freely chosen seeing as man now knows that to be perfect is to be one that aligns their will to His. The perfect man or the perfect child of God is not something that is created but is something that is developed, nurtured, or perhaps fostered.  The world, therefore, does not only allow for the cultivation of this idea of perfection but is “…a valley of soul-making,” which means that it is a place where self and spiritual development is always happening.

But, according to Hick, the soul-making process is not one that we can complete on Earth. It may be due to the natural life-span of man or to the unpredictability of our environment, but the process of self -development, and soul making is one that will reach completion in the afterlife despite the fact that it begins on Earth. It is a process that will occupy man for the entirety of his mortal life and perhaps even after it. Nonetheless, John Hick’s soul-making theodicy does present a more optimistic and positive perspective of God’s position and actions in the face of evil being present in the world. His theodicy does not necessitate a compromise of the three omni-attributes but invokes the idea of a God that is as loving as he is patient. However, this does not mean that it is beyond critique.

One of the criticisms that makes itself apparent is the scope of the soul-making process. As we have understood from Hick, one of the main motivation for God to let the world experience suffering is to help them develop and become virtuous beings that acknowledge their dependence on Him. Does this also mean that this soul-making process also extends to the non-human beings? If not, then it begs the question of why God allowed these non-human beings (which includes, but are not limited to, animals, plants, insects, and microorganisms) to suffer the same evil as human beings if they are not included in the development. Following his inclination to using scientific evidence, the inclusion of the non-humans would imply that God unfairly subjected the non-human beings to pain and suffering as far back as Mesozoic Era in anticipation of the human race’s development despite the fact that they do not come into existence for at least several billion years later. This line of argumentation not only works against the idea of a kind God but also of an omnipotent God.

Another point of contention in Hick’s theodicy concerns the duration of the soul-making process. If the person at the beginning of the process is the same at the end of it in the sense that they were still both developing, then what does the completion of the process entail? If it truly did entail the development of man into a perfect being, then why does God want to wait for a person to die before he can become someone reconcilable to Him? Pragmatically-speaking, it would make more sense to have man return and believe in Him while they were still alive as to assist others in reaching God-consciousness? This line of questioning, in turn, invokes the idea of an afterlife wherein man can actually ‘reap’ the results of his life-long struggle for development and ‘be with’ his/her creator. Sadly, Hick was silent about the idea of a life after death nor did he clarify why the process had to end in death and not when a person reaches an epiphany.

Yet, by the end of it all, John Hick’s idea of a life-long process of self and spiritual development is one that gives a more positive perspective of an evil-filled world. Suffering does exist, but it is not detrimental to both man and his world as it is through pain and suffering that they learn to become better versions of themselves, to be virtuous, God-conscious, and perfect beings that are on their way to being reconciled with Him in this life or the next.

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St. Anselm’s Argument for God’s Existence

One of the famous arguments for the existence of God is the ontological argument. And, as is well known, of all the versions of the ontological argument, it is Anselm’s argument for God’s existence that stands out the most.

What is common among these versions of ontological argument, including Anselm’s argument for God’s existence, is the claim that it is self-contradictory to deny the existence of a greatest possible being. In other words, for the adherents of the ontological argument, the existence of a greatest possible being is necessary, and He is God. Therefore, God exists.

On a side note, according to Norman Melchert (1999), the term “ontological” comes from the ancient Greek word onto, which means being. The term “ontological argument” was given such name in the eighteenth century by one of its critics, namely, Immanuel Kant. This is because, unlike the argument of St. Thomas Aquinas, it does not begin from facts about the world from which the term “cosmological arguments” was derived. Instead, it goes straight from the idea of God to the conclusion about his being and his necessary existence.

According to Melchert, many thinkers find it important to distinguish two, or even more, distinct arguments because at least one form of the argument is pretty obviously invalid. In his version of the ontological argument, Anselm does not do so. Many thinkers interpret Anselm’s argument as one argument. Let us now briefly sketch Anselm’s argument for God’s existence.

Anselm’s Argument for God’s Existence: A Brief Sketch

For Anselm, God does not just exist, but God “truly and necessarily” exists so that it is impossible for us to think that He does not exist. According to Melchert, this apparently simple, yet deeply perplexing argument is called in the history of philosophy as ontological argument.

Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, which he developed in his famous work titled Proslogium, begins with a definition of God. But the idea of definition here does not necessarily refer to the “idea” of something as produced by experience. By “definition” Anselm means our rather abstract conception of God when we utter the word God.

For Anselm, God is a being in which nothing greater can be thought of or, in Anselm’s own words, “than, that which no greater can be conceived” (Melchert, p. 270). According to Melchert, Anselm used this convoluted phrase for two reasons. On the one hand, Anselm does not want the idea of God to be limited by what we may be able to conceive. On the other hand, Anselm does not want to suggest that a positive conception of God can be entirely comprehensible by us. Suppose we are thinking or conceiving of a certain being. According to Anselm, if the mind can still conceive of something greater than what we have just thought, then it is not yet God that we have conceived. This is because it is not yet “that, than which no greater can be conceived”. Hence, as we can see, Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence rests entirely on the conception of a being in which nothing greater can be thought of or, again, in Anselm’s own words, “that, than which no greater can be conceived”.

It is important to note that this line of thinking was framed in terms of the Augustinian notion of a Great Chain of Being. As we may already know, the Great Chain of Being is a hierarchical structure of all matter and life, which, in medieval Christianity, has been understood as being decreed by God. This means that the world is ordered by the degrees of being and value (or greatness) in its various parts. For example, the tree is higher than the stone, while humans are higher than the trees, and so on. Now, if we move up and down the chain, it would appear pretty obvious that we can easily conceive of lesser and greater beings; and in doing so, we are inevitably led to think of an idea of something that is not only greater than other beings, but of an idea of something that we cannot even think of a greater. As Anselm would have us believe, this being, which is at the highest point of the Great Chain of Being, is God.

Now, if God is a being in which nothing greater can be conceived, is there such being in reality? Of course, it might be the case that this being in which nothing greater can be thought of exists only in the mind, like the idea of a golden mountain or a unicorn. As we can see, this calls to mind the contention of the atheists that “There is no God”.

In response to this, Anselm argues that the claim that God does not exist in reality is absurd because while we can utter the words “There is no God” or “God does not exist”, we cannot clearly think what we mean without falling into the pit of contradiction. This is because the idea of God appears to be self-evident. If we think of the Great Chain of Being, we cannot help but affirm the existence of a being in which nothing greater can be conceived. God, therefore, necessarily exists.

As we can see, the atheists are wrong, at least for Anselm. Indeed, for Anselm, the statement “There is no God” or “God does not exist” is absolutely false. Hence, as Anselm argues, it follows not only that God exists but also that it is impossible that He does not exist. Melchert (p. 273) puts Anselm’s argument for God’s existence this way:

Anselm’s argument for God’s existence, as we can see above, moves from God’s essence to God’s existence. In other words, it moves from our understanding of what God is to the fact that God is. “In certain clear sense, the argument is a claim that the existence of God is self-evident. What that means is that it is enough to understand the conception of God to know that God must exist. Nothing else is required. God’s essence entails God’s existence.” (Melchert, p. 273)

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Descartes’ Proofs for God’s Existence

Descartes’ proofs for God’s existence came after he had proven that it is his ability to doubt that proved his very own existence. The argument that culminated in his most famous dictum, “cogito ergo sum,” is what some scholars would call the first certitude in his philosophy. The second certitude is the proof for God’s existence or that he exists despite our doubting of everything else in our immediate world, and Descartes’ argument promptly “starts off” where the first certitude ends. He proves His existence using the idea of perfection.

At this point in his philosophy, it is a fact that man has the ability to doubt everything that surrounds him. Due to the fact that man has this said ability, Descartes believes that he is an imperfect being. But despite his being imperfect, he can still think of perfection and he can still conceive of a more perfect being than himself which is God. This would not make sense because an imperfect being cannot think of or know of perfection and of such a perfect being, that is, unless there is someone or something out there that had given or bestowed upon him this idea of perfection, allowing him to be able to know it or conceive it.

According to Descartes, for man to be able to do that, it must also follow that this being must also be perfect to be able to impart the idea of perfection since it makes no logical sense for an imperfect being to impart knowledge of perfection to anyone else. The only perfect being that can do this is God; and since we can conceive him and know of his perfection-therefore, God exists.

His argument was short, concise and impactful but continued to be logical and sensible. But as well-written and elucidated it is, there remains several points of clarification and considerations. Firstly, Descartes has to defend or clarify whether God is necessarily perfect. In his argument, it is because of our ability to conceive of perfection that necessitated the existence of a perfect being but how will Descartes’ argumentation hold if the very being that imparts the knowledge of his existence to man, the imperfect being, is not the perfect being that the philosopher was describing?

If his answer would still be in the affirmative, that God is perfect, it would also be logical to say that it still wouldn’t necessarily follow that man would, each and every time, hold the idea of God as a being that is perfect. Several sects of the faith do believe in God, however, they do not see him as the omni-God or the perfect God but they see him as the imperfect God or a God that suffers and bleeds with them. An Atheist can still think of and conceive of God but they see him as a flawed being; a being that isn’t just, that doesn’t listen, and so on and so forth. Man would then still know of God but we then have an imperfect idea of God. Such an idea would make it hard to continue to call that deity “God” seeing as that God would then be seen as a Being that is just as vulnerable and erroneous as man which is the complete opposite to the idea of the Christian God.

Secondly, is man’s capability to conceive ideas of perfection and of God really evidence enough to declare the existence of God? As Descartes himself has said, men are imperfect beings that still use their unreliable senses to gain knowledge and understanding of their world, regardless of whether that knowledge is true or not. It is then reasonable to see man having different or deviant ideas of perfection. In the very first place, it is difficult to get to one idea of perfection seeing as man can think of many ways that perfection can be characterized, so is it really the best idea of concept to use in justifying the existence of a transcendent Being? If man’s ability to know of perfection can lead to the conclusion that there is a being that is more perfect than us, does that also mean that man’s ability to think of and conceive of evil and unjustness also lead to the existence of a perfectly evil and unjust being? If so, wouldn’t that defeat the purpose for his having included the defense of God in his works when it would also defend the existence of His counterpart?

Still, despite the fact that his argument kept being questioned at every possible opportunity, his defense of God’s existence through the consideration of man’s imperfect nature and his ability to conceive of perfection and the idea of God by itself is a testament to his sound and resourceful logic. Considering that this has been conceived of and written in the 17th century, it is a feat then that Descartes’ philosophy continues to find relevance in modern society and thought and that it has paved the way for man’s reconsideration of what truth actually is and how we can attain it.

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St. Thomas Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence

To answer the question concerning God’s existence, St. Thomas Aquinas presented five ways or proofs in his most notable work, the Summa Theologica. This is also called “Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence”. These five arguments draw proof or evidence from man’s experience with the world, which are noticeably influenced by Aristotle and his concept of the four causes.

The first argument that Aquinas formulated is the argument from motion. After observing objects in motion, Aquinas was convinced that whatever is currently in motion were once at rest but had changed states when it was moved by something else. This mover was something once at rest as well but was also moved by something else. This line of thought would go on and on until it forms an almost infinite series of concurrent events where the objects are both movers and moved. But if this series of events needed something to begin the movement, then, it is logical to assume that at the very beginning of this infinite series is the first mover, which starts the movement.  Aquinas describes this first mover as the “unmoved mover,” a label which is quite similar to Aristotle’s “prime mover.” As we can see, both see this mover as one that is not caused or moved by anything other than itself. And for Aquinas, this is God.

The second argument is the argument from causation, which builds upon Aristotle’s concept of the efficient cause. The main idea here is that every object, action, or event, according to Aristotle, has an efficient cause or an entity or event responsible for its creation or change. Just like how a baby finds their efficient cause in their parents and their parents in their own parents and so on and so forth, Aquinas uses these examples of dependent relationships to show that every person or object in the world depends on a creator (efficient cause) and that this creator also has its own creator, and this new creator also has its own efficient cause. This cycle, much like the argument from motion, can go on infinitely but, according to Aquinas, it should not be so since in the first place the series would not have begun.

It is then logical to assume that at the very beginning, there is the existence of a “First Maker” or an “Uncaused Cause,” which, as the name suggests, is the efficient cause that is not caused by others or anything but itself. This “Uncaused Cause” is, of course, attributed by Aquinas to the Christian God.

The third argument is the argument from contingency which necessitates the distinction between “necessary” and “possible” beings. “Possible” beings, simply put, are beings that can be created and corrupted or are beings that can exist and not exist. An example of a possible being is man. Man is a possible being because we have the potential to exist (birth) and the same potential to not exist (death). Plants, animals, and structures are among some of the other beings included in this category.

With this in mind, it is then reasonable to think that since most beings in the world are possible beings, then there must have been a time that they had not existed at all, which means that nothing ever existed. And if there truly was a time of pure non-existence, then nothing could currently exist because nothingness can only yield nothingness. The only way that our existence at this very moment could be explained, for Aquinas, is if there was a being that already exists despite the nothingness of the possible beings.

This being is called a necessary being. Necessary beings, on the other hand, are beings that necessarily exist or are beings that cannot be nonexistent. For Aquinas, there must be at least one necessary being to exist at the very beginning for the rest of the beings to be able to exist. This being is, of course, God.

The fourth argument is the argument from degrees of perfection. This argument makes use of man’s knowledge of perfection and his tendency to judge or evaluate whether an object or person is more or less perfect. This action of judging something to be more or less perfect means that there is a standard that is used for the said evaluation. But how could man ever have such standards unless there is a being that is all-perfect to compare it to? Aquinas affirms the existence of such a perfect being and says that if any other being would be compared or evaluated against such perfection, they would always be judged as less perfect. He calls this all-perfect being God.

The fifth and last argument in St. Thomas Aquinas’s five proofs for God’s existence is the argument from final causes or design. Some scholars would also call this as the teleological argument. Aquinas once again drew on the notions of causality as presented by Aristotle to justify this argument. The “final cause,” as described by Aristotle, is the fourth cause and is one that refers to “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done.” Some scholars would describe it, rather simply, as the cause that refers to the purpose of which a specific object or entity has been created to fulfill.

Humans and most natural beings in the world have been “designed” to have a purpose and we behave or act according to that purpose. For instance, the bird’s wings behave in accordance with its design which allows it to fly. Humans talk using their mouths because this is in accordance with their body’s design which allows them to utilize air and various muscles in their body to create sounds.

For Aquinas, if there is some sort of design that is set in our world, then there must be a designer. This designer cannot possibly just be humans or other natural beings themselves as he describes man as imperfect and not intelligent enough to set such a grand design. Some of the natural beings, Aquinas tells us, are not even capable enough to know what their end is. The design of the world, therefore, must have been set by a being that is vastly more intelligent than humans and knowledgeable enough to guide them towards their end. This, of course, is God.

Aquinas’ five proofs for God’s existence, during, of course, Aquinas’ time, were found to be compelling enough and soon grew to be influential in religious discourses. For some religious denominations, these arguments still remain significant in defense of the Faith up until the 21st century, where most of them have been incorporated into doctrines and statements. But as groundbreaking as St. Thomas Aquinas’ arguments were and are, there is still room for critique.

St. Thomas Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence: A Brief Critique

The main criticism that one can immediately infer from these arguments is the fact that a majority of them remain as assumptions. Though St. Thomas Aquinas did invoke observations from man’s experience with natural phenomena as well as logic to prove his point, there is no concrete way of knowing whether these events do happen in the manner that the theologian-philosopher has described it.  In the case of the first proof, there is no concrete explanation as to whether every single movement in this world can be traced back to one single cause nor is there enough proof to determine that an event or an object is necessarily moved or affected by the simultaneous movement of another object or entity. In the case of the fifth argument, it is simply too illogical to immediately assume that just because the bird’s wings are aerodynamic or that humans are capable of speech it automatically suggests the presence of both a grand design and of a grand intelligent mind when, in the same paradigm, the notion of spontaneity and adaption exists.

Interestingly, he did speak of this same point in the Summa Theologica as Objection #2 and his response to this response is as follows: “For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature, and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason. Therefore, there is no need to suppose God’s existence.”  Though the reduction does serve the purpose of trying the establish concrete principles where he can root his arguments on, the idea that natural and voluntary things can be reduced into just nature and reason is still an assumption by itself.

It is tempting to think that there is indeed such a connection between the beings in the world, but as far as human knowledge is concerned, these conclusions are merely a product of inference and are not concretely proven.

This then leads to the second point of my criticism. Should a person not be satisfied with the assumptions forwarded by St. Thomas Aquinas and decides to do away with them, then Aquinas’s five proofs will become irrelevant. The arguments would not be able to stand once you remove the assumptions, such as the assumption that the one thing is caused by another or that if the notion of a grand design necessitates the existence of a grand designer, as these are the logical links between his premises. To continue to believe in these arguments without said assumptions, one must somehow either see it in a dogmatic light or ignore contrary logical proof.

Despite these criticisms, St. Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy has withstood time and continues to play a significant role in the development of both the Church and modern theology. By incorporating human experience, logic, and Aristotle in his attempt of proving His existence, he not only formulated five succinct and insightful arguments but he had also brought theology further than what his time had expected.

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Tautologies and Contradictions

In these notes, I will briefly discuss tautologies and contradictions in propositional or symbolic logic. But please note that this is just an introductory discussion on tautologies and contradictions as my main intention here is just to make students in logic become familiar with the topic under investigation.

On the one hand, a tautology is defined as a propositional formula that is true under any circumstance. In other words, a propositional expression is a tautology if and only if for all possible assignments of truth values to its variables its truth value is always true. 

Thus, a tautology is a proposition that is always true. Consider the following example:

Either the accused is guilty or the accused is not guilty. (p)

Obviously, the proposition is a disjunction; yet both disjuncts can be represented by the variable p. Hence, the proposition is symbolized as follows:

p v ~p

Now, in what sense that this proposition is always true? The truth table below will prove this point.

tautologies and contradictions

As we can see in the truth table above, if p is true, then ~p is false; and if p is false, then ~p is true. And if we apply the rules in both inclusive and exclusive disjunction, the result of p v ~p is always true. If we recall our discussion on inclusive and exclusive disjunction, we learned that an inclusive disjunction is true if at least one of the disjuncts is true; and an exclusive disjunction is true if one disjunct is true and the other is false, or one disjunct is false and the other is true. 

Hence, there is no way that p v ~p will become false. Indeed, the propositional form p v ~p is always true.

On the other hand, a contradiction is defined as a propositional formula that is always false under any circumstance. In other words, a propositional expression is a contradiction if and only if for all possible assignments of truth values to its variables its truth value is always false. Thus, again, a contradiction is a proposition that is always false. Let us consider the examples below.

Man is both mortal and immortal. (p)

Obviously, the proposition is a conjunction; yet both conjuncts can be represented by the variable p. Hence, the proposition is symbolized as follows:

p • ~p

Now, in what sense that this proposition is always false? The truth table below will prove this point.

tautologies and contradictions

As we can see in the truth table above, if p is true, then ~p is false; and if p is false, then ~p is true. And if we apply the rule in conjunction here, which says that “A conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true,” then surely there is no way that the proposition “Man is both mortal and immortal” or p • ~p will become true. Indeed, the propositional form p • ~p is always false.

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Propositional Logic: Indirect Truth Table Method and Validity of Arguments

In these notes, I will discuss the indirect truth table method in determining the validity of an argument in symbolic logic.

In my other notes (look for “Propositional Logic: Truth Table and Validity of Arguments” in Studypool search engine), I discussed the truth table method in determining the validity of an argument in symbolic logic. But the problem of the truth table method is that it can hardly be used in determining the validity of longer arguments. 

Consider the example below.

  1. If the fact that the airship Albatros had powerful weapon meant it could destroy objects on the ground, and its capability of destroying objects on the ground meant that the captain could enforce his will all over the earth, then the captain either had good motives for controlling the world or his motives were evil. The airship Albatros had powerful weapon only if its captain had more advanced scientific knowledge than his contemporaries; and if the captain had more advanced scientific knowledge than his contemporaries, then Albatros could destroy objects on the ground. It is either the case that if the Albatros could destroy objects on the ground its captain could enforce his will all over the earth, or it is the case that if he attempted to blow up the British vessel then his passengers would recognize the hoax. It is not the case that his attempt to Blow up the British vessel resulted in his passengers’ recognizing the hoax.  Furthermore, the captain’s motives for controlling the world were not evil.  Therefore, his motives were good. (A, D, W, G, E, S, B, P)

As we can see, the argument contains 8 constants, namely, A, D, W, G, E, S, B, and P. If we employ the truth table method in determining the validity of this argument, then this means that we need to construct a truth table that contains 256 rows. Needless to say, that’s going to be a long and arduous process. It is for this obvious reason that logicians invented a shorter, more efficient method of determining the validity of arguments, namely, the indirect truth table method.

Let us determine the validity of the argument above using the indirect truth table method.

First, let us symbolize the argument above proposition by proposition or sentence by sentence to avoid confusion. In case one does not know yet how to symbolize arguments in logic, please refer to my previous post titled “Truth Table and Validity of Arguments”, http://philonotes.com/index.php/2018/03/26/truth-table-and-validity-of-arguments/. See also “Symbolizing Propositions in Symbolic Logic”, http://philonotes.com/index.php/2018/02/14/symbolizing-propositions-in-symbolic-logic/.

Proposition 1:

If the fact that the airship Albatros had powerful weapon meant it could destroy objects on the ground, and its capability of destroying objects on the ground meant that the captain could enforce his will all over the earth, then the captain either had good motives for controlling the world or his motives were evil.

[(A ⊃ D) • (D ⊃ W)] ⊃ (G v E)

Proposition 2:

The airship Albatros had powerful weapon only if its captain had more advanced scientific knowledge than his contemporaries; and if the captain had more advanced scientific knowledge than his contemporaries, then Albatros could destroy objects on the ground.

(A ⊃ S) • (S ⊃ D)

Proposition 3:

It is either the case that if the Albatros could destroy objects on the ground its captain could enforce his will all over the earth, or it is the case that if he attempted to blow up the British vessel then his passengers would recognize the hoax.

(D ⊃ W) v (B ⊃ P)

Proposition 4:

It is not the case that his attempt to Blow up the British vessel resulted in his passengers’ recognizing the hoax.

~ (B ⊃ P)

Proposition 5:

Furthermore, the captain’s motives for controlling the world were not evil.

~ E

Conclusion:

Therefore, his motives were good.

/∴ G

In the end, the argument above is symbolized as follows:

Indirect Truth Table Method

Now, in determining the validity of the argument above using the indirect truth table method, what we need to do is try to make the conclusion false and all the premises true. This is because if we recall our discussion on the rule in determining the validity of an argument in symbolic logic, we learned that an argument is invalid if the conclusion is false and all the premises are true. Thus, in using the indirect truth table method in determining the validity of an argument, we aim to make the argument invalid. If it is possible for us to make the argument invalid, then obviously the argument is invalid. If it is impossible for us to make the argument invalid, then obviously the argument is valid.

But how do we make the argument invalid?

First, let’s write the premises and the conclusion in a horizontal manner for convenience’s sake.

And second, assign truth-values to the conclusion and the premises that would result in the form “false conclusion and all true premises”. In doing so, start with the conclusion and assign the value “false”, and then go back to the premises and try to make all of them true. In making the premises true, always start with the first premise in order to avoid confusion and, of course, save time. Consider the example below.

indirect truth table method

As we can see, the argument above is valid because, although the conclusion is false, we cannot make all of the premises true. No matter what we do, Premise #5 cannot be true. Let me explain this further.

As said, let us always start with the conclusion and assign a false value to it. Please note that we should not assign a true value to the conclusion because if we do so, then we are defeating the purpose. This is obviously because if we assign the value true for the conclusion, then the argument will already appear valid. So, again, we should assign the value false for the conclusion. Look at the illustration below.

indirect truth table method

Please note that in this example, we can easily make the conclusion false by assigning the truth-value “false” to it because the conclusion above is a simple proposition. But even if it’s a compound proposition, we can still easily make it false if we have mastered the rules in compound propositions in symbolic logic. For example, if the conclusion is p ⊃ q, then we just need to assign the value true for p and false for q to make the proposition (conclusion) false. If we recall, the conditional proposition is false if the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

Now, since we have made the conclusion false, let’s go back to the premises and try to make all of them true. And let’s start with the first premise. Look at the illustration below.

indirect truth table method

As we can see, the first premise is a conditional proposition whose antecedent is [(A ⊃ D) • (D ⊃ W)] and the consequent is (G v E). Because this is a conditional proposition, and since our goal here is to make this premise true, then all we need to do is assign truth-values that would make the consequent (G v E) true. Please note that we need not assign any values to the antecedent [(A ⊃ D) • (D ⊃ W)] because whatever its truth-value, the premise is already true since the consequent is true. Again, the only instance wherein the conditional proposition becomes false is when the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Thus, whenever the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, the conditional proposition becomes automatically true.

So, how do we make the consequent (G v E) true?

Since the consequent is an exclusive disjunctive, then we need to see to it that (G v E) should not have the same truth-value in order for it to become true. If we recall our discussion in exclusive disjunction, an exclusive disjunction is true if one disjunct is false and other is true, and vice versa. And since we already have the value false for G in the conclusion, then we cannot make it true in the premise. Please note that in indirect truth table method, once the variable or constant has a fixed truth-value, then we cannot change it. Thus, if we change the truth-value of one variable or constant, then we need to change the truth-value of the same variable or constant in the entire indirect truth table. Since G is false, then we are forced to assign the truth-value “true” for E to make (G v E) true. So, since G is false and E is true, then the exclusive disjunction (G v E) is now true. And since the proposition is a conditional one, and because the consequent (G v E) is true, then Premise #1 is now true.

Let’s proceed to the second premise and try to make it true. Look at the illustration below.

indirect truth table method

Premise #2 is a conjunctive statement whose conjuncts are both conditional propositions. If we recall our discussion on conjunctive statements, we learned that a conjunctive statement is true if both conjuncts are true. Hence, if one conjunct or both are false, then the conjunctive statement is false. Since our goal here is to make Premise #2 true, then we have to see to it that both conjuncts must be true. In other words, (A ⊃ S) and (S ⊃ D) must be true.

How do we make  (A ⊃ S) and (S ⊃ D) true?

Let’s start with (A ⊃ S). Since we don’t have a value for A and S yet, then we are free to assign whatever value that will make (A ⊃ S) true. So, if we assign a true value for both A and S, then (A ⊃ S) is true. Hence, as you can see in the diagram above, A is true and S is true.

The second conjunct is (S ⊃ D). Please note that we already have a value for S, which is true. Hence, we cannot assign a false value to D because it will make the proposition false. So, we are forced to assign the value true for D. Since S and D are now true, then the proposition (S ⊃ D) is true.

And since the conjuncts (A ⊃ S) and (S ⊃ D) are now true, then Premise #2 is now true (see diagram above).

Let’s proceed to Premise #3. Look at the illustration below.

indirect truth table method

Premise #3 is an inclusive disjunction whose disjuncts are both conditional propositions. If we recall our discussion on inclusive disjunction, we learned that an inclusive disjunction is true if at least one of the disjuncts is true. So, in Premise #3, we just need to make either of the disjuncts true in order for it to become true. And in the illustration above, we just made the first disjunct (D ⊃ W) true.

How do we make the first disjunct (D ⊃ W) true?

Since we already have the value true for D (see Premise #2), and since the proposition is conditional, that is, (D ⊃ W), then we cannot assign a value false for W; otherwise, we are making the proposition false. Hence, we are forced to assign the value true for W. Now, Since D is true and W is true, then the first disjunct (D ⊃ W) is true. If we look at the illustration above, we do not assign a value to the second disjunct (B ⊃ P). Of course, we are free to assign a value for (B ⊃ P), but that is not necessary because whatever value we have for (B ⊃ P), the premise (D ⊃ W) v (B ⊃ P) is already true because the first disjunct is true.

Let’s proceed to Premise #4. Look at the illustration below.

indirect truth table method

Premise #4 is a conditional proposition, but it is completely negated. In this case, it is relatively easy for us to make this premise true. All we need to do is make B ⊃ P false; so that if B ⊃ P is false, then ~ (B ⊃ P) is true.

How do we make B ⊃ P false?

Because B ⊃ P is a conditional proposition, there is only one way to make it false, that is, assign a true value to the antecedent B and false to consequent P. If we recall our discussion on conditional propositions, we learned that a conditional is false if the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Hence, if B is true and P is false (see illustration above), then B ⊃ P false. Again, since B ⊃ P false, then ~ (B ⊃ P) is true (see illustration above).

Lastly, let us make Premise #5 true. Look at the illustration below.

indirect truth table method

Premise #5, as we can see, is just a simple proposition. So, it is very easy for us to make this premise true. Since the premise is ~ E, all we need to do is assign the value false for E. This is because if E is false, then ~ E is true.

However, if we go back to Premise #1, we notice that we have assigned the value true for E. And since in indirect truth table method we are not allowed to change the value of a variable or constant, then we are forced to use the value true for E in Premise #5. So, if E is true, then ~ E is false (see illustration above).

At the end of it all, it’s impossible for us to make the argument above invalid. Therefore, the argument is absolutely valid.

Just a final note. There are, of course, several ways of making a conclusion false and all the premises true in indirect truth table method. For example, we can make Premise #1 in the argument above by making the antecedent [(A ⊃ D) • (D ⊃ W)] false. But I have exhausted all the ways in making the argument above invalid but to no avail. The argument, therefore, is valid.

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Propositional Logic: Truth Table and Validity of Arguments

In these notes, I will discuss the topic truth table and validity of arguments, that is, I will discuss how to determine the validity of an argument in propositional logic using the truth table method.

However, it must be noted that there are two basic methods in determining the validity of an argument in symbolic logic, namely, truth table and partial truth table method. Again, in this post, I will only discuss the truth table method, thus the topic “truth table and validity of arguments”. I will discuss the partial truth table method in my next post.

Validity and Invalidity of Arguments

How do we know whether an argument is valid or invalid?

On the one hand, a truth-functionally valid argument form is an argument that is composed of propositions that have truth-functional forms such that it is impossible for its premises to be all true and its conclusion false. In other words, an argument is valid if it does not contain the form “all true premises and false conclusion”.

On the other hand, a truth-functionally invalid argument form is an argument that is composed of propositions that have truth-functional forms such that it is possible for its premises to be all true and its conclusion false. In other words, an argument is invalid if all of its premises are true and its conclusion false.

Let’s consider the example below.

1. If the squatters settle here, then the cattlemen will be angry and that there will be a fight for water rights. The squatters are going to settle here. Therefore, there will be a fight for water rights. (S, C, F)

So, how do we determine the validity of the argument above?

Before we can apply the truth table method in determining the validity of the argument above, we need to symbolize the argument first. After symbolizing the argument, we will construct a truth table for the argument, and then apply the rule in determining the validity of arguments in symbolic logic.

But how do we symbolize the argument above?

In case one does not know how to symbolize arguments in symbolic logic, please refer to my previous post titled “Symbolizing Propositions in Symbolic Logic”, http://philonotes.com/index.php/2018/02/14/symbolizing-propositions-in-symbolic-logic/.

In symbolizing arguments in symbolic logic, we just need to apply the techniques that we employed in symbolizing propositions. Hence, we symbolize arguments in symbolic logic proposition by proposition or sentence by sentence.

Now, if we look at the argument above, the first proposition is “If the squatters settle here, then the cattlemen will be angry and that there will be a fight for water rights.” And then we see the constants “S, C, and F” at the end of the argument.

If we recall my discussion on symbolizing propositions, we learned that the variables or constants provided after the proposition (argument in this case) represent the propositions in the entire proposition (argument in this case) respectively. Hence, the constant S stands for “The squatters settle here”, C for “The cattlemen will be angry”, and F for “There will be a fight for water rights”. Thus, the first proposition “If the squatters settle here, then the cattlemen will be angry and that there will be a fight for water rights” is symbolized as follows:

S ⊃ (C • F)

The next proposition in the argument above says “The squatters are going to settle here”. As we notice, this proposition is just a repeat of the proposition in the previous statement, and this proposition is symbolized by the constant S. Hence, the second proposition “The squatters are going to settle here” is symbolized as follows:

S

The third and last proposition is obviously the conclusion because of the signifier “therefore”. This proposition is also a repeat of the proposition in the first sentence, which is symbolized by the constant F. Hence, the conclusion “Therefore, there will be a fight for water rights” is symbolized as follows:

F

At the end of it all, the argument “If the squatters settle here, then the cattlemen will be angry and that there will be a fight for water rights. The squatters are going to settle here. Therefore, there will be a fight for water rights. (S, C, F)” is symbolized as follows:

S ⊃ (C • F)
S /∴ F

Please note that in the symbolized form of the argument above, S ⊃ (C • F) is the first premise, S is the second premise, and F is the conclusion. 

Now, how do we construct a truth table for this argument?

First, we need to construct a truth table that contains columns for the variables or constants and columns for the premises and the conclusion. In order to do this, we will use the formula 2 raised to the power n (2n), where 2 is constant and n is a variable.

The n in the formula 2n represents the number of variables or constants used in the argument. Since the argument above contains 3 constants, namely, S, C, and F, then the formula now reads:

23

So, 23 = 8. This means that we need to construct a truth table that contains 8 rows. But first we have to draw columns for the constants and the premises and the conclusion, which will look like this:

Truth Table and Validity of Arguments

After drawing the columns for the constants and the premises and conclusion, we will now draw 8 rows. With this, the truth table will now look like this:

Now that we have constructed the truth table that contains the columns for the constants and the premises and conclusion, let us provide the truth values of the variables S, C, and F. We need to do this because the truth values of the premises and the conclusion will be based on the truth values of the variables or constants.

But how do we do this?

First, it must be noted that the product 8 above (23 = 8) also represents 4 true values and 4 false values for the variable or constant (S in the case of the example above). And the rule here is that we write the true values first and then the false values. So, the truth table will now look like this:

For the next column (that is, the column for C), we need to divide the 4 true and false values by 2. Thus, we will have 2 true values and 2 false values. The rule is we will write 2 true values first and then 2 false values. For the remaining rows, we will write 2 true values and 2 false values alternately. So, the truth table will now look like this:

For the next column (that is, the column for F), we need to divide the 2 true and false values by 2. Thus, we will have 1 true and 1 false value. The rule is we will write 1 true value first and then 1 false value. So, the truth table will now look like this:

For the remaining rows, we will write 1 true value and 1 false value alternately. So, the truth table will now look like this:

Since we already have the truth values of the constants S, C, F, we can now determine the truth values of the premises and the conclusion. Please note that we need to provide the truth values of all the premises and the conclusion before we can apply the rule in determining the validity of an argument. So, let’s provide the truth values of the premise.

The first premise is S ⊃ (C  • F). As we can see, the first premise is a conditional proposition whose consequent is a conjunction. We also need to remember that in determining the truth value of this premise, we need to apply the rules in conditional and conjunctive propositions. If one does not know yet the rule in conditional propositions, one may visit our previous post titled “Conditional Propositions”, http://philonotes.com/index.php/2018/02/11/conditional-propositions/. And for the rule in conjunctive statements, please see “Conjunctive Statement”, http://philonotes.com/index.php/2018/02/03/conjunctive-statements/.

Now, before we can apply the rule in conditional proposition in the premise S ⊃ (C • F), we need to simplify first the consequent (C • F). This can be done my determining its truth value using the rule in conjunction. Since the rule in conjunction says “A conjunction is true if both conjuncts are true”, then the truth table will now partially look like this:

Please note that in the truth table above, I temporarily removed the column for S to avoid confusion, that is, in order to show that we are just using the values for the columns C and F.

Since we have already simplified (C • F), then we can now proceed to determining the final truth values of the first premise S ⊃ (C • F). So, the truth table will now look like this:

Please note that the final truth values of the first premise S ⊃ (C • F) are the ones in bold red. Let me illustrate how I arrived at those values. But let me just illustrate the first two rows. In the first row, S is true, C is true and F is true. So,

In the second row, S is true, C is true, and F is false. So,

 For the truth values of the second premise which is S, we just need to copy the truth values of S in the first column. This is obviously because the second premise is a simple proposition. So, the truth table will now look like this:

For the truth values of the conclusion which is F, we just need to copy the truth values of F in the third column. This is obviously because the conclusion is a simple proposition. So, the truth table will now look like this:

As we can see, the truth table is now complete. So, we may now apply the rules in determining the validity of arguments in symbolic logic. But before we proceed to that, let us remove the columns for the variables in order to avoid confusion. It must be remembered that the rule talks about the premises and the conclusion only, and so we may now drop them. Of course, as we can see, the columns for the variables/constants are needed only in determining the truth values of the premises and conclusion. So, the truth table of the argument above will finally look like this:

If we recall, the rule in determining the validity of an argument in symbolic logic says that an argument is valid if it does not contain the form “all true premises and false conclusion” and an argument is invalid if “all of its premises are true and its conclusion false”. Please note that in applying the rule, we need to consider all rows in the truth table.

Now, the easiest and most convenient way to do it is to look for an invalid form in each row, that is, a row that contains all true premises and a false conclusion. Thus, if we cannot find one, then the argument is obviously valid.

If we look at the final truth table of the argument above, we cannot find at least one row that contains the form all true premises and a false conclusion. Therefore, at the end of the day, the argument “If the squatters settle here, then the cattlemen will be angry and that there will be a fight for water rights. The squatters are going to settle here. Therefore, there will be a fight for water rights” is absolutely valid.

Finally, let me give an example of an invalid argument so we can fully understand why the argument above is valid. Consider the example below.

2. If Marco had been a poor businessman, then he would have had to undertake extensive lecture hours. He did undertake extensive lecture hours. Hence, he must be a poor businessman. (p, q)

I need not explain again here why we have come up with the truth table above. The discussion above is enough for us to know how to construct a truth table.

Now, although not necessary, let’s remove the columns for the variables in the truth table above to avoid confusion. So, the truth table will now look like this:

If we recall, the rule in determining the validity of an argument in symbolic logic says that an argument is valid if it does not contain the form “all true premises and false conclusion” and an argument is invalid if “all of its premises are true and its conclusion false”. Please note that in applying the rule, we need to consider all rows in the truth table.

The easiest and most convenient way to do it is to look for an invalid form in each row, that is, a row that contains all true premises and a false conclusion. Thus, if we cannot find one, then the argument is obviously valid.

Now, if we look at the final truth table of the argument above, we can indeed find one row (row 3) that contains the form all true premises and a false conclusion. Thus, at the end of the day, the argument “If Marco had been a poor businessman, then he would have had to undertake extensive lecture hours. He did undertake extensive lecture hours. Hence, he must be a poor businessman. (p, q)” is absolutely invalid.

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