Morality for Immanuel Kant means acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. In fact, as is well known, for Kant, the categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality. Hence, for Kant, an act is moral if it is done in accordance with the categorical imperative; otherwise, it is non-moral or immoral.
The Categorical Imperative
What is the categorical imperative?
First, as we know, an imperative is a command. For example, one may say “Don’t cheat” or “You have to fulfill your promises”.
There are two types of imperative, namely, hypothetical and categorical imperative. On the one hand, a hypothetical imperative is one that expresses a conditional command. For example, we may say “If you want to become successful, then you have to work very hard”. As we can see, this example poses a condition, that is, you only have to work very hard if you want to become successful. If you don’t want to become successful, then you can just sit, lie, and relax. On the other hand, a categorical imperative is one that expresses an absolute command. For example, we may say “Do not be late”. As we can see, this command does not pose a condition as it does not contain an “if-then” clause. Even if one is tempted to cheat, she ought not to because she is commanded absolutely not to cheat.
To know the nature and dynamics of the categorical imperative, we need to familiarize ourselves with some of the core concepts in Kantian ethics, namely, the idea of the good will, duty and the moral worth of an act, and the formulations of the categorical imperative.
The Good Will
According to Kant, the good will is the one that facilitates a human act. But what makes a good will good? For Kant, a good will is good not because it produces good results (as in the case of pragmatic ethics) or greatest happiness to the greatest number of people (as in the case of utilitarian ethics), but it is good by virtue of its intrinsic value.
The good will, therefore, is good without qualification. It is good without any condition.
How is the good will manifested?
According to Kant, a good will is manifested when it is done for the sake of duty. Hence, in order for a good will to be called good without qualification, it must be done for the sake of duty.
Let us consider the example of the “will” to help a friend. Kant would have us believe that if one expects something in return when someone helps a friend, then the “will” is not good without qualification because it is not done for the sake of duty. But if someone helps a friend because she believes that it is her duty to do so, then, for Kant, the will here is good without qualification because it is obviously done for the sake of duty.
Now, Kant says that the “will” is autonomous if it is self-legislating. Thus, the concept “autonomy of the will” means that it is not influenced by any outside factors. In other words, when a moral agent performs a particular act, her will is considered “autonomous” if she is not forced to do it.
Duty and the Moral Worth of an Act
Kant argues that duty should be the motive of any moral act. Inclination or self-interest can never be the motive of any moral act. This means, for example, that if a physician treats a patient, her motive should be “duty”, that is, the physician is moved to treat the patient because it is her obligation as a healthcare provider to treat a patient, and not the interest of profiting from the patient herself.
For Kant, therefore, an act has a moral worth (that is, moral) if it is done for the sake of duty. If an act is done out of self-inclination, then it has no moral worth (that is, immoral).
It is interesting to note that for Kant sometimes an act is done in accord with duty. For Kant, this act has no moral worth, though not necessarily immoral, because the act simply accords with duty. Indeed, it is not done for the sake of duty. As we can see, for Kant, there is a difference between “actions that accord with duty”, that is, actions that are done in accordance with duty, and “actions that are done for the sake for duty”. Again, for Kant, only those actions that are done for the sake of duty have moral worth.
Formulations of the Categorical Imperative
First Formulation
The first formulation of the categorical imperative is based on the principle of universality. It reads: “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Put differently, the principle of universality commands that every maxim someone acts on must be such that others are willing to make it the case that everyone always acts on that maxim when in a similar situation. The idea here is that if the maxim, that is, the principle on which the moral agent acts, cannot be universalized, then the action has no moral worth.
Let us consider, for example, the act of stealing the properties of the rich and distribute them to the poor. As we can see, the maxim, which is “stealing” or “to steal” in this case, cannot be universalized. Of course, even if someone is willing to steal, reason tells us that we cannot force all people to will the same. Hence, stealing is always impermissible, according to the categorical imperative.
Let us take another example, such as the act of helping a friend in times of need. The maxim, which is “to help”, is obviously universalizable because we can expect others to will the same. Hence, the act of helping a friend in times of need is morally right according to the categorical imperative.
The Second Formulation
The second formulation of the categorical imperative is famously called the “formula of the end”. Kant formulated the formula of the end as a response to his critics who lamented that the principle of universality is too strict.
The second formulation of the categorical imperative, which is based on the principle of humanity, reads: “So act as to treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of another never as means but always as an end.” It is important to note that Kant believes that human beings have inherent value and should never be treated as means to a particular end. This is because for Kant, if humans are treated as means, then they are reduced into things or on the level of animals. Thus, for Kant, any act that treats humanity as a means is not morally right.
Let us consider the example of cheating someone. For Kant, the act of cheating someone is absolutely immoral because this act treats others as a means, that is, the other is treated as thing. Needless to say, if we cheat on others, then we are treating them as means to our own selfish end.
Natural law ethics is a popular name attributed to the model of ethics developed by St. Thomas Aquinas during the Medieval period. Because it was developed by St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law ethics is also called Thomistic ethics.
The basic idea in natural law ethics is that “Reason” is the source of the moral law and that it directs us towards the “Good”. According to Aquinas, the “Good” is the ultimate goal of the person’s actions. And for Aquinas, the “Good” is discoverable within the person’s nature. This explains why the basic goal of natural law ethics is “to do good and avoid evil”.
Now, how do we know that a person is acting rightly or wrongly?
According to Aquinas, an act is morally right if it is done in accordance with the moral law. But what is the moral law?
As already mentioned, “reason” is the source of moral law; hence, the moral law is the dictate of reason. But for Aquinas, the moral law comes from God’s Eternal Law. Indeed, for Aquinas, the moral law is the Divine Law expressed in human nature, which reads: “Do good and avoid evil.”
If the moral law is “doing good and avoiding evil,” how do we know that one is acting in accordance with the good?
According to Aquinas, the “good” is that which is suitable to human nature or that which is proper to human nature. And for Aquinas, we know that an action is good, that is, suitable to human nature, if it is done in accordance with conscience.
Aquinas understands conscience as the inner voice of the intellect or reason which calls the human person to follow the moral law, that is, to do good and avoid evil. As we can see, in natural law ethics, conscience serves as the guide in making moral decisions.
But how do we know that one’s action obeys conscience?
According to Aquinas, an action obeys conscience if it satisfies the three-fold natural inclination of the human person, namely:
1) self-preservation, 2) just dealing with others, and 3) propagation of human species.
Self-preservation, for Aquinas, is a natural inclination that urges the human person to take care of her health or not to kill or put herself in danger. This explains why for Aquinas suicide is absolutely wrong.
Just dealing with others urges us to treat others with the same respect that we accord ourselves. Thus, for Aquinas, all forms of inhumanities, such as exploitation, seduction, deception, manipulation, cheating, kidnapping, murder, and intimidation, are absolutely wrong too.
In terms of the propagation of human species, Aquinas believes that the reproductive organ is by nature designed to reproduce and propagate human species. Any act of intervention, therefore, that frustrates the very purpose of the reproductive organ is unnatural, hence immoral. This explains why even masturbation is immoral in natural law ethics.
It must be noted that for Aquinas if at least one of these three natural inclinations of the human person is violated, then an act does not obey conscience; it is therefore immoral. Needless to say, for an action to be considered moral in natural law ethics, it must be done in accordance with conscience. Again, it must be done in accordance with the moral law, that is, “doing good and avoiding evil”.
Three Determinants of Moral Actions
In addition to the three-fold natural inclinations of the human person, Aquinas introduced three things that determine the morality of a human act, namely:
1) object of the human act, 2) its circumstance, and 3) its end.
The object of the act refers to that which the will intends primarily and directly. It may either be a thing or an action. Take, for example, the physician’s act of removing a tumor. As we can see, the direct object of the act is “to remove a tumor”. Please note that the circumstance and the end are also intended here, but not directly.
The circumstance refers to the condition which affects the morality of an action. It is important to note that the circumstance may aggravate or mitigate the morality of the human act.
Aquinas classified circumstance into:
1) quality of a person (who), 2) quality or quantity of the moral object (what), 3) the circumstance of place (where), 4) the circumstance of means (by what means), 5) the circumstance of end (why), 6) manner in which the action is done (how), and 7) time element involved in the performance of the action (when).
As to the first, it is bad to rape a woman, but it is worse to rape a daughter.
As to the second, the act of a taxi driver who returns a wallet containing a couple of thousand dollars is good in itself, but that of one who takes the initiative of returning fifty thousand dollars left by a tourist is even better.
As to the third, smoking in public may not be good, but it is worse if one smokes inside a church.
As to the fourth, to pray for a sick person is good in itself, but to give her money for medicine for her medication is better.
As to the fifth, helping an orphan kid finish schooling is good, but doing it with the intention of employing her later is better.
As to the sixth, killing might generally be conceived as evil. But in the case of unjust aggression, it might be morally right to kill the aggressor.
And as to the seventh, it might not be a good idea to smoke inside the church, but it is worse to do it while the mass is going on.
The end of the act refers to the purpose of the doer or the agent of the human act itself. According to Aquinas, it can be taken as a circumstance because the end is an integral part of every moral act. For example, marrying a person one is engaged to is good in itself. But doing so while motivated by the selfish end of, say, taking a big share of an inheritance, makes the whole action morally wrong.
It must be noted that for Aquinas, all the three determinants of a human act must be all good for an act to be considered good or morally right.
Four Principles of Double Effect
Sometimes a human act may produce two conflicting results, that is, one is good and the other is evil. To address this dilemma, Aquinas formulated the four principles of double effect, namely:
The action intended must be good in itself, or at least morally indifferent; otherwise, the act is evil at the very outset;
The good effect must follow the action at least as immediately as the evil effect, or the good and evil effects must occur simultaneously;
The foreseen evil effect should not be intended or approved, but merely permitted to occur; and
There must be a proportionate and sufficient reason for allowing the evil effect to occur while performing the action.
According to Aquinas, all of the 4 principles must be satisfied for an action to be considered morally right.
Let us take for example the act of removing a cancerous uterus of a pregnant woman which necessarily implies abortion. As we can see, the act will produce two results, one good and the other is evil. Of course, the removal of the cancerous uterus of the pregnant woman will definitely save her life (good result) but at the same time, it will kill the fetus (evil result). So, what is the morality of the action if we apply Aquinas’s four principles of double effect?
Please note that the act is simply to remove the cancerous uterus. So, obviously, we satisfy principle #1 because the intention of removing the cancerous uterus is good in itself. We may even view it as morally indifferent.
We also satisfy principle #2 because the good effect, that is, the recovery of the pregnant woman follows the action immediately. And even if the fetus dies after the removal of the cancerous uterus, at least this evil effect occurs simultaneously with the good effect.
Principle #3 is also satisfied because abortion, that is, the death of the fetus, was not intended. It was just allowed to happen. As we can see, the main intention of removing the cancerous uterus of the pregnant woman is to save her life. Even if the death of the fetus was foreseen, according to Aquinas, it was just allowed to occur.
And lastly, principle #4 is also satisfied because there is indeed a sufficient reason for allowing the evil effect, that is, abortion or the killing of the fetus, to happen. Needless to say, if we don’t remove the cancerous uterus, then we lose both the lives of the woman and the fetus. But if we remove the cancerous uterus, at least, as Aquinas would have us believe, we save one life.
As we can see, the removal of a cancerous uterus of a pregnant woman which implies abortion is morally right.
Let us take another example, that of killing a drug lord. As is well known, illegal drugs have been destroying many lives both young and old. So, killing a drug lord will produce a good result. However, the act produces an evil result too, that is, murder. So, what is the morality of the act of killing the drug lord from the vantage point of Aquinas’s 4 principles of double effect?
A utilitarian may argue that the act of killing the drug lord is good as it may produce more benefits, that is, greatest happiness, to the greatest number of people concerned. However, for Aquinas, the act of killing the drug lord is intrinsically immoral because, as we can see, it does not satisfy the first principle of the 4 principles of double effect. The first principle says that the act must be good in itself or at least morally indifferent. But the act of “killing” (the drug lord) is evil in itself. Hence, even if this act produces more benefits to many people concerned, for Aquinas, it is absolutely immoral. This explains why the Roman Catholics, who adhere to Aquinas’s natural law ethics, strongly oppose extrajudicial killing (EJK) in general and killing a drug lord in particular.
Now, since the first principle is violated, we need not proceed and check the remaining principles because in the first place the act is already immoral. `
Ethical relativism or moral relativism is the view that ethical or moral values and beliefs are relative to the various individuals or societies that hold them. Thus, according to the ethical or moral relativists, there is no objective right and wrong. This means that what is right for one person is not necessarily right for another or what is right in some circumstances is not necessarily in another.
Two Forms of Ethical Relativism
There are two forms of ethical relativism, namely:
1) Personal or Individual Ethical Relativism and 2) Social or Cultural Ethical Relativism.
On the one hand, personal or individual ethical relativism holds that ethical judgments and beliefs are the expressions of the moral outlook and attitudes of individual persons. Hence, for the individual ethical relativists, there is no objective standard of right and wrong inasmuch as the “individual person” is the basis of moral judgments. The ethical relativist may, therefore, say “I have my own view and you have yours. Neither my view nor yours is better or more correct.”
Let us take, for example, senicide or geronticide, that is, the abandonment to death or killing of the elderly. There was a common belief that during famines or other extremely difficult situations, the Inuit or the indigenous people of Northern America would leave their elderly on the ice to die. If this is indeed the case, the individual relativist would say that no one, especially the outsiders of this culture, has the right to say that the Inuit are wrong because the morality of such action depends entirely on the individual Intuit beliefs. Hence, in individual ethical relativism, any person has no right to say that others are correct or incorrect since to do so would assume an objective standard of right and wrong. As we can see, this example is considered an individual or personal ethical relativism because it is the individual that is the basis of moral judgment.
On the other hand, social or cultural ethical relativism holds that ethical values and beliefs vary from society to society and that the basis of moral judgment lies in these social or cultural views. Thus, in determining the rightness or wrongness of human actions, one must base it on the norms of a particular society. Let us take, for example, the ancient Indian practice of Sati or Suttee.
As is well known, the ancient Indians had the practice of burning the wife alive in the funeral pyre of her deceased husband. Whatever the reasons behind this practice, the act was seen as heroic. In fact, records show that some wives willingly allowed themselves to be burnt alive on their husbands’ funeral pyre. Indeed, if an outsider is to judge this act, she may view this as immoral, especially if she is a Christian. But for the social ethical relativist, that might be the right to do in that particular culture. This is because, for the social ethical relativists, no society’s view is better than any other in a trans-cultural sense. Hence, no society has the right to say that particular culture of a certain society is wrong.
From what we have just presented above, we can draw three possible reasons that support ethical relativism.
First, on the diversity of moral values. The ethical relativists may have argued that the presence of disagreements on many ethical issues or even on basic moral values or principles will prove the point that we cannot attain objective truth. Hence, the idea of objective right and wrong is inconceivable for ethical relativists.
Second, on moral uncertainty. Because of moral uncertainty, the ethical relativists would have argued that because there is great difficulty in knowing what is the morally right thing to do or believe, then again, we cannot attain objective right or wrong.
Third and last, on situational differences. For the ethical relativists, the situations and life world of different people vary so much that it is difficult to believe that same things that would be right for one would be right for another. Hence, what is right or wrong for one may not be necessarily right or wrong for another.
Why the need to distinguish moral standards from non-moral ones?
It is important to note that different societies have different moral beliefs and that our beliefs are deeply influenced by our own culture and context. For this reason, some values do have moral implications, while others don’t. Let us consider, for example, the wearing of hijab. For sure, in traditional Muslim communities, the wearing of hijab is the most appropriate act that women have to do in terms of dressing up. In fact, for some Muslims, showing parts of the woman’s body, such as the face and legs, is despicable. However, in many parts of the world, especially in Western societies, most people don’t mind if women barely cover their bodies. As a matter of fact, the Hollywood canon of beauty glorifies a sexy and slim body and the wearing of extremely daring dress. The point here is that people in the West may have pitied the Muslim women who wear hijab, while some Muslims may find women who dress up daringly despicable.
Again, this clearly shows that different cultures have different moral standards. What is a matter of moral indifference, that is, a matter of taste (hence, non-moral value) in one culture may be a matter of moral significance in another.
Now, the danger here is that one culture may impose its own cultural standard on others, which may result in a clash in cultural values and beliefs. When this happens, as we may already know, violence and crime may ensue, such as religious violence and ethnic cleansing.
How can we address this cultural conundrum?
This is where the importance of understanding the difference between moral standards (that is, of what is a moral issue) and non-moral ones (that is, of what is a non-moral issue―thus, a matter of taste) comes in. This issue may be too obvious and insignificant for some people, but understanding the difference between the two may have far-reaching implications. For one, once we have distinguished moral standards from non-moral ones, of course, through the aid of the principles and theories in ethics, we will be able to identify fundamental ethical values that may guide our actions. Indeed, once we know that particular values and beliefs are non-moral, we will be able to avoid running the risk of falling into the pit of cultural reductionism (that is, taking complex cultural issues as simple and homogenous ones) and the unnecessary imposition of one’s own cultural standard on others. The point here is that if such standards are non-moral (that is, a matter of taste), then we don’t have the right to impose them on others. But if such standards are moral ones, such as not killing or harming people, then we may have the right to force others to act accordingly. In this way, we may be able to find a common moral ground, such as agreeing not to steal, lie, cheat, kill, harm, and deceive our fellow human beings.
Now, what are moral standards, and how do they differ from non-moral ones?
Moral Standards and their Characteristics
Moral standards are norms that individuals or groups have about the kinds of actions believed to be morally right or wrong, as well as the values placed on what we believed to be morally good or morally bad. Moral standards normally promote “the good”, that is, the welfare and well-being of humans as well as animals and the environment. Moral standards, therefore, prescribe what humans ought to do in terms of rights and obligations.
According to some scholars, moral standards are the sum of combined norms and values. In other words, norms plus values equal moral standards. On the one hand, norms are understood as general rules about our actions or behaviors. For example, we may say “We are always under the obligation to fulfill our promises” or “It is always believed that killing innocent people is absolutely wrong”. On the other hand, values are understood as enduring beliefs or statements about what is good and desirable or not. For example, we may say “Helping the poor is good” or “Cheating during exams is bad”.
According to many scholars, moral standards have the following characteristics, namely:
moral standards deal with matters we think can seriously injure or benefit
humans, animals, and the environment, such as child abuse, rape, and murder;
moral standards are not established or changed by the decisions of
authoritative individuals or bodies. Indeed, moral standards rest on the adequacy of the reasons that are taken to support and justify them. For sure, we don’t need a law to back up our moral conviction that killing innocent people is absolutely wrong;
moral standards are overriding, that is, they take precedence over other
standards and considerations, especially of self-interest;
moral standards are based on impartial considerations. Hence, moral
standards are fair and just; and
moral standards are associated with special emotions (such as guilt and
shame) and vocabulary (such as right, wrong, good, and bad).
Non-moral Standards
Non-moral standards refer to standards by which we judge what is good or bad and right or wrong in a non-moral way. Examples of non-moral standards are standards of etiquette by which we judge manners as good or bad, standards we call the law by which we judge something as legal or illegal, and standards of aesthetics by which we judge art as good or rubbish. Hence, we should not confuse morality with etiquette, law, aesthetics or even with religion.
As we can see, non-moral standards are matters of taste or preference. Hence, a scrupulous observance of these types of standards does not make one a moral person. Violation of said standards also does not pose any threat to human well-being.
Finally, as a way of distinguishing moral standards from non-moral ones, if a moral standard says “Do not harm innocent people” or “Don’t steal”, a non-moral standard says “Don’t text while driving” or “Don’t talk while the mouth is full”.
First of all, let us define the term dilemma before we discuss the nature and dynamics of moral dilemmas.
A dilemma is a situation where a person is forced to choose between two or more conflicting options, neither of which is acceptable. As we can see, the key here is that the person has choices to make that will all have results she does not want. For example, a town mayor faces a dilemma about how to protect and preserve a virgin forest and at the same time allow miners and loggers for economic development in the town.
It must be noted, however, that if a person is in a difficult situation but is not forced to choose between two or more options, then that person is not in a dilemma. The least that we can say is that that person is just experiencing a problematic or distressful situation. Thus, the most logical thing to do for that person is to look for alternatives or solutions to address the problem.
When dilemmas involve human actions which have moral implications, they are called ethical or moral dilemmas.
Moral dilemmas, therefore, are situations where persons, who are called “moral agents” in ethics, are forced to choose between two or more conflicting options, neither of which resolves the situation in a morally acceptable manner. Consider the following example:
Lindsay is a deeply religious person; hence, she considers killing humans absolutely wrong. Unfortunately, it is found out that Lindsay is having an ectopic pregnancy. As is well known, an ectopic pregnancy is a type of pregnancy that occurs outside the uterus, most commonly in the fallopian tubes. In other words, in ectopic pregnancy, the fetus does not develop in the uterus. Now, if this happens, the development of the fetus will definitely endanger the mother. Thus, if Lindsay continues with her pregnancy, then there is a big possibility that she will die. According to experts, the best way to save Lindsay’s life is to abort the fetus, which necessarily implies killing the fetus. If we do not abort the fetus, then Lindsay, as well as the fetus, will die.
In the above example of a moral dilemma, Lindsay is faced with two conflicting options, namely, either she resorts to abortion, which will save her life but at the same time jeopardizes her moral integrity or does not resort to abortion but endangers her life as well as the fetus. Indeed, Lindsay is faced with a huge moral dilemma.
According to Karen Allen, there are three conditions that must be present for situations to be considered moral dilemmas. First, the person or the agent of a moral action is obliged to make a decision about which course of action is best. Here, the moral agent must choose the best option and act accordingly. In the case of the example of above, Lindsay may opt to abort the fetus as the best course of action. Second, there must be different courses of action to choose from. Hence, as already pointed out above, there must be two or more conflicting options to choose from for moral dilemmas to occur. And third, no matter what course of action is taken, some moral principles are always compromised. This means that, according to Allen, there is no perfect solution to the problem. And for this reason, according to Benjiemen Labastin, in moral dilemmas, the moral agent “seems fated to commit something wrong which implies that she is bound to morally fail because in one way or another she will fail to do something which she ought to do. In other words, by choosing one of the possible moral requirements, the person also fails on others.”
Types of Moral Dilemmas
There are several types of moral dilemmas, but the most common of them are categorized into the following: 1) epistemic and ontological dilemmas, 2) self-imposed and world-imposed dilemmas, 3) obligation dilemmas and prohibition dilemmas, and 4) single agent and multi-person dilemmas.
Epistemic moral dilemmas involve situations wherein two or more moral requirements conflict with each other and that the moral agent hardly knows which of the conflicting moral requirements takes precedence over the other. In other words, the moral agent here does not know which option is morally right or wrong. For instance, I ought to honor my promise to my son to be home early, but on my way home I saw a sick old man who needs to be brought to the hospital. Where does my actual duty lie? We cannot deny that there are conflicting duties (moral requirements) here, but we need to note that we want a fuller knowledge of the situation: Is an important purpose being served by my getting home early? How serious is the condition of the sick old man? Indeed, I could hardly decide which option is morally right in this situation. However, one option must be better than the other; only, it needs fuller knowledge of the situation―thus the term “epistemic” moral dilemmas. Ontological moral dilemmas, on the other hand, involve situations wherein two or more moral requirements conflict with each other, yet neither of these conflicting moral requirements overrides each other. This is not to say that the moral agent does not know which moral requirement is stronger than the other. The point is that neither of the moral requirements is stronger than the other; hence, the moral agent can hardly choose between the conflicting moral requirements. For instance, a military doctor is attending to the needs of the wounded soldiers in the middle of the war. Unfortunately, two soldiers urgently need a blood transfusion. However, only one bag of blood is available at the moment. To whom shall the doctor administer the blood transfusion? For sure, we could not tell whether administering a blood transfusion to Soldier A is more moral than administering a blood transfusion to Soldier B, and vice versa.
A self-imposed moral dilemma is caused by the moral agent’s wrongdoings. For example, David is running for the position of the town mayor. During the campaign period, he promised the indigenous peoples in his community to protect their virgin forest just to gain their votes, but at the same time, he seeks financial support from a mining corporation. Fortunately, David won the elections, yet he is faced with the dilemma of fulfilling his promised to the indigenous peoples and at the same time allows the mining corporation to destroy their forest. Indeed, through his own actions, David created a situation in which it is impossible for him to be discharged from both obligations. A world-imposed moral dilemma, on the other hand, means that certain events in the world place the agent in a situation of moral conflict. William Styron’s famous Sophie’s Choice is a classic example. “Sophie Zawistowska has been asked to choose which of her two children, Eva or Jan, will be sent to the gas chamber in Auschwitz. An SS doctor, Fritz Jemand von Niemand, will grant a dispensation to only one of Sophie’s children. If she does not choose which one should live, Dr. von Niemand will send both to their death. Sophie chooses her daughter Eva to go to the gas chamber. Her son, Jan, is sent to the Children’s Camp.”
Obligation dilemmas are situations in which more than one feasible action is obligatory, while prohibition dilemmas involve cases in which all feasible actions are forbidden. The famous “Sartre’s Student” is a classic example. It reads:
The famous Sophie’s Choice, as mentioned above, is a classic example of prohibition dilemmas.
Finally, in single agent dilemma, the agent “ought, all things considered, to do A, ought, all things considered, to do B, and she cannot do both A and B”. In other words, the moral agent is compelled to act on two or more equally the same moral options but she cannot choose both. For instance, a medical doctor found out that her patient has HIV. For sure, the medical doctor may experience tension between the legal requirement to report the case and the desire to respect confidentiality, although the medical code of ethics acknowledges our obligation to follow legal requirements and to intervene to protect the vulnerable. In multi-person dilemma, on the other hand, “…the situation is such that one agent, P1, ought to do A, a second agent, P2, ought to do B, and though each agent can do what he ought to do, it is not possible both for P1 to do A and P2 to do B.” According to Benjiemen Labastin, “the multi-person does not inasmuch as agents X, Y and Z may possibly have chosen conflicting moral choices – that is, person X chooses A instead of B and C and person Y chooses B instead of A and C, so on and so forth. The multi-person dilemma occurs in situations that involve several persons like a family, an organization, or a community who is expected to come up with consensual decision on a moral issue at hand. A family may be torn between choosing to terminate or prolong the life of a family member. An organization may have to choose between complying with the wage law by cutting its workforce or by retaining its current workforce by paying them below the required minimum wage. The multi-person dilemma requires more than choosing what is right, it also entails that the persons involved reached a general consensus. In such a manner, the moral obligation to do what is right becomes more complicated. On the one hand, the integrity of the decision ought to be defended on moral grounds. On the other hand, the decision must also prevent the organization from breaking apart”.
In these notes, I will address the question “What is ethics?“. I will also discuss the different types of ethics, namely, normative ethics, metaethics, and applied ethics.
The term ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, which originally means custom or character. Broadly construed, ethics is a branch of philosophy that studies the rightness or wrongness of a human action. In particular, this branch of philosophy is concerned with questions of how human persons ought to act, and the search for a definition of a right conduct and the good life. It is for this reason that the attempt to seek the “good” through the aid of reason is the traditional goal of ethicists (Albert, Denise & Peterfreund 1984, p. 1-2).
It must be noted, however, that there is no single, absolute definition of ethics. This is because ethics as a discipline is constantly evolving as a result of a change in socio-cultural and political context. For example, in the Greek tradition, ethics was conceived as relating to the concept of the “good life”. Thus, the ethical inquiry during this time was directed toward discovering the nature of happiness. In fact, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics does not only present a theory of happiness but also provides ways in which happiness is attained. Now, centuries later, a quite different orientation was introduced by the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this ethical tradition, the ideals of righteousness before God and the love of God and neighbor, not the happy or pleasant life, constitute the substance of ethics. Indeed, if we make an effort to reconcile these views, we are faced with the difficult task of defining the relationship between “doing what is right” and “being happy”. Again, it is for this reason that we cannot have an absolute definition of ethics. The least that we can do, in my opinion, is to describe the nature and dynamics of ethics based on a specific time and context.
It is also important to note that ethics is not the same with morality, although many philosophers believe that the two terms can be used interchangeably. This is because the former denotes the theory of right action and the greater good, while the latter indicates practice, that is, the rightness or wrongness of a human action. In other words, ethics undertakes the systematic study (that is, questioning and critical examination) of the underlying principles of morality. Hence, it is interested primarily in the illustration of a more general problem and the examination of underlying assumptions and the critical evaluation of moral principles.
Morality, on the other hand, is more prescriptive in nature. It tells us what we ought to do and exhorts us to follow the right way. According to Terrance McConnell (1994), “morality is characterized as an ‘end-governed rational enterprise’ whose object is to equip people with a body of norms (rules and values) that make for peaceful and collectively satisfying coexistence by facilitating their living together and interacting in a way that is productive for the realization of the general benefit”. For example, a religious leader may ask her followers to be good at all times. In this way, a moralist may want to keep alive the values she considers to be worthwhile and to improve the moral quality of the community where she belongs. Hence, morality, at the very least, aims to guide one’s action by reason and gives equal weight to the interests of each individual affected by one’s decision. Indeed, this gives us a picture of what it really means to be a morally upright person.
Based on the brief discussion above, we may conclude that ethics is the science of morals, while morality is the practice of ethics.
Types of Ethics
During the mid-20th century, according to Sumner (1967), a “certain theory in the methodology of ethics has gradually become more and more widely accepted, at least by British and American moral philosophers”. According to this position, there are two ways of doing ethical inquiry, namely, normative ethics and metaethics.
On the one hand, normative ethics is prescriptive in nature as it seeks to set norms or standards that regulate right and wrong or good and bad conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others. Hence, normative ethics normally attempts to develop guidelines or theories that tell us how we ought to behave. For example, Immanuel Kant’s claim that an act is morally right if it is done for the sake of duty is an example of a normative ethics.
Metaethics, on the other hand, is descriptive in nature. According to Sumner (1967), “metaethics is allegedly constituted, at least in part, by questions of the meanings of the various ethical terms and functions of ethical utterances.” Hence, if a normative ethical inquiry is evaluative and prescriptive, metaethics is analytical and descriptive. Put simply, metaethics is a type of ethical inquiry that aims to understand the nature and dynamics of ethical principles. It asks questions about the nature and origin of moral facts, as well as the way in which we learn and acquire moral beliefs. Thus, for example, if normative ethics urges us to do good at all times, metaethics asks the question “What is good?”. For sure, if a moral philosopher attempts to address the questions “What is good?”, “What is justice?”, “Why should I be moral?”, then that moral philosopher is doing metaethics. Hence, when Plato proposed an answer to the question “Why should I be moral”, Plato was doing metaethics―indeed, Plato raised a metaethical question.
In the course of the development of ethics, applied ethics became its third major type. As its name suggests, applied ethics is the actual application of ethical or moral theories for the purpose of deciding which ethical or moral actions are appropriate in a given situation. For this reason, casuists (that is, the adherents of applied ethics) are concerned with individual moral problems, such as abortion or euthanasia, and attempt to resolve the conflicting issues that surround these particular moral problems. Casuists may also act on some occasions in an advisory capacity, such as guiding individuals in their choice of actions. For example, they may attempt to resolve the conflicting duties of a mother suffering from ectopic pregnancy who has no other option than to abort the fetus.
Applied ethics is usually divided into different fields. For example, we may talk about business ethics, which deals with ethical behavior in the corporate world; biomedical and environmental ethics, which deal with issues relating to health, welfare, and the responsibility we have towards people and our environment; and social ethics, which deals with the principles and guidelines that regulate corporate welfare within societies.
Finally, the difference between the three major types of ethics can be illustrated in the following situation:
A police officer shoots a terrorist who is about to blow up a crowded shopping mall.
The act of the police officer is morally wrong according to metaethics because it is always wrong to kill. As is well known, killing in itself is intrinsically wrong. However, if the police officer does not shoot the terrorist, many innocent people will die or get injured. Though the police officer’s act may be wrong, the adherents of normative ethics may say that it is the right thing to do in this particular situation because not doing so will result in the death of so many people. Hence, the action might be morally correct. Finally, the casuists may say that the police officer is just doing his best to fulfill his duty, that is, to protect as many innocent lives as possible.
References
Albert, E., Denise, T., and Peterfreund, S. (1984). Great Traditions in Ethics. 5th ed. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
McConnell, T. (1994). Review: On the Nature and Scope of Morality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(2), pp. 421-425.
Sumner, L. W. (1967). Normative and Metaethics, 77(2), pp. 95-106.
Imperialism refers to the policy or practice of extending the rule or authority of a state or nation over other countries, territories, or peoples, usually by force or coercion. It involves the exercise of political, economic, and military power to establish control and domination over other lands and peoples, often with the aim of extracting resources and wealth for the benefit of the imperial power.
Historically, imperialism has been associated with the expansion of European powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as with the earlier empires of Rome, Greece, and other ancient civilizations. However, imperialism can take many forms, and can be found in many different historical and cultural contexts.
One of the key features of imperialism is the use of military force or the threat of force to establish control over other peoples and territories. This often involves the conquest and annexation of foreign lands, as well as the imposition of new political and social systems that reflect the interests and values of the imperial power. Examples of this include the British colonization of India and Africa, the French colonization of Algeria, and the Spanish colonization of the Americas.
In addition to military conquest, imperialism also often involves the use of economic and cultural power to establish influence and control over other nations and peoples. This can take the form of economic exploitation, such as the extraction of resources and labor from colonies for the benefit of the imperial power. It can also involve the imposition of cultural values and practices, such as the spread of Western-style education, religion, and language to colonies and subject peoples.
Imperialism has been justified in a variety of ways throughout history, often with appeals to notions of superiority, progress, and civilization. For example, European powers in the 19th century often justified their imperial projects as a means of “civilizing” and “uplifting” the peoples of their colonies, while also promoting European-style governance and institutions. Similarly, the Roman Empire justified its conquests in terms of bringing peace, stability, and civilization to the peoples it conquered.
Critics of imperialism, however, have pointed out that these justifications often mask the underlying economic and political motives of imperial powers. They argue that imperialism is fundamentally exploitative and oppressive, and that it serves the interests of the ruling elite rather than the people being colonized.
In addition to the ethical and moral criticisms of imperialism, there are also practical and strategic concerns. For example, some argue that imperialism can create long-term instability and conflict, as resentment and resistance build up among subject peoples. Others argue that imperialism can undermine the democratic and civic values of the imperial power itself, as well as create economic and social inequalities both at home and abroad.
In recent decades, the concept of imperialism has been applied in new ways, particularly in the context of globalization and neoliberal economic policies. Some argue that the economic and cultural influence of powerful nations and corporations over developing nations and marginalized communities constitutes a new form of imperialism. Others argue that the rise of international institutions and global governance structures represents a new kind of imperialism, in which powerful nations and transnational corporations exercise influence and control over less powerful states and peoples.
Overall, the concept of imperialism is complex and multifaceted, and has been used in a variety of historical and contemporary contexts to describe different forms of domination and control. While some argue that imperialism can be a positive force for economic and social development, others see it as fundamentally exploitative and oppressive, and as a source of conflict and instability both locally and globally.
One of the dominant themes in the course Introduction to the Philosophy of the Human Person is the idea that the human person is an embodied spirit. But first of all, we need to define terms here because, as it appears, the meaning of the concept “embodied spirit” is not directly clear to students who do not have a strong background and orientation in philosophy. So, what do we exactly mean by “embodied spirit”?
The most direct connotation that comes to mind when we say something is “embodied” is that it is being materialized or incarnated. Hence, when we say “embodied spirit”, we normally thought of a spirit being incarnated. However, the idea of the human person as an “embodied spirit” does not necessarily refer to the incarnation or materialization of spirit as an immaterial entity. The embodiment of the spirit in the context of Christian philosophy (as is well known, the concept of the embodied spirit is specific to Christian philosophy) specifically refers to the inseparable union of body and soul. Thus, when we say “embodied spirit” we mean that the body is not separate from the soul, just as the soul is not separate from the body.
So, when we say that the human person is an embodied spirit, we specifically mean that the human person is the point of convergence between the material and spiritual entities, that is, between the body and soul. We cannot talk, therefore, of the human person without the union of body and soul, just as we cannot talk of anything without the union of (as Aristotle would have us believe) matter and form.
Now, to understand the specificity of the human person as an embodied spirit is important because aside from the fact that it enables us to know our potentialities and limitations, it also exposes us to a thorough and deeper understanding of ourselves as a unique creature united by body and soul. With this caveat in mind, let us now proceed to an engagement with one of the most famous philosophers in this particular scholarship, namely, Aristotle.
Aristotle on the Human Person as an Embodied Spirit
Before we engage Aristotle’s account on the human person as an embodied spirit, that is, again, as a union of body and soul, it is important at this point to provide the theoretical context of this issue. As we may already know, Aristotle’s account of the human person as an embodied spirit is in large part a reaction against Plato’s take on the nature of the human person.
For Plato, the nature of the human person is seen in the metaphysical dichotomy between body and soul. This dichotomy implies that there is an inherent contradiction between the body and the soul. On the one hand, the body, according to Plato, is material; hence, it is mutable and destructible. On the other hand, the soul is immaterial; hence, it is immutable and indestructible.
Inasmuch as the body is material, mutable, and destructible, while the soul is immaterial, immutable, and indestructible, Plato contends that in the context of the nature of the human person, the body’s existence is dependent on the soul while the soul’s existence is independent of the body. In fact, in the Timaeus, Plato argues that the soul existed prior to the body. Plato writes: “…the gods made the soul prior to the body and more venerable in birth and excellence to the body’s mistress and governor”. Interestingly then, as Eddie Babor claims, the contention above made Plato conclude that the human person is just a soul using a body.
According to Plato, there are three parts of the soul, namely, the rational, the spiritual, and the appetitive. Plato tells The Myth of the Charioteer to comprehend the complex nature of the soul, but we will not discuss this topic here since our task here is just to provide an overview of Plato’s account of the human person, which serves as a background to Aristotle’s account of the human person as an embodied spirit.
For Plato, the rational soul is located in the head, the spiritual soul in the chest, and the appetitive in the abdomen. According to Plato, the spiritual and appetitive souls contribute to the motion and activity of the whole person, while the rational soul’s function is to guide the spiritual and appetitive souls.
According to Plato, the appetitive part of the soul drives the human person to experience thirst, hunger, and other physical wants, while the spiritual soul drives the human person to experience abomination, anger, and other emotional feelings. Lastly, it is the rational part of the soul that enables the human person to think, reflect, analyze, comprehend, draw conclusions, and the like.
As we can see, the rational soul, which is the highest of all parts of the soul, guides the other two parts, namely, the appetitive and the spiritual. “What else could perform this guiding function, from Plato’s point of view, than the rational part of the soul? Think of a desperately thirsty man in the desert. He sees a pool of water and approaches it with all the eagerness that deprivation is able to create. But when he reaches the pool, he sees a sign: ‘Danger. Do not drink. Polluted.’ He experiences conflict within. His desire urges him to drink. But reason tells him that such signs usually indicate the truth, that polluted water will make him very ill or may kill him, and that if he drinks he will probably be worse off than he doesn’t. He decides not to drink. In this case, it is the rational part of the soul that opposes his desire. His reason guides him away from the water.”
The principle then that drives the person to drink is called “appetite”, while the principle that forbids the person to drink the water because it is polluted is called “reason”.
“Another example could be that of a man who is angry with another person who insulted him. Out of anger, he may desire to kill his mocker but does not actually kill the culprit because he knows that if he does he will be imprisoned. With the same thread of reasoning, Plato argues that it is the spirit in man that makes the person angry with his derider, yet his anger is curbed by reason, that is, by the rational soul.”
Hence, again, for Plato, desire, spirit, and reason make up the soul. Desire motivates, spirit animates, and reason guides. And for Plato, if reason can successfully guide desire and spirit, then the human person will attain a well-balanced personality.
If we recall, for Plato, the soul exists prior to the body; hence, the soul is an entity distinct from the body. Now, it is important to note that if we talk about the human person, we talk about the body and soul and that they are inseparable. But this is not the case for Plato. Plato believes that the body and soul are separable. In fact, for Plato, as already mentioned, the human person is just a soul using a body. And Plato believes that the soul is imprisoned in the body and that the soul survives the death of the body because it is immaterial, immutable, and indestructible. This means that for Plato, when the person dies, the body decomposes (because it is material, mutable, and destructible) while the soul leaves the body and goes back to the World of Forms. It must be noted that in Plato’s doctrine of form, there are two kinds of worlds, namely, the World of Forms and the World of Matter. And for Plato, everything comes from the World of Forms and everything that exists (World of Matter) will go back to the World of Forms after it perishes. Again, when the human person dies, the body decomposes and the soul will go back to the World of Forms and lives there eternally. It is here where Aristotle’s notion of the human person as an embodied spirit comes in.
Indeed, Aristotle disagrees with Plato’s dualism which implies the concept of “otherworldliness”. Aristotle believes that there is no dichotomy between the person’s body and soul. The body and soul for Aristotle are in a state of unity. They are inseparable. Hence, unlike Plato, Aristotle believes that we cannot talk about the soul apart from the body and vice versa. Now, how does Aristotle view the human person as an embodied spirit?
First, we need to understand that the term soul is the English translation of the Greek word psyche. And for Aristotle, the general definition of the soul involves the concept of life. Thus, the soul for Aristotle is the principle of life. This suggests, therefore, that anything that has life has a soul.
As the principle of life, the soul causes the body to live; indeed, it is the soul that animates the body. If the soul is the animator of the body, the body acts as the matter to the soul. Hence, Aristotle believes that the soul is the form to the body, while the body is the matter to the soul. For Aristotle, everything that exists is composed of matter and form, and matter and form are indeed inseparable. Hence, we cannot talk about any object if either of these entities is not present. In the context of the human person, Aristotle believes that body and soul are inseparable. Body and soul, therefore, constitute the human person as a whole.
Because for Aristotle anything that has life has a soul, then it follows that plants and animals (in addition to humans) have souls. Thus, Aristotle distinguishes three levels of soul, namely, that of plants, that of animals, and that of humans.
The kind of soul that is found in plants, according to Aristotle, is called vegetative, while those found in animals and humans are called sensitive and rational souls respectively.
According to Aristotle, plants have souls because they possess the three basic requirements for something to be called a “living being”, that is, the capacity to grow, reproduce, and feed itself. However, plants do not share the higher levels of soul; although they grow, reproduce, and feed themselves, plants are not capable of feeling and thinking.
Sensitive souls also grow, reproduce, and feed themselves; but unlike vegetative souls, sensitive souls are capable of sensation. As Aristotle writes:
Plants possess only the nutritive faculty, but other beings possess both it and the sensitive faculty; and if they possess the sensitive faculty, they must also possess the appetitive; for appetite consists of desire, anger, and will. All animals possess at least one sense, that of touch; anything that has a sense is acquainted with pleasure and pain, with what is pleasant and what is painful; and anything that is acquainted with these has desire, since desire is an appetite for pleasant.
Finally, rational souls grow, reproduce, feed themselves, and feel; but unlike the sensitive souls, rational souls are capable of thinking. According to Aristotle, this highest level of soul is present only in humans.
Now, since humans possess all the characteristics of animals, that is, the capacity to grow, reproduce, feed itself, and feel, in addition to being rational, Aristotle concludes that the human person is just an animal that thinks. As Aristotle’s famous dictum on the human person goes, “Man is a rational animal.”
Phenomenology comes from the two Greek words phainomenon, which means “appearance,” and logos, which means “reason” or “study.” Hence, etymologically speaking, phenomenology means “study of phenomenon.” The term phenomenon means anything that exists of which the mind is conscious. A “book” is a concrete example of a phenomenon. A book is there existing materially, and the mind is conscious of it. However, phenomenology is formally defined as the investigation of the essence or the nature of material things or things that appear to us.
It is important to note that Husserl did not invent phenomenology out of a vacuum.
The context here is that realism and idealism had reached an impasse toward the end of the nineteenth century regarding that status of the knower and the thing known. As is well known, the realists argue for the independence of the “object” of knowledge, while the idealists argue for the primacy of the “subject,” that is, the knower. It is in view of this impasse that Husserl offered his phenomenology as a way out. But instead of making a philosophical speculation of the nature of reality, Husserl argued for the need for philosophy to turn to a pure description of the “what is,” of the thing as it appears to us. Thus, the famous Husserlian motto: “back to the things themselves.” In Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy, William Barrett writes: “For Husserl, phenomenology was a discipline that attempts to describe what is given to us in experience without obscuring preconceptions or hypothetical speculations.”
With this note, let me now briefly sketch Husserl’s notion of phenomenology as a method of philosophizing. Please note that I will not discuss in great detail Husserl’s model of phenomenology as our concern here is just to know the nature and dynamics of phenomenology as a method of philosophizing. For a detailed discussion on the nature and dynamics of Husserl’s model of phenomenology, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Phenomenological Reduction,” http://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-red/#SSH5a.i
Again, phenomenology for Husserl is a discipline that attempts to describe (or understand) what is given to us in experience. In other words, phenomenology for Husserl provides an account of how things (phenomena) appear to our awareness or, ultimately, how the world appears to us in terms of our subjective experience of it. That is why, according to Gerry and Rhiza, phenomenology deals primarily with the determination of the nature and structure of human conscious experience. Indeed, phenomenology is about reflecting upon our everyday immediate or lived experiences in order to gain some understanding of its underlying order, coherence, and structure.
To begin with, within Husserl’s model of phenomenology (which is called pure phenomenology, in contradistinction to the existential phenomenology of his followers, such as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre) is the idea that we normally view reality from the vantage point of what Husserl calls “The Natural Attitude.” For Husserl, this natural attitude toward things suggests that people conduct their life with the common natural belief that the reality that they inhabit is fundamentally separable from their subjective experience of it. In other words, for those people with a natural attitude, the world is out there relative to their experience of it.
In contrast to this natural attitude, Husserl claims that it is possible for people to adopt a phenomenological attitude, wherein they suspend or “bracket” their belief and natural attitude, and eventually recognize that it is just a natural attitude―that the knowledge that they gained from this attitude is not real or true knowledge. This act of bracketing, which is also called epoche, allows people to turn their attention on the ongoing activity of their consciousness to which their experience of reality or things is ultimately constituted.
According to Husserl, the overall act of employing epoche, that is, suspending or bracketing all preconceived notions and prejudices about a particular phenomenon under study―and then record, identify, and then put to one side―in order for us to gain an understanding of the true nature of reality, is called phenomenological reduction. According to Richard Schmitt, it is called “phenomenological” because it transforms the world into a phenomenon, and it is called “reduction” because it leads us back to the source of the meaning and existence of the experienced world.
According to Frogstuff, “The concept [of epoche or bracketing] can be better understood in terms of the phenomenological activity it is supposed to make possible: the ‘unpacking’ of phenomena, or, in other words, systematically peeling away their symbolic meanings like layers of an onion until only the thing itself as meant and experienced remains. Thus, one’s subjective perception of the bracketed phenomenon is examined and analyzed in its purity.”
It must be noted, however, that in phenomenological reduction, the mind does not make up features of reality that everything must conform to. On the contrary, objects in the world (phenomena) already have some kind of structure or unity, and these objective meaningful features of the things (phenomena) are disclosed to us in our experience by means of the interpretations we can give to them. In this way, our mind can be viewed as active because it can create interpretations of our experience in meaningful ways. However, it must be remembered that there is already something meaningful in the objects (phenomena) themselves which can provide confirmation of or contradiction to that interpretation.
Now, with phenomenological reduction, people are able to have a shift in perspective. And it is important to note that this basic shift in perspective as a result of the employment of phenomenological reduction enables us to assume a phenomenological attitude toward our experience. According to some scholars, this can produce some surprising insights into the fundamental nature of things. In other words, with phenomenological reduction, one is able to get at the pure phenomena from a user’s point of view. Put differently, through phenomenological reduction, we are able to know and understand the essence or meaning of things as they appear to us.
Let us take “man” as a phenomenon and apply a phenomenological reduction to it in order for us to know the essence of man.
The Natural Attitude may say: “Man is a rational animal.” Here, man is simply perceived as an animal that thinks.
But from the standpoint of a Phenomenological Attitude, the nature of man or the understanding of man depends on how one experiences man. Thus, with a phenomenological attitude, man can be viewed as a being that possesses freedom or a being that escapes definition. Here, man is more than a thinking animal. This means that the meaning of man can vary considerably depending on the way in which we view man, whether from the vantage point of a natural attitude or from a phenomenological attitude.
There are some techniques of doing phenomenology, of the way to go about exploring our consciousness of reality. One way of doing this is to undertake what Husserl calls Eidetic Reduction. By the way, for Husserl, eidetic reduction is a second reduction, which follows the moment we have turned our reflective awareness toward experience by employing the phenomenological reduction. In fact, eidetic reduction is a way of understanding the essence of some experience. This precisely what Husserl calls the movement from fact to essence.
In must be noted that for Husserl, epoche has two fundamental moments, namely: 1) the reduction to the sphere of immanence and 2) the movement from fact to essence. The first moment involves a suspension of the natural attitude and placing in abeyance all beliefs in the transcendental world. It is important to note that Husserl did not use the term “transcendental” in the mystical sense, for example, the way it is used in the phrase “transcendent God.” In order for us to understand Husserl’s use of the word ‘transcendent” or “transcendental,” let us posit this word vis-à-vis the term “materiality.” In Husserlian phenomenology, materiality could mean the physical existence of things, such as tables, chairs, books, trees, cars and the like. On the other hand, transcendental phenomena are those phenomena that have transcended their materiality, such as feelings, thoughts, experiences, memories, and the like. It is for this reason that Husserl’s philosophy is “transcendental” because it is concerned with the conditions of possibility that make an experience possible. Indeed, thoughts, memories, experiences and feelings serve as the conditions of possibility that make an experience possible. The second moment, sometimes called eidetic reduction, involves a shift to consider things not as realities but as instances of idealities, that is, as pure possibilities rather than actualities. In this way, objects are no longer conceived as material things, but as essences―that is, meanings, categories, ideal types, and laws.
Let me give an example in order to drive my point clearly.
We may ask the question: “What is a table?”
Here, it is important to remember, according to some scholars on Husserl, that what Husserl is after is a special moment in the inquirer’s reflective awareness, a special moment which Husserl calls intuition. Husserl distinguishes between perception and intuition. In perception, a person may perceive and be conscious of the fact that she perceives an object, but without understanding its meaning and essence. Intuition, on the other hand, is an insight into the nature and meaning of something through the experience of that something. Now, according to Husserl, eidetic reduction helps bring about an intuition into something as essence by employing a method knows as Imaginary Variation.
In imaginary variation, the inquirer varies all the possible attributes of an experience as a way of exploring what is truly necessary for it to be what it is. Thus, in the question “what is a table,” we may raise the following points:
1. A table has four legs;
2. A table is made up of wood;
3. A table has a flat surface;
4. A table is rectangular in shape;
5. A table is used primarily for dining or putting things on it.
Or we may ask the following, as a way of varying all possible attributes of an experience:
1. Would it still be a table if it has no legs?
2. Would it still be a table if it has no flat surface?
3. Would it still be a table if it is not made up of wood?
4. Would it still be a table if it is not rectangular in shape?
5. Would it still be a table if it is not used for dining or putting things on it?
Eventually, according to Husserl, this kind of explanation helps the inquirer reach or attain a special moment of intuition about her experience of the table. Thus, she may say: “A table is a four-legged furniture, made up of wood, has a flat surface, rectangular in shape, and is used primarily for dining or putting things on it.” This is what makes a table “a table.” Indeed, this is the nature of the phenomenon (table in this case) as it appears to us, that is, as we experienced it. According to some scholars, this is a kind of “Aha” moment in which the inquirer realizes the overall essential nature of the experience. This is exactly what is meant by the dictum: “back to the things themselves” as that which characterizes Husserl’s project. It must be noted, however, that Husserl’s famous dictum “back to the things themselves” meant “the things as we experienced them rather than take them for granted.”
Finally, some of the implications as a result of doing pure phenomenology is the realization that consciousness is intentional. For Husserl, consciousness is understood as fundamentally intentional. This means that consciousness as an act is always a consciousness “of” or “about” something. Thus, consciousness in Husserlian phenomenology is not directed toward itself, but toward phenomena in the world. It follows, therefore, that any form of thinking is based ultimately on “phenomena in the world.” For this reason, consciousness or thinking is just secondary to the lived experience of phenomena as they show themselves. This explains why for Husserl, the world of immediate or lived experience takes precedence over the objectified world of natural sciences.
In the phenomenological parlance, intentionality denotes two things. First, the intentionality of consciousness means that consciousness is always an act of doing something. Thus, consciousness is an activity. This is what is meant when Husserl said that to be conscious is to experience an act of knowing (noesis) in which the subject is aware of an object. And second, intentionality of consciousness means that consciousness is always referential, that is, consciousness is always pointing or referring to something. That is also what is meant when Husserl said that a conscious act is an act of awareness in which the subject is presented with an object (noema).
Let’s take, for example, the act of thinking about the definition of a table.
Thinking about the definition of a table involves actual thinking (noises). At the same time, it involves a referent, that is, a table (noema). At the end of it all, for Husserl, consciousness is not like a box that contains some perceptions. On the contrary, consciousness is an active ongoing referential process.
In these notes, I will briefly sketch the history of ancient Greek philosophy, which is divided into four parts, namely:
The Problem of the World (cosmology),
The Problem of Knowledge (epistemology),
The Problem of Freedom, and
The Problem of Religion
It must be noted, however, that I will only schematically trace the development of philosophy in these periods because the main concern here is just to know the origin of Western philosophy and its development. Thus, I will not discuss in great detail the specificity of each period of philosophy.
In the first part of these notes, I will focus on the problem of the world, which is the first problem that the ancient Greek philosophers attempted to address.
Part 1 The Problem of Cosmology: From Thales to Anaxagoras
The first problem of Greek philosophy was about cosmology, that is, the explanation of the nature of the world as it was experienced by the perceiving mind. Thus, the first question being posed was:
What is the basic material of which the world is formed?
This question was answered by the three most illustrious philosophers of Ionia, namely: Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.
Thales (c. 620 BCE – c. 546 BCE), the acclaimed first philosopher of the Western world, claimed that the basic stuff or material of which the world is formed is water. Thus, for Thales, “all is water” and that everything comes from and arises out of water. Again, as I already mentioned, I will not present the details of Thales’s (and other philosophers discussed here) philosophy because my concern here is simply to trace the historical development of philosophy. For a detailed discussion on the life and works of Thales, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/thales/.
Anaximander (c. 610 BCE – 546 BCE), who was known to be one of Thales’s students, was not convinced that water is the basic stuff of the world. For this philosopher, thebasic material upon which the world is formed cannot be determined. Anaximander calls this Apeiron, the Greek word for that which is “unbounded” or “indefinite” or “infinite”. For more on Anaximander’s life and works, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/anaximan/.
Anaximenes (d. 528 BCE), also known to be another student of Thales, disagreed with Anaximander and argued that the basic stuff of the world can be determined; yet it is not water, as Thales would have us believe. For Anaximenes, “all is air”, and that everything comes from and arises out of air. Anaximenes argued that the life of the universe resembled that of man, that air, the breadth of life which the human soul is made, is its principle. For more on Anaximenes’s life and works, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/.
As we can notice, the first question of philosophy deals with matter only, that is, again, the basic stuff of the world. It did not address the question concerning substance, that is, the principle upon which order or creation is based. Thus, the second question was posed:
In what consists its fundamental form, its principle of order?
This is where Pythagoras (c. 570 BCE – c. 495 BCE) came in. To be specific, this was the question that Pythagoras attempted to address and not simply the basic material upon which the world is formed. Again, this is what I meant when I said above that we need to know the intellectual history that surrounds a particular scholarship, that is, we need to know the historical development of philosophy so that we will know where to situate a particular philosopher in a specific context and time. In this way, we do not just lump philosophers together in discussing their philosophies in a specific historical period. To reiterate, all philosophers are addressing a specific problem or problems in a specific time and context.
For Pythagoras (and, of course, the Pythagoreans), the essential reality of things can be completely expressed in numerical terms. Thus, the formal order of the universe can be conceived mathematically. For Pythagoras, therefore, “all is number.” In other words, numbers are the principle of order (of the universe). Thus, for Pythagoras, everything can be explained in numbers. It is also important to note that the Ancient Egyptians also conceived numbers as the underlying principle of all things. For a detailed discussion on the life and works of Pythagoras, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/pythagor/.
Now, the combination of the first two questions in philosophy necessarily led to the third one:
How do things arise?
This question relates to world-process, that is, the origin of the world. This is a necessary question for the ancient Greek philosophers because when the principle and the real ground of all things are determined, the next question would be “How do things result
from their real ground and principle?”
This is precisely where Heraclitus and Parmenides entered in the scene. Heraclitus attempted to address this problem of world-process, while Parmenides (and the Eleatics, such as Xenophanes and Zeno) denied the idea of the world-process.
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 500 BCE) argued that Logos-Fire, that is, fire or perpetual change, is the universal principle. Logos-Fire, therefore, is the cause of order, proportion, harmony, and rationality in the continual flow of things. As is well known, Heraclitus said that everything is change, that “we cannot step twice in the same river”. Thus, for Heraclitus, the world arises out of the Logos-Fire.
Some scholars would say that for Heraclitus, the basic stuff or material of which the world is formed is fire. I argue that this is a mistake because Heraclitus’s concern was not to determine the basic stuff of the world, but to determine the principle that could explain the arising of things, that is, world-process.
However, for Heraclitus, we cannot exactly know the specificity of the arising of things. He simply claimed that the world-process or the arising of things is governed by the principle of Logos-Fire. For more on Heraclitus’s life and works, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/heraclit/.
Parmenides of Elea (Late 6th century – to Mid 5th century BCE), unlike Heraclitus who claimed that everything is change, that nothing is permanent, argued that change is impossible. For Parmenides, reality is one. He said that “what is, is and it is impossible for it not to be.” This is is existing fully and completely; and if it is full and complete, it is impossible for it to change. Thus, for Parmenides, this is is the real One, which remains forever and immovable. Finally, for Parmenides, therefore, the idea of world-process is an illusion for nothing can come out of that which is. For a detailed discussion on Parmenides’s life and works, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,http://www.iep.utm.edu/parmenid/.
Heraclitus and Parmenides’s thoughts on the issue of world-process did not satisfy the inquiring mind. Hence, Heraclitus’s answer to the problem of world-process and Parmenides’s reaction did not suffice. The problem of philosophy after them was still occupied with the world-process as nature. Thus, for the inquiring mind, this problem must be solved: the world-process and the origin and formation of all things must be explained once and for all.
This is the reason why Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxagoras came to the fore. They insisted that the problem of the world-process needed to be pushed further. The basic contention of Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxagoras is that there is something that lies at the foundation of world-process, which has not and cannot become; something, therefore, that is original and unchangeable.
Empedocles (c. 492 BCE – c. 432 BCE) attempted to explain the world-process and its derivation. For Empedocles, the world-process is derived from the combination of the four basic elements, namely: fire, water, earth, and air. Empedocles calls these four elements as the Fundamental Materials of the world. Thus, for Empedocles, the world- process and the formation of things resulted from the combination of these four
The Atomists, particularly Leucippus (5th century BCE) and Democritus (460-370 BCE), found that the four elements of Empedocles are changeable and divisible. Therefore, they cannot be the primary beings that lie at the foundation of world-process. Hence, Leucippus and Democritus argued that atoms, which are numberless, are the primary beings that lie at the foundation of the world-process. In fact, for these philosophers, mechanical motion in the world-process resulted from the weight of the combined atoms. For more on the life and works of Leucippus, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/leucippu/. For the life and works of Democritus, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/democrit/.
Finally, if mechanical motion results from the weight of the combined atoms, the question of Anaxagoras (c. 500 BCE – 428 BCE) was: what is the explanation of the form and order of things? Thus, Anaxagoras argued that there must be a primordial being that is responsible for the form and order of things. For Anaxagoras, this primordial being is Nous or Mind. According to Anaxagoras, this Nous is the law-giving motion, without which motion in the universe is impossible. This is likened to Hegel’s notion of “Reason” as the driving force of history.
Now, it is important to note that with Anaxagoras, the first period of Greek philosophy naturally closes. This period, which is usually called as the period of natural philosophy―because it addresses the problem of world-material, that of the world- order, and world-process―has so far thought of the problem of the world, and from its answers, Mind necessarily resulted.
Just a final note. As we can notice, the ancient Greek philosophers did not ask the question as to who created the world, as we normally do today. The notion of a Creator, at least in the history of philosophy, was picked up later by the Medieval thinkers, particularly St. Augustine, the acclaimed philosopher of the Medieval period. This is exactly what makes this intellectual endeavor truly philosophical: it used reason in explaining reality.
Part 2 The Problem of Knowledge: The Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle
In Part 1 of this series of discussions about the history of Greek philosophy, we learned that for Parmenides and the Eleatics, there is no world-process. Now, if there is no world-process, then this means that there is no “process” or any “change” that actually happens in reality. The implication of this argument in epistemology is that there is no mental process and, for this reason, knowledge is impossible to attain.
If there is nothing but process or change, and nothing whatsoever is permanent, as Heraclitus would have us believe, then neither subject nor object continues. Hence, there is neither a knowing subject nor a thing to be known. If this is the case, then the same conclusion can be arrived at, that knowledge is impossible to attain.
If there is nothing but mechanical process, nothing but the union and separation of the four basic elements, as Empedocles and the Atomists believed, then there is also no mental process, and so, knowledge is also impossible to attain.
And if a mental process depends upon a being (Nous or Mind) outside the world, as Anaxagoras maintains, then there is no natural process of knowledge. For this reason, human knowledge is impossible to attain.
The overall implication of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxagoras’s philosophy in epistemology is that knowledge cannot be attained. More importantly, if there is no knowledge, then this implies that there is no truth.
And if there is no truth, then nothing whatsoever is “in itself”, that is, there is nothing that exists as universally valid being or truth, neither in science nor in philosophy. At the end of it all, nothing remains but subjective opinion; nothing but the individual as the measure of all things. This is precisely the theme of the Sophists, particularly Gorgias and Protagoras.
As is well known, the Sophists in general were convinced that knowledge is impossible to attain. As Protagoras claims: “Man is the measure of all things, of the reality of those which are, and the unreality of those which are not.” Another famous line of Protagoras reads: “As to the gods, I cannot know whether they exist or not; too many obstacles are in the way, the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of life.” For more on the life and works of Protagoras, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/protagor/.
It is important to note that Sophism as a philosophical movement (philosophical movement because it’s not a branch nor a sub-branch of philosophy) is partly an expansion of the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxagoras, but in the realm of knowledge.
Now, with the contention of the Sophists that knowledge is impossible to attain, Socrates came into the fore, which gave way to Plato and, later, Aristotle. Needless to say, this is where Socrates, Plato and Aristotle entered the scene.
Socrates (469 BCE – 399 BCE), indeed, was the first to see the problem with Sophism. In fact, the primary question that preoccupied Socrates was nothing else than the genesis of knowledge, the passage of the mind from the stage of “not-knowing” into that of “knowing”, and the seeking of truth, with a factual refutation of the Sophists who declared that knowledge is impossible to attain.
One of the proofs why the Sophists believed that knowledge is impossible to attain is the continual contradiction of human opinions about anything. Thus, the Sophists believed that knowledge and truth are impossible to attain because people disagree on almost everything.
However, Socrates was convinced that “harmony” or “agreement” is inherent in any disagreement. Thus, Socrates believes that “harmony” or “agreement” can be produced out of the contradiction. This made Socrates conclude that truth and knowledge are possible, and that they can be found in intercourse with men, that is, in a dialogue with men. Thus, for Socrates, with dialogue, universal concepts―those in which all men agree―are made possible. For more on the life and works of Socrates, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/socrates/.
Plato (427 BCE – 347 BCE), as we know, was Socrates’s most brilliant student. Plato was a philosopher in his own right. However, Plato’s philosophy began with his attempt to write or record Socrates’s philosophy. As we know, Socrates never wrote his philosophy. Later, however, as he expands Socrates’s philosophy, Plato developed his own way of philosophizing and, eventually, his own philosophy.
Plato agreed with Socrates’s claim that universal concepts―those in which all men agree―are true concepts, which are the objects of knowledge. The strong proviso that Plato added is that everything that exists is just a copy of the real. Thus, the world of ideas (in contradistinction to the world of matter or the material world) is the only real world and, consequently, the only real knowledge. For sure, this is the step from Socrates to Plato.
Plato’s notion of the world of ideas and the world of matter laid down the notion of the dualism of matter and form. And this dualism implies the opposition of ideas and matter, that is, of the intelligible world and the material world. For more on Plato’s life and works, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/plato/.
But the question of the inquiring mind was: how does matter acquire form? In other words, how is the union of matter and form possible? This question gave way to the philosophy of Aristotle.
Aristotle (382 BCE – 322 BCE) got rid of Plato’s dualism. For Aristotle, form and matter are inseparable. This is because, according to Aristotle, we cannot think of anything without matter and form. Indeed, for Aristotle, something cannot exist if it does not have both matter and form, that is, if it is not complete. This is the reason why Aristotle argues that anything that exists is perfect, is complete, because it has matter and form. For example, a table cannot exist as a table in reality if it does not have a form of a table and matter of which it is made.
However, Aristotle argues that it is form that actualizes the potentialities of matter. This explains exactly Aristotle’s principle of act and potency. Furthermore, Aristotle introduces the idea of a Prime Matter. According to Aristotle, Prime Matter is the source of everything, and this Prime Matter has the possibility of becoming something. For more on Aristotle’s life and works, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/.
Lastly, but most importantly, it must be noted that with Aristotle, the classic period of Greek philosophy ends.
Part 3 The Problem of Freedom: Stoicism, Epicureanism, Skepticism
In Part 2 of this series of discussions about the history of the development of Greek philosophy, I have traced the development of Greek philosophy from the Sophists to Aristotle, with emphasis on the problem of knowledge. In this post, I will present the development of Greek philosophy, particularly ancient Greek philosophy, from the Stoics to the Skeptics, with emphasis on the problem of freedom.
To reiterate, the classic period of ancient Greek philosophy ends with Aristotle. Now, after Aristotle, philosophy took a different direction. Here, the problem of philosophy was no longer on cosmology, that is, the problem of the world-stuff, world-order, and world-process, but on the person’s freedom from the world. This desire for freedom from the world, which came after Aristotle, was viewed as the restoration of the divine perfection of the human person―an inner perfection which approximate divinity. It is important to note that the human person was conceived in antiquity as an entity that can approximate divinity. It is also important to note that the background here is that the world is full of evil, of debaucheries, of wickedness, which had corrupted the human soul―thus, the need to free oneself from the world.
Those who attempted to free the human person from the world, at least in the context of ancient Greek philosophy, were represented by the Stoics, Epicureans, and the Skeptics. Let me briefly sketch the key concepts in Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism.
According to The Basics of Philosophy, “Stoicism is an ancient Greek philosophy (developed by Zeno of Citium around 300 B.C. as a refinement of Cynicism) which teaches the development of self-control and fortitude as a means of overcoming destructive emotions. It does not seek to extinguish emotions completely, but rather seeks to transform them by a resolute Asceticism (a voluntary abstinence from worldly pleasures), which enables a person to develop clear judgment, inner calm and freedom from suffering (which it considers the ultimate goal).” See The Basics of Philosophy, http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_stoicism.html.
Thus, according to the virtue of the Stoics, to free oneself from the world, one must cease to desire, to suffer, to struggle, i.e., to strive for the solution of the problems of the world. In a sense, one must put herself in a condition in which there is nothing worthy of desire, in which the will is affected and influenced by nothing. For more on nature, meaning and dynamics of Stoicism, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/stoicism/#H1.
On the other hand, Epicurus (341 BCE – 271 BCE) suggests that in order for one to protect herself against the world, one must lead a life that is free from suffering. One way of doing this is not to ask too much from nature. In this way, one suffers a little and enjoy as much as possible.
However, it is a mistake to equate Epicureanism with hedonism. As we know, hedonism is the pursuit of pleasure, sensual pleasure so to speak. Thus, the famous hedonist motto: eat now, drink now, be merry for tomorrow you will die. On the contrary, Epicureanism urges one to seek modest pleasure in order to attain the greatest good, which is the attainment of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia), as well as the absence of bodily pain (aponia). For more on Epicurus and Epicureanism, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/epicur/.
Lastly, we have the doubt of the ancient Greek Skeptics. Ancient Greek Skepticism “is generally applied either to a member of Plato’s Academy during its skeptical period (c. 273 B.C.E to 1st century B.C.E.) or to a follower of Pyrrho (c. 365 to 270 B.C.E.).
Pyrrhonian skepticism flourished from Aenesidemus’ revival (1st century B.C.E.) to Sextus Empiricus, who lived sometime in the 2nd or 3rd centuries C.E. Thus the two main varieties of ancient skepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian.” See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/skepanci/.
It is known that almost every form of ancient Greek skepticism has something to do with the claim that humans have the inability to gain knowledge of the world, and so the need to suspend judgment. In the case of Pyrrho, who was overwhelmed by his inability to determine rationally which competing schools of thoughts during his time was correct, doubt then is the key to attaining peace of mind (ataraxia). In fact, after admitting to himself that indeed he could not attain absolute truth, Pyrrho gained peace of mind. For more on the life and works of the Skeptic Pyrrho, see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/pyrrho/.
Thus, doubt for the Skeptics is the key to freeing oneself from the wicked world. In fact, the Skeptics claim that in order for one to get rid of the “unrest of mind”, one must cease to strive, and must give up the solution of the problems of the world, being convinced that these problems cannot be solved.
To reiterate, the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics have one common goal: freedom from the world. The Stoics seek to become free from the world through “virtue”, the Epicureans through “happiness”, and the Skeptics through “doubt”.
Part 4 The Problem of Religion: Plotinus to Jesus Christ
In Part 3 of this series of discussions about the history of ancient Greek philosophy, I have presented the development of Greek philosophy from the Stoics to the Skeptics, with emphasis on the problem of freedom. In this concluding part, I will discuss briefly the last problem of ancient Greek philosophy, namely: the problem of religion.
As we have seen, the means of the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Skeptics in attaining freedom from the world seemed to have failed. It is for this reason that the problem of the world, that is, the evil it contains, requires a deeper solution: religion.
It is important to note, therefore, that after the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Skeptics, the desire for freedom from the world took another direction, and this is now religious in nature. It is now viewed as the desire for salvation. Grecian philosophy soon met with Christianity, which broke through the limits of Judaism. For this reason, the desire for freedom now seeks union with God. Here, God must be conceived in such a way that the human person can say that if she were with Him, she would be happy―that in God’s presence, there is nothing that disturbs and oppresses. For this reason, it is only through God that salvation is possible.
The idea of salvation in late ancient Greek philosophy was introduced by the Ascetics, the Neo-Platonists, and Jewish Philosophy.
The Ascetics, such as the monks, want to attain divine illumination through a continued renunciation of the world and control of their natural desires, even to the extremist abstinence. Thus, the Ascetics normally withdraw from the world and voluntarily renounced worldly pleasures in the pursuit of spiritual goals. According to The Basics on Philosophy, http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_asceticism.html, “The justification behind Asceticism is usually that spiritual and religious goals are impeded by indulgence in pleasures of the flesh, although it does not necessarily hold that the enjoyment of life is bad in itself. Thus, ascetic practices are not usually regarded as virtuous as such, but merely a means towards a mind-body transformation, or a purification of the body which enables connection with the Divine and the cultivation of inner peace. It aims to achieve freedom from compulsions and temptations, bringing about peacefulness of mind and an increase in clarity and power of thought.”
The Neo-Platonists, such as Ammonius Saccas (175 CE – 242 CE) and Plotinus (204 CE – 270 CE) believed that the doctrine of the order of the world can be conceived as thoughts of God. For one, Plotinus believes that the rational soul participates in the divine eternal world; thus, the rational soul directly originates from the divine essence. Plotinus believes that the rational soul is in constant communion with the One, and for this reason, the rational soul continually receives from the One. Thus, for Plotinus, salvation is possible only if the rational soul is connected to the One (or God). For more on the life and works of Plotinus, see “Plotinus,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plotinus/.
Jewish philosophy
Jewish philosophy has a spiritual kinship with Neo-Platonism. This is because its chief problem was the salvation of the world. The fundamental thought in which its solution is sought is that of a world-saving principle, that is, the Logos. The Logos, which was regarded by the ancient Greek philosophers as the principle of world-order, is now viewed as the Mediator between God and the human person. Indeed, the Logos was viewed by the Jewish thinkers as the creative word of God.
Indeed, when Jewish philosophy met Grecian philosophy, the idea of the Logos of the latter, which was understood as the principle of world-order, was now understood by the Jews as Messiah. Thus, the Logos-Messiah becomes the Mediator and Savior of the world.
Now, the problem of salvation demands a personal solution. This solution is possible only if a man appears who can actually overcome the world in himself, and who is truly free from the world. This man should then be the Savior of the world. Thus, the Logos has to become a flesh, that is, God the Savior has to become a man. And only though faith in this man can the person’s desire for salvation be satisfied. Thus, Jesus Christ has come into the fore. Indeed, it is precisely in this late period of Greek philosophy that Jesus Christ emerged.
What comes after this late stage of Greek philosophy was the development of philosophy in the Medieval period. But I will not discuss this part because this is no longer our main concern here. It is enough that we now know the origin and development of Western philosophy, particularly Greek philosophy.
